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Abstract  
This thesis focuses on the portrayal and implications of ‘literary 
psychosis’ as represented in selected writing by experimental writer 
Kathy Acker. I argue that Acker’s contextual, textual, and experiential 
representations offer a version of psychosis that is meaningful and 
‘understandable’, subsequently offering clinical insights that prompt 
rethinking of contemporary clinical and critical views. In this thesis, I 
demonstrate how reading psychosis in Acker’s work can lead to new 
ways of learning about and working with people which support the need 
for new ways of acknowledging and understanding psychosis, ways that 
a dominant biomedical perspective on mental health does not always 
sufficiently recognise. Acker, in my reading, shows the need for close 
attention to the context of experience, to how it is formally narrated, and 
to the phenomenology of experiences that might be aligned with 
psychosis. Acker’s writing details both the context and content of strange 
and unusual mental experiences and challenging emotions, while often 
simultaneously structurally mirroring the form of psychosis. Acker’s 
version of psychosis is not, however, aligned with a strictly nosological 
or disease-centric context. I argue that the uniqueness of each textual 
construction highlights the uniqueness of human experience, which is 
concomitantly denied through homogenising diagnostic frameworks and 
related treatment approaches that dominate contemporary psychiatric 
practice. Acker's fiction is widely recognised as being challenging, even 
alienating, for the reader through her destruction of linear narrative and 
coherent textual form, twisting of narrative time and place, and thematic 
concerns which emerge as sometimes violent, explicit and boundary 
7 
 
dismantling. I argue that Acker's fiction requires new reading and 
understanding skills. In this thesis I draw parallels between these novel 
interpretative, comprehensive and responsive skills and the development 
of narrative competencies in clinical education and practice, which 
function to better support and work with people experiencing what might 
be formulated as ‘psychosis’.  
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‘Psychosis’ in the work of Kathy Acker: An Introduction  
The only reaction against an unbearable society is equally 
unbearable nonsense.1  
 
This thesis focuses on the portrayal and implications of ‘psychosis’ as 
represented in writing by experimental author Kathy Acker (b. 1947 – d. 
1997).2 I argue that Acker’s contextual, textual, and experiential 
representations offer a version of psychosis that is meaningful and 
‘understandable’, subsequently offering clinical insights that prompt 
rethinking of contemporary clinical and critical views. I argue that 
reading psychosis in Acker’s work might inform clinical practice and 
pedagogy to better support people experiencing challenges to their 
mental health that involve unusual experiences, perceptions, cognitions, 
beliefs and emotions. These insights lead to new ways of viewing and 
understanding psychosis, ways that a dominant biomedical perspective 
on mental health does not always sufficiently recognise. Acker’s version 
of psychosis is not, however, aligned with a strictly nosological or 
disease-centric context.3 I argue that the uniqueness of each textual 
construction highlights the uniqueness of human experience, which is 
                                                
1 Kathy Acker, ‘Realism for the Cause of Future Revolution’, in Bodies of Work, by 
Kathy Acker (London: Serpents Tail, 1997), pp. 14-26, (p. 18).  
2 Throughout this thesis I use psychosis as a broad umbrella term for the range of 
classified disorders including ‘schizophrenia’, ‘drug-induced psychosis’, ‘psychotic 
depression’, ‘schizoaffective disorder’ and so forth. Here I follow the line of thought 
promoted by the recent campaign to abolish the ‘schizophrenia’ label, and work from a 
range of service users who might prefer the imperfect but preferable ‘psychosis’ to the 
stigmatising and non-scientific ‘schizophrenia’. See Paul Hammersley and Terence 
McLaughlin, ‘Campaign for the Abolition of Schizophrenia Label’ Asylum, [n. d.] 
<http://www.asylumonline.net/resources/campaign-for-the-abolition-of-schizophrenia-
label/>[Accessed 11th November 2013].  
3 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) and ICD-10 
Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders (ICD-10) are the two diagnostic 
manuals used in contemporary psychiatry, with the DSM predominantly used in the 
USA and the ICD-10 more commonly used in the UK and Europe. See American 
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edn 
(Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2013); World Health 
Organisation, The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: Clinical 
descriptions and diagnostic guidelines (Geneva: World Health Organisation, 1994).  
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concomitantly denied through homogenising diagnostic frameworks and 
related treatment approaches that dominate contemporary psychiatric 
practice.  
In Karl Jaspers’ terms, Acker’s work may at first glance appear 
to model the “ununderstandability” of the broad range of experiences 
clustered under the ‘psychoses’ (as opposed to different ‘neuroses’ which 
he suggested were ‘understandable’).4 Her writing is widely recognised 
as being challenging, even alienating, for the reader through her 
destruction of linear narrative and coherent textual form, twisting of 
narrative time and place, and thematic concerns which emerge as 
sometimes violent, explicit and boundary dismantling. In this way, I 
argue that reading the ‘literary psychosis’ in Acker's writing might 
prompt the development of new reading and understanding skills. My 
aim is to draw parallels between these novel interpretative, 
comprehensive and responsive skills and the development of narrative 
competencies in clinical education and practice that can be used to better 
support and work with people experiencing what might be formulated as 
‘psychosis’. 
This thesis crosses the disciplinary boundaries of literary 
scholarship (in the academic subgenre of work focusing on madness in 
literature) and psychiatric education, practice and theorisation. The 
established tradition of madness as a trope in literature provides a starting 
point in my reading of what I term ‘literary psychosis’ in Acker’s 
writing. I simultaneously draw on medical frameworks of contemporary 
                                                
4 Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology, 2 vols (1959) trans. by J. Hoenig, and M. W. 
Hamilton. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997). I am aware that the term 
“ununderstandable” might better replaced with “incomprehensible”, however 
ununderstandability was used by Jaspers hence it is referred to as such throughout.  
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psychiatric practice and policy and critical and postpsychiatry.5 In this 
respect the thesis is inherently interdisciplinary and best situated within 
the medical humanities and the emergent discipline of health humanities, 
offering scholarship that crosses boundaries of literary interpretation, 
clinical practice and education, and philosophies of madness more 
widely.6 The various issues intrinsic to interdisciplinarity were at times 
challenging to navigate in developing the arguments expressed in this 
work; literary writing and clinical formulation are sometimes uneasy 
bedfellows, and throughout the work I reflect on the challenge of 
avoiding an uncritical application of a medical frame onto a literary 
work. Nonetheless, the work offers value to literary scholarship and both 
the medical and the health humanities. Acker’s literary performance of 
psychosis through text (thematically and structurally) offers 
developments in the way that psychosis is considered and approached 
clinically. In this respect, this work offers a new approach to Acker’s 
work alongside the utilisation of such a reading to rethink clinical and 
critical psychiatric theorisation and practice.  
This thesis is structured into this introductory section and five 
subsequent chapters. In this opening section, I introduce Acker’s work 
and her interest in psychosis alongside considering, briefly, her critical 
reception, to show her literary relevance and significance. In Chapter 1, I 
                                                
5 See Patrick Bracken and Philip Thomas, Postpsychiatry: Mental Health in a 
Postmodern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); see also Craig Newnes, 
Guy Holmes and Cailzie Dunn, eds., This Is Madness: A Critical Look at Psychiatry 
and the Future of Mental Health Services (Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books, 1999); Craig 
Newnes, Guy Holmes and Cailzie Dunn, eds., This is Madness Too: Critical 
Perspectives on Mental Health Services (Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books, 2001).  
6 See Paul Crawford, Brian Brown, Charley Baker, Victoria Tischler and Brian Abrams, 
Health Humanities (Basingstoke: Palgrave: 2015) for the first book-length study of 
what Health Humanities is, aims and ethos, and how it might function across different 
humanities and clinical sectors.  
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provide a brief overview of psychosis as it has come to be understood 
through clinical and critical psychiatric discourses, to provide a clinical 
background to this work. I also explore broad critiques around how 
‘psychosis’ is formulated and managed, to which I argue my reading of 
Acker offers new understandings. Chapter 1 finally discusses existing 
scholarship that focuses on madness in literature in order to show this 
work as a critical analysis of Acker’s writing and the interdisciplinary 
space where such analysis is situated. In Chapter 2, I argue that attention 
needs to be refocused in psychiatric care for women on the female socio-
political context of mental health and illness, through readings on 
elements of gender, sex and psychosis in Acker’s fictions. Here I use 
work around the gendered nature of psychiatric epidemiology and 
feminist criticism of psychiatric practice to examine the synergism and 
divergence of Acker from these existing critical perspectives on the way 
female madness is constructed and managed. In this respect, I argue 
Acker demonstrates that women’s ‘unreasonable’ responses and 
reactions may be entirely ‘reasonable’.  
Chapter 3 reconstructs Acker’s destructed literary expression, 
arguing that her fragmented narratives, use of repetition and inaccessible 
languages are in different ways analogous to psychosis – the form of 
psychotic expression and cognition is demonstrated through the textual 
construction itself. In some writing, particularly her earlier fragments, 
Acker can be seen writing psychosis. Close reading and interpretation of 
the expressions of psychosis is necessary for understanding that which is 
expressed in a seemingly unusual, confused or unfamiliar manner. This 
reading of Acker’s texts argues that she offers both a vision of the 
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interior of psychosis and the opportunity to develop novel reading skills, 
which might aid in supporting people expressing and cohering their inner 
worlds during psychosis. While Chapter 3 explores the form of psychosis 
in Acker’s work, in Chapter 4 I explore the experience, or content, of 
psychosis in Acker’s fractured texts, a “de-narrative” presentation that is 
often referred to (by Acker, her critics and scholars who provide 
commentary on Acker) as “schizophrenic”.7 I argue that a closer focus on 
content of experience (rather than the ‘form’ of symptoms) can 
potentially restructure the incomprehensible, ‘ununderstandable’ or 
alienating elements of psychosis.8 The elements I draw upon in Acker’s 
writing in this chapter are not ‘symptoms’, but the content of experience 
and how it relates to individual characters sense of certainty and to their 
(in)ability to construct themselves and their experiences in coherent 
ways. Finally, in Chapter 5, I draw these elements together to 
demonstrate how my reading of Acker might provide insights into 
clinical practice with people experiencing ‘psychosis’ with particular 
reference to: the medical and health humanities; working in a narrative 
way with individuals; using literature in clinical education; and 
innovations in theoretical and care approaches that might be 
complemented by the clinical implications of Acker’s work. 
The structure of this thesis aims to demonstrate the way that 
concern with ‘psychosis’ in Acker’s work is, in my reading, evident 
through three interrelated strands. Firstly, concern with contextual issues 
                                                
7 Larry McCaffrey, ‘The Path of Abjection: An Interview with Kathy Acker’, in Some 
Other Frequency: Interviews with Innovative American Authors, ed. by Larry 
McCaffrey (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), pp. 14-35, (p. 14).  
8 Darian Leader’s recent book What is Madness? (London: Penguin, 2011) provides a 
solid overview of the importance of understanding the content, impact, personal 
importance and effects of madness on individual’s sense of selfhood.  
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of gender, sex and sexual trauma as contributing to the development of 
psychosis is evident. Secondly, the fragmentary, non-linear and 
disordered stylistics of Acker’s texts can be read as a being textually 
analogous with the experience and expression of psychosis. In this way, I 
argue, Acker writes psychosis at the level of form. Finally, Acker’s 
version of the individual’s experience of subjective fragmentation, 
temporal dislocation, paranoia and control can offer an interpretation that 
resists the psychiatric practice of descriptive psychopathology and 
symptomatological categorisation. These three areas can be 
conceptualised as context/cause, form/expression and content/effect – 
gender experience and sexuality as one of the causes of madness, 
psychosis as replicated through Acker’s textual style as the expression of 
madness, and Acker’s characters sense of fracturing and fragmentation as 
demonstrating the difficulty of cohering secure and autonomous 
subjectivity within intrapersonal and external circumstances fraught with 
challenge. Acker, I argue, creates the “psychotic realities” that she saw in 
Burroughs’ work on a socio-political, textual and individual level.9 
However, the psychosis that is enacted within and through her texts is 
radically different from that nosologically defined within clinical 
literature. It is instead a literary performance of psychosis, radical in 
structure (as explored in Chapter 3) and content (as discussed in Chapter 
4). This ‘literary psychosis’, then, is both read through and offers 
advancements to contemporary critical evaluations of the biomedical 
approaches to psychosis. The ways in which Acker’s writing enacts 
psychosis on textual, contextual and content levels might encourage the 
                                                
9 Kathy Acker, ‘William Burroughs’s Realism’, in Bodies of Work, pp. 1-3, (p. 2).  
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clinical reader to read differently, to think differently, to respond 
differently.   
Each area explored in this thesis coalesces into the final 
clinically informed and clinically minded innovations, examining 
different ways in which ‘psychosis’ might be approached in a genuinely 
person and individual centred way. Acker’s vision of psychosis is one 
that is inextricable from critical perspectives on sex and gender 
essentialism, gender inequality, oppression, sexual identity, sexual 
experience and desire, and sexual trauma. Acker offers a creative telling 
of feminist theories of women’s madness. Her early narratives 
demonstrate the causal and reasonable development of madness in 
women – in this way, her narratives offer clinical insights into both 
trauma and gendered experience which offer ways forward in working 
with women’s ‘madness’. There is a visceral quality to Acker’s writing – 
seen most explicitly in her interweaving of the bodily and the mental 
through the corresponding experiences of sex, particularly orgasm, and 
psychosis. In Acker, female existence is fraught with challenge, not least 
from the forming of an authentic sexual identity, the threat of rape and 
sexual assault (both of which occur frequently in her work), the impact of 
orgasm on notions of presence, selfhood and coherence of language, and 
the instability of a gendered identity. Her fictional landscapes, 
appropriations, dystopias and fragmented texts are replete with characters 
that are dispossessed, abused and subjugated, both male and female. 
Abhor, in Empire of the Senseless, for example, considers women’s 
‘choices’ in the most stark terms – “I quickly chose a raped body over a 
mutilated or dead one […] I didn’t know what to do about the useless 
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and, more than useless, virulent and destructive disease named 
heterosexual sexual love. I’ve never known”.10 The dilemmas of sexual 
desire versus sexual trauma and connection versus isolation are 
experienced by many of Acker’s characters, producing a double bind 
effect that induces cognitive dissonances of desire and repulsion, arousal 
and fear. It is her re-telling of female madness that most acutely re-
positions women’s madness in a creative and sometimes synergistic 
manner to some of the feminist discourses on female madness that 
emerged during her most radical earlier writing period. Chapter 2 
illuminates four areas that contribute to Acker’s overall creative retelling 
of the context of women’s madness: her subversion of essentialist and 
patriarchally constructed expectations of women; her portrayal of the 
effects of cognitive dissonance caused by romantic and sexual 
relationships; the way in which sexual desire and sex acts are 
multidimensional in Ackers work with the experience of orgasm 
analogous to a ‘psychotic’ dissociation from the real; and her 
transgressive depictions of sexual violence. 
Acker’s experimental texts exude strangeness – they are non-
linear, fragmentary, littered with fractures, ruptures, diversions and 
tangents, which interrupt the traditional literary flow and form that 
readers may expect. I argue in Chapter 3 that a reading of the texts 
themselves may be analogous to an experience of psychosis. This occurs 
in two ways: firstly, through structurally mirroring forms of the 
expression of psychosis, her texts offer an insight into the experience of 
psychosis through the reading process; secondly, they may prompt the 
                                                
10 Kathy Acker, Empire of the Senseless (London: Picador, 1988), p. 64. Further 
references to this novel are given in the text as (ES, p.).  
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development of novel interpretative and reading skills that subsequently 
are useful in clinical practice. This extract from Acker’s first novel Rip 
Off Red, Girl Detective exemplifies the thematic concerns Acker returned 
to time and again but, more importantly, the style of narrative that is 
common to Acker’s early works, which shows the kind of fragmentation 
and tangentalism inherent in Acker’s characters first person narrative:  
In my head I’m always talking to someone (I have few real 
people to talk to) and when I forget, the two voices go on in 
my head, I sometimes think one or both of the voices are 
outside my head, I decide I’m insane. 
The dreams and fantasies and desires these events show are 
growing: 
 
I dream I set out from Sligo, green on green on green, I walk 
slowly I can’t tell if I’m in dream or reality, the thoughts 
move past me as does the silk outside my eyes, the trees 
streams are an endless black-and-white silk screen. [...] 
I’m not explaining why I feel so strongly, why I hate and 
love, and finally, despite all childhood reasons, I don’t 
know.11 
 
Segments such as this offer a view into the interior of fragmentation 
while simultaneously challenging the reading process through form. It is 
in many respects extremely difficult to describe Acker's work in terms of 
storyline or charactorial development as her early work, in particular, 
often consists of fragments that are only loosely interlinked. Hence, the 
majority of this thesis focuses on Acker’s narrative fragments, rather than 
the narrative arc or novel as a whole. My focus here on Acker’s lack of 
linear flow offers a further clinically focused insight however – Acker 
demonstrates how vital the fragment is to understanding the whole. A 
parallel could be drawn, too, between the way a clinician sees only a 
fragment of a person, rather than the ‘whole’ that might take time to 
                                                
11 Kathy Acker, Rip Off Red, Girl Detective and The Burning Bombing Of America 
(1973 / 1972) (New York: Grove Press, 2002). This quote from Rip Off Red, Girl 
Detective, p. 68-69.  
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consider, but which also may never fully emerge given the boundaries of 
the therapeutic relationship. When read with our pre-learnt interpretative 
skills, textual fragments may lead to incoherence, to what Jaspers 
referred to as the ununderstandability that defines psychosis as opposed 
to neurosis.  
However, I argue in Chapter 3 that a parallel can be drawn 
between the act of reading works like Acker’s – where I cohere 
fragments to consider more widely the overarching effect of the 
fragments – and the experience of encountering psychosis. Both are 
potentially unfamiliar, strange, aliening even to our concept of what is 
real/unreal or true/false. Both might represent a challenge to our pre-
existing understanding of literature and of the world as we experience 
and understand it. Both demand the acquisition of novel comprehensive, 
responsive and interpretative skills. Acker is a deeply disruptive writer in 
this way. She not only disrupts the expectations and certainties of her 
reader, as Jeffrey Ebbesen has suggested, but also disorientates them by 
creating texts that I see as textually analogous to psychosis.12 The effect 
on the reader of narratives like Acker’s has been partially theorised by 
Evelyn Keitel, whose work provides a theoretical background to Chapter 
3.13 This section, then, explores Acker’s form, concentrating on her use 
of narrative fragment and fragmentation, repetition, and inaccessible 
language, with the overarching view that these elements contribute to her 
textual creation of psychosis at the level of form.  
                                                
12 Jeffrey Ebbesen, Postmodernism and Its Others: The Fiction of Ishmael Reed, Kathy 
Acker, and Don DeLillo (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).  
13 Evelyn Keitel, Reading Psychosis: Readers, Texts and Psychoanalysis (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989).  
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Reality for Acker’s characters is uncertain, precarious – their 
quest for a secure self (particularly in more well developed characters 
such as Abhor in Empire of the Senseless) often involves the concomitant 
acceptance of the paradoxical notion of the uncertainty of reality and the 
human desire for certainty. This acceptance, for Acker, defines the 
“history of the century” which “can be seen as defined by the struggle 
between a model of or desire for an absolute reality and a model or 
recognition of reality as indeterminate”.14 Here Acker effectively 
summarises one psychological conflict inherent in much theorising on 
late twentieth century life – there are limited certainties, and the quest for 
certainty is fraught with paradox. Acker’s characters are often presented 
as self-fragmented, uncertain, insecure, paranoid, experiencing an 
uncertainty about interpretation and continuity of personal past, present 
and future. First person narration sometimes involves multiple voices 
speaking as “I”, a kind of literary babbling and multiplicity of identities. 
Acker discusses her interest in notions of identity and ‘schizophrenia’ 
several times in interviews. With Ellen G. Friedman, she states, “I came 
to plagiarism from a different point of view, from exploring 
schizophrenia and identity”.15 Similarly, with Sylvère Lotringer, she 
states, “I became very interested in the model of schizophrenia. I wanted 
to explore the use of the word I […] The idea that you don’t need to have 
a central identity, that a split identity was a more viable way in the 
                                                
14 Kathy Acker, ‘A Young Girl’, in High Risk: An Anthology of Forbidden Writings, ed. 
by Amy Scholder and Ira Silverberg (London: Serpent’s Tail, 1991), pp. 123-149. (p. 
141).  
15 Ellen G. Friedman, ‘A Conversation with Kathy Acker’, A Review of Contemporary 
Fiction, 9. 3 (1989) 
<http://www.centerforbookculture.org/interviews/interview_acker.html> [accessed 9th 
June 2005] (para. 8 of 115).  
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world”.16 She was also clear that the radical disjunction that exists in the 
contemporary world between the individual’s view of reality and the 
external world is “insanity” in itself, writing: “Pretend that there is a 
distinct entity named self and a different entirety named world or other. 
Define insanity as the situation between the self’s version of the world 
and the world. According to this definition, American culture is now 
insane”.17 Furthermore, the expression of this personally experienced and 
culturally demonstrated “insanity” cannot be adequately demonstrated, 
for Acker, through “[w]ell-measured language, novels which structurally 
depend on Aristotelian continuities, on any formal continuities”.18 She 
argued that coherent novels “cannot describe, much less criticise, this 
culture”.19 Chapter 4 then explores this disjunction and subsequent 
experience of psychosis through Acker’s intrasubjective portrayal. In 
particular, I focus here on the relationship between narrative ‘I’ and 
coherency of identity for the reader; issues of authorial truth through the 
blurring of autobiography and fiction; the importance of considering 
temporality in the development of a linear and secure sense of self; and 
the experiences of paranoia and control experienced by Acker’s 
characters; finally drawing on critical perspectives on the form / content 
divide in psychiatry to situate this exploration of the content of psychosis 
within clinical perspectives.  
This final drawing together of the form / content divide in 
psychiatry leads to Chapter 5, where I draw together the ways in which 
                                                
16 Sylvère Lotringer, ‘Devoured, by Myths: An Interview with Sylvère Lotringer’, in 
Hannibal Lecter, My Father, by Kathy Acker. (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), pp. 1-
24. (p. 7) 
17 Acker, ‘William Burroughs’s Realism’, p. 2.  
18 ibid. p. 2.  
19 ibid. p. 2.  
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Acker’s rewriting of elements of experiences that might be aligned with 
psychosis offers clinical implications. In the conclusion to this thesis I 
suggest that Acker’s work, as an exemplar of a particular type of fiction, 
can provide insights that might be useful both in clinical practice and 
pedagogy when thinking about ways of working with people 
experiencing unusual or ‘ununderstandable’ mental states. In particular I 
consider here how re-framing of ‘psychosis’ is occurring in clinical 
innovations both theoretically, such as in postpsychiatry, and practically, 
such as with Open Dialogue models of intervention – and how my 
reading of Acker’s writing offers complementing and novel ways 
forward.  
I have previously argued, with reference to Acker and others, 
that collectively many of the “key themes that emerge from descriptions 
of ‘what postmodernity is’ are ones that are simultaneously allied and 
aligned with madness: fragmentation, chaos, loss of coherency, 
randomness, fear, and the loss of certainty”.20 It seems, therefore, natural 
that writers who are concerned with postmodern existence, postmodern 
expression and postmodern art will also potentially be concerned with 
forms of madness, alienation, anxiety, insecurity and a hyper-acute sense 
of selfhood – or lack of coherent self. I have argued elsewhere that 
postmodern fiction is the first medium to explicitly create a dialogue 
from within psychotic narrative discourse rather than being fiction about 
psychosis.21 The formal structure of postmodern fiction speaks both 
                                                
20 Charley Baker, Paul Crawford, B. J. Brown, Maurice Lipsedge and Ronald Carter, 
Madness in Post-1945 British and American Fiction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), p. 
161.  
21 Baker and others, Madness in Post-1945 British and American Fiction – see 
especially Chapter 6 “Postmodern Madness”, which was written exclusively by myself 
and developed through elements of this thesis.  
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through and with psychosis – in the sense that the texts can appear 
radically fragmented, travelling spatial, temporal and psychological 
boundaries at will, prompting challenges for the reader to situate text 
within an external reality or to fix depicted events, thoughts or feelings in 
context. In this thesis, however, rather than focusing on whether or not 
Acker’s writing offers a literary performance of a postmodern type of 
‘psychosis’, I focus instead on the ways in which Acker’s literary 
innovations offer clinical insights. 
Indeed, a range of experimental authors, who may be termed 
‘postmodern’ in different ways, but who all encompass a type of literary 
experimentalism that is of note to my argument here, could have been 
chosen for this thesis to demonstrate my core argument that a certain type 
of innovative writing might offer insights into psychosis that we can 
employ in clinical settings to offer a more humane and ethically-minded 
psychiatry than currently on offer.22 Acker offers an exemplar of my 
argument, rather than being the sole writer who I could have used. 
William S. Burroughs’ cut-up/fold-in technique, for instance, can be read 
as providing a literary analogue of psychosis like that which I suggest 
Acker does in Chapter 3.23 Burroughs had a significant influence over 
Acker’s themes and style; she refers to him as writing “psychotic 
realities”, where he was “able to portray futures which are now our 
present”.24 This influence is noted in more detail in Chapter 3. Similarly, 
Thomas Pynchon’s iconic Oedipa Maas in The Crying of Lot 49 provides 
                                                
22 I explore the criticisms of contemporary psychiatry in detail in Chapter 1.  
23 See, for example, William S. Burroughs, Naked Lunch (1959) (London: Flamingo, 
1993), William S. Burroughs, Nova Express (1964) (New York: Grove Press, 1992), 
William S. Burroughs, The Soft Machine (1961) (London: Flamingo, 2001) and William 
S. Burroughs, The Ticket That Exploded (1962) (London: Flamingo, 2001).  
24 Acker, ‘William Burroughs’s Realism’, p. 2.  
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a literary exemplar of paranoia and the effect of uncertainty on self and 
behaviour, as I explore in Chapter 4.25 In a similar way, Paul Auster’s 
The New York Trilogy demonstrates amply the diminishment of the self 
in psychosis to the point of what ‘anti’-psychiatrist R. D. Laing may have 
conceptualised as extreme ontological insecurity.26 I chose to focus on 
Acker as, through the three elements I am concerned with, her earlier 
work and transitional novel Empire of the Senseless seems to best 
exemplify what I refer to as Acker’s literary psychosis. The 
heterogeneous fictions and fragments of Acker’s written work are 
inherently fragments of incoherency, dissolution, discontinuity and 
irresolution. They narrate the context, form and content of psychoses, 
and as such her writing best articulates what I believe innovative fiction 
can offer clinical practice.  
There has been no exploration of Acker from a medical or health 
humanities disciplinary perspective, beyond work published as a result of 
this thesis, specifically how analysis of her work may provide clinically 
useful insights.27 In this thesis, I focus on Acker’s thematic, textual and 
                                                
25 Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49 (1965) (London: Vintage, 2000). See also 
Will Slocombe and Charley Baker, ‘Seeing things…Differently, or Hallucinating the 
Postmodern’ Studies in Literary Imagination – Special Edition – ‘Representing States 
of Mind’ (In Press) for an analysis of the issue of ‘postmodern hallucination’ in 
Pynchon’s work.  
26 Paul Auster, The New York Trilogy (1987) (London: Faber and Faber, 1992). See also 
R. D. Laing’s classic text The Divided Self (1960) (London: Penguin, 1990).  
27 However, see Carolyn Zaikowski, ‘Reading Traumatized Bodies of Text: Kathy 
Acker’s Blood and Guts in High School and Sarah Saterstrom’s The Pink Institution’, 
Nebula, 7. 1/7. 2 (2010), 199-219 – for a reading of Acker’s Blood and Guts in High 
School using Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as an interpretative framework.  
For critical views on ‘madness’ in Acker’s Don Quixote, a novel I am not exploring in 
this thesis as my focus is instead on Acker’s shorter early texts and fragments and her 
transitional novel Empire of the Senseless, see Annette Schlichter, ‘Critical Madness, 
Enunciative Excess: The Figure of the Madwoman in Postmodern Feminist Texts’, 
Cultural Studies↔ Critical Methodologies, 3. 3 (2003), 308-329; Cristina Garrigós, 
‘Kathy Acker’s Spanish Connection: Plagiarism, Madness and Love in Don Quixote’, in 
Kathy Acker and Transnationalism ed. by Polina Mackay and Kathryn Nicol 
(Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), pp. 115-132 and Carol 
Siegel, ‘The Madness Outside Gender: Travels with Don Quixote and Saint Foucault’, 
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individual concern with psychosis, using my analysis in support of the 
overarching notion that literature can offer useful adjunctive and 
integrative elements to clinical education and practice. 
That said, this thesis does not provide a diagnostic reading of 
characters, texts or the author, for several reasons. Firstly, to use an 
existing (and problematic, as I argue in Chapter 1) clinical framework to 
interpret characters would be to deny the strongly subversive element of 
Acker’s work. Secondly, Acker does not present psychosis in a 
traditionally defined ‘clinical’ manner – which in itself goes some way to 
subverting the way psychosis is formulated clinically. Finally, diagnostic 
readings of creative works, in my view, produce only reductive 
conceptualisations of narratives that offer, often simultaneously, multiple 
meanings, themes and functions. Such singular readings risk mirroring 
the homogenising potential of contemporary psychiatric practice that 
fundamentally relies on flawed nosological conceptualisations.  
I disagree, however, with Carolyn Zaikowski’s assertion that the 
“use of the schizophrenic model” 
[…] is intriguing as a metaphor, but too often undefined and 
misunderstood by those who theorize about its application to 
language and narrative. It risks glorifying a set of symptoms 
that many experience as torturous, debilitating, life-
threatening conditions; and it is generally, like hysteria, 
considered a pathology.28  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
in Devouring Institutions: The Life and Work of Kathy Acker ed. by Michael Hardin 
(San Diego: Hyperbole, 2004), pp. 3-25.  
For examples of the way in which ‘madness’, ‘rationality’ and ‘irrationality’ are 
explored in scholarship on Acker’s work, see, for example, Barrett Watten, ‘Foucault 
Reads Acker and Rewrites the History of the Novel’, in Lust for Life: On the Writings 
of Kathy Acker, On the Writings of Kathy Acker, ed. by Amy Scholder, Carla Harryman 
and Avitall Ronell (London: Verso, 2006), pp. 58-77 and Robert L. Mazzola, ‘Kathy 
Acker and Literary Madness: Erecting a Pornographic Shell’, in Devouring Institutions: 
The Life and Work of Kathy Acker, pp. 27-46.  
28 Zaikowski, p. 215.  
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At no point in this thesis do I underestimate the distress that can be 
associated with ‘psychosis’ and nor do I (or Acker) ‘glorify’ such 
experiences. The presence, in part, of Chapter 1 of this thesis aims to 
explore in detail the clinical framing of ‘psychosis’ I work alongside and 
against, to avoid allegations of ‘misunderstanding’. Specific experiences 
that, collectively, might be taken clinically to indicate psychosis, are 
referred to when relevant (for example, Acker’s portrayal of 
hallucination in The Childlike Life of the Black Tarantula by The Black 
Tarantula).29 I am interested less in the affiliation of these experiences 
with a notion of an ‘authentic’ or ‘recognisable’ symptomatology; my 
focus here is on the individual representation and what this can offer to 
critically-minded mental health education and practice.  
This view strongly aligns with the philosophies of medical 
humanities scholarship and the emerging health humanities discipline, 
explored in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 5. The medical and health 
humanities both aim to realign human experience as meaningful, 
understandable and recoverable, both in and outside of formal medical or 
clinical practice, with a focus on wide conceptualisations of health, 
illness, community, social experience and political context within and in 
utilising various arts and humanities discourse, artefacts and therapeutic 
practices.30 It is within this interdisciplinary framework that this thesis is 
situated, with its focus on the wider context, content and form of 
psychosis in Acker’s writing, rather than only aiming to demonstrate how 
a problematic and pathologised concept is evident in Acker’s fiction. 
                                                
29 Kathy Acker, The Childlike Life of the Black Tarantula, by The Black Tarantula 
(1973) in Portrait of an Eye by Kathy Acker (New York: Grove Press, 1998), pp. 1-90. 
Further references to this text are given in the text as (CLBT, p.).  
30 See Crawford and others, Health Humanities.  
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      Kathy Acker: Critical Perspectives  
This thesis draws on the extensive body of critical commentary and 
scholarly work on Acker’s concern about existence in the contemporary 
world, and her disruptive and disrupted narrative form, structure and 
content. Nicola Pitchford notes that in much early criticism of Acker’s 
work “the tendency has been to emphasize her practice’s affinity with 
poststructuralism” rather than considering the broader utility of her work 
and her resistance to a clear affiliation with a specific discoursal 
framework.31 In recent years, there has been a varied range of criticism 
published. Volumes of critical scholarship, for example those edited by 
Michael Hardin, Amy Scholder, Carla Harryman and Avitall Ronell, and 
Polina Mackay and Kathryn Nicol, provide rich archives of diverse 
perspectives on Acker’s work, demonstrating that interpretation of 
Acker’s work can be as wildly distinct and intellectually challenging as 
her narratives themselves.32 Book length studies of Acker’s work, often 
comparing with her contemporaries, are also available, such as 
Pitchford’s Tactical Readings and Ebbesen’s Postmodernism and Its 
Others. She has attracted a significant and growing body of literary 
scholarship; my aim with this thesis is to contribute to this work while 
offering novel clinical interpretations of her writing. 
Acker’s graphic portrayal of sex and sexuality is often noted in 
critical scholarship. With regards to this element of her work, she is 
(sometimes simultaneously) both venerated and denigrated. Jerome 
                                                
31 Nicola Pitchford, Tactical Readings: Feminist Postmodernism in the Novels of Kathy 
Acker and Angela Carter (London: Associated University Presses, 2002), p. 68.  
32 Hardin, Devouring Institutions: The Life and Work of Kathy Acker; Scholder, 
Harryman and Ronell, Lust for Life: On the Writings of Kathy Acker; Polina Mackay 
and Kathryn Nicol, eds., Kathy Acker and Transnationalism (Newcastle Upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009).  
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McGann, for example, argues that Acker can be seen in a sense as 
ironically canonical: “Acker is one of our most highly regarded 
contemporary artists”, he writes, but placing her side-by-side with Genet, 
he states both are “thus canonical, but they are clearly loose – loose 
canons”.33 A more critical view on the canonical nature of Acker’s work 
is available, as Ellen G. Friedman suggests, noting that male texts have 
less trouble “acquiring membership of the canon” while Acker and other 
female contemporary writers “remain outlaws, outside the canon because 
there is little in the backward, oedipal glance for them”: instead “they 
aim their gaze audaciously and unabashedly forward”.34 Despite the 
suggestion that such ‘deviant’ authors – those that Acker refers to as 
“writers I think of as in ‘that tradition,’ ‘the other tradition,’ ‘the non-
acceptable literary tradition’” – can be canonised, McGann perhaps 
demonstrates his own conservatism around such literary outsiders.35 
There are, he says, “good and understandable reasons” that “most 
educators – at all levels – avoid writing that involves pornography”.36 
Yet the sexually graphic nature of Acker’s work is one way I feel she is 
persuasively subversive, because she does not write ‘pornography’ for 
titillation. Her sexual scenes can challenge and revolt as much as they 
might arouse, forcing questions around gendered experience and 
oppression, victimology and – most importantly – the impact of both 
sought after sexual encounters and forced sexual experience in term of 
psychological health.  
                                                
33Jerome, McGann, ‘Canonade’, New Literary History, 25. 3 ‘25th Anniversary Issue 
Part 1’ (1994), 487-504, (p. 492).  
34 Ellen G. Friedman, ‘Where are the Missing Contents? (Post) Modernism, Gender, and 
the Canon’, PMLA, 108. 2 (1993), 240-252, (pp. 250-251).  
35 Kathy Acker, ‘A Few Notes on Two of My Books’, in Bodies of Work, pp. 6-13, (p. 
6-7).  
36 McGann, p. 492.  
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In reference to the sex workers that feature in Acker’s The Adult 
Life of Toulouse Lautrec by Henri Toulouse Lautrec, but in a statement 
which I think is applicable to many of Acker’s narrators and characters, 
Ebbesen suggests that “Acker’s ubiquitous profanity serves, in part, to 
speak their pain”.37 Acker has been dismissed as being merely 
pornographic, obscene and ‘immoral’ for her graphic portrayal of 
sexuality, sexual violence, and sexual taboos.38 Yet as critics have noted, 
Acker’s appropriation of pornography may be both “snide and ironic”.39 
Alternatively, as Georgina Colby suggests regarding the way Acker’s My 
Mother: Demonology and Cindy Sherman’s photography uses 
“pornographic reference”, her explicit portrayals function in some ways 
against heteronormative pornography as a way to “disrupt and dislocate 
the narrative and image from convention, in order to empower the female 
sex organs”.40 As I argue, her ‘obscenity’ and explicitness is a necessary 
part of demonstration and subversion of the ways in which women might 
be positioned, uncritically, as victims of men – and how their reasonable 
and understandable psychological responses to painful bodily and mental 
trauma pathologised as indicative of ‘mental illness’, as I explore in 
depth in Chapter 2.  
                                                
37 Ebbesen, p. 9. See also Kathy Acker, The Adult Life of Toulouse Lautrec by Henri 
Toulouse Lautrec (1975) in Portrait of an Eye, by Kathy Acker (New York: Grove 
Press, 1998), pp. 185-310 
38 See Pitchford, pp. 151-152 and also Kathy Acker, ‘Immoral’, in Hannibal Lecter, My 
Father, pp. 142-148. ‘Immoral’ is a copy of the 1986 German decision to ban Acker’s 
novel Blood and Guts in High School due to being “harmful to minors” (Acker, 
‘Immoral’, p. 142). See also Georgina Colby, ‘Radical Interiors: Cindy Sherman's “Sex 
Pictures” and Kathy Acker's My Mother: Demonology’, Women: A Cultural Review, 
23. 2 (2012), 182-200. Other critics have been more critical of Acker’s representation of 
sexuality – see, for example, Colleen Kennedy, ‘Simulating Sex and Imagining 
Mothers’, American Literary History, 4. 1 (1992), 165-185.  
39 Arthur F. Redding, ‘Bruises, Roses: Masochism and the Writing of Kathy Acker’, 
Contemporary Literature, 35. 2 (1994), 281-304, (p. 300).  
40 Colby, ‘Radical Interiors’, p. 186.  
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On the theme of what might be considered ‘obscene’, Nayland 
Blake suggests, in his reflections on his personal encounters with Kathy 
Acker, that the 1970s, where much of Acker’s most radical narratives 
emerge, “were a time when the obscene was the last refuge of the 
sane”.41 This was a time when, he writes, a: 
[…] bloated culture made by corporations paraded itself 
everywhere as common sense and sensual bliss at the same 
time. Collective political action had collapsed onto a morass 
of ‘self’ cultivation that blinded people to the extent of their 
oppression. Cities festered in anger, poverty, and debris that 
no normal person wanted to live around. So that left all the 
other people, the abnormal, to make anything they wanted 
out of the crap that was left lying around.42 
 
Many of Acker’s key themes can be identified in this quote – disgust at 
corporate greed, classist power struggles, the oppression of the poor, 
women and those who are in any way “abnormal”. Additionally, the 
sense that the reader gets from Acker’s work that she drew together, 
plagiarised and rewrote anything she wanted is clear here. Critical work 
on Acker varies between elucidation and illumination of such concerns 
and pieces that either focus on personal tributes intermingled with 
insights into her life, and/or work that mimics Acker’s own fragmented 
and alienating style, making their meaning and argument challenging to 
reach.43 There have been attempts to track Acker’s work through creative 
                                                
41 Nayland Blake, ‘Kathy Acker: “Because I Want to Live Forever in Wonder”’, in Lust 
for Life: On the Writing of Kathy Acker, pp. 99-109, (p. 100).  
42 Blake, p. 100.  
43 See, for example, the collection of essays Lust for Life: On the Writings of Kathy 
Acker. See also memorial pieces that appeared posthumously, some on a now defunct 
memorial website, but elsewhere as well, for example: 
C. Carr, ‘On Edge: Theoretical Grrrl – The Legacy of Kathy Acker’, The Village Voice 
(6th-12th November 2002) <http://www.villagevoice.com/new/0245,carr,39664,.html> 
[accessed 2nd August 2005].  
Michael Hardin, ‘Between Theory and Autobiography: negotiating desire, sex, and love 
in the work of Kathy Acker’, in Devouring Institutions: The Life and Work of Kathy 
Acker, pp. 135-154.  
29 
 
periods where she drew on varying inspirations, not least the high literary 
canonical texts which she plagiarised and appropriated with abandon, but 
also philosophical theorising, feminisms and critical-clinical 
perspectives, such as those by ‘anti’-psychiatrist R. D. Laing.44 Much 
scholarship on Acker’s texts and writing process refers at some point to 
her plagiarism and appropriation of literary works. The sheer volume of 
critical work on Acker produces its own challenges in formulating 
responses to and readings of Acker’s work – perspectives multiply 
through secondary literature as much as they did in her own work.  
In many ways, Acker challenges foundational assumptions 
about how ‘sanity’ or ‘madness’ is defined. Her work is, however, 
resistant to a reading informed by a traditional or ‘known’ sense, as 
might be the case in reading a more structured or popular ‘novel’ (as 
distinct from Acker’s texts which are the focus here). Acker calls upon 
all our intellectual faculties to read differently by de-situating the reader. 
Blake argues that she does this in one way through combining “formal 
editing strategies that had previously been used to produce an effect of 
                                                                                                                                                            
Richard Kadrey, ‘Black Tarantula: The Intense Life and Uncompromising Death of 
Renegade Writer Kathy Acker’, Salon, 3rd December 1997 
<http://www.salon.com/media/1997/12/03media2.html> [accessed 24th January 2007]  
Robert Lort, ‘In Memoriam to Kathy Acker: A Deleuze and Guattarian Approach’, 
<http://acker.thehub.com.au/ackademy/lort.htm> [accessed 2nd August 2005] 
Doug Rice, ‘All Words are Guilty: A Few Disjointed Theoretical and Cultural Risks in 
Writing After Kathy Acker. Collected and then discarded, by Doug Rice (a voice 
imitator)’, <http://acker.thehub.com.au/ackademy/guilty.html> [accessed 2nd August 
2005] 
Doug Rice, ‘In Memoriam to Identity: Re(w)riting and (Re)membering Kathy Acker’, 
English Studies Forum <http://www.bsu.edu/web/esf/1.1Rice.htm> [accessed 2nd 
August 2005] 
Sarah Schulman ‘Sarah Schulman Discusses Kathy Acker’, Pavement Magazine (2003) 
<http://pavementmagazine.com/kathyacker.html> [accessed 2nd August 2005] 
Peter Wollen, ‘Death (and Life) of the Author: Peter Wollen on Kathy Acker’, London 
Review of Books, 20. 3, 5th February 1998, pp. 8-10 
<http://www.lrb.co.uk/v20/n03/peter-wollen/death-and-life-of-the-author> [accessed 
14th October 2012].  
44 See Peter Wollen, ‘Kathy Acker’, in Lust for Life: On the Writings of Kathy Acker, 
pp. 1-11, (p. 8-9).  
30 
 
intellectual distance” with “content of overwhelming intimacy”.45 I 
would further argue that it is in her ideological subversion through use of 
pornographic text, portrayal of base physicality, and explicit scenes of 
rape and sexual violence that Acker challenges and destabilises the 
reader’s expectations in terms of gender and sexuality. It is through the 
liberties she took with textual form and her dissolution of narrative 
linearity and coherency that Acker shifts the reader’s expectations 
constantly, leading to a form of “reading psychosis” which I discuss in 
Chapter 3.46 Finally, the experiences of uncertainty, distress, confusion, 
fear, fragmentation and trauma portrayed through her narrators and 
characters offers a version of ‘psychosis’ that is useful in terms of aiding 
a consideration of how best respond to people who might experience the 
world differently to other people, either temporarily or more long term. 
Thus her texts, as Blake notes, simultaneously offer the reader a 
distancing through their alienating textual strategy and offers content of 
an acutely intimate nature. This destabilising makes Acker both 
challenging and interesting in equal measures.  
What might be recognised as a space in which the reader’s 
expectations are destabilised and frustrated – the lacuna between 
antithetical or opposing representations, between that which is expected 
and that which is found – is noted by Watten, who discusses Foucauldian 
readings of Acker and the “madness” in Acker’s work. Watten argues 
that Acker’s “mechanical copying and transgressive overwriting of 
unrelated texts creates an ‘as if’ scenario in which known ethical 
paradigms and narrative outcomes are rejected and where plausible or 
                                                
45 Blake, p. 104.  
46 See Keitel,.  
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implausible alternatives proliferate as textual play”.47 The space between 
possibilities and alternatives is thus “a space of madness as potential / 
deferred freedom that accedes to knowledge”.48 In her being anti-
generic, by “[r]ejecting the continuity of personal identity, the pretension 
and retention of self and object that founds the genre of the novel”, 
Watten argues, she “substitutes in its place a mode of discontinuous 
answering back”.49 Thus, for Watten, the “dissociation of personal 
identity” in Acker is both a key theme of Acker’s and forms the narrative 
structure itself. He continues, suggesting that throughout Acker’s work, 
she “poses a question to the world as the limit of coherence – the limit in 
which the work of art, in Foucault’s account of Bataille, ceded to 
madness as it is determined by the world, rather than any internal 
motivations that would reflect a continuity of personal identity”.50 The 
way in which Acker’s works surrender to madness as a formally and 
intrapersonally defined lack of coherence, via her dissolution into textual 
fragmentation and narrational disintegration, make Acker an immensely 
challenging writer. I argue that it is from such difficulty that the most 
acute conclusions can be drawn, and the most useful clinical insights can 
be gleaned; simple narrative forms may tell a good story, but do not offer 
the same insights into literary psychosis as the disjointed and estranging 
strategies used by Acker.  
In this thesis, I use both Acker’s fiction and nonfiction for two 
reasons, generally focusing on earlier fragmented texts and novellas over 
her later, more structured works. Firstly, the ideas expressed in her non-
                                                
47 Watten, p. 64.  
48 ibid. p. 64.  
49 Watten, p. 64.  
50 ibid. p. 65.  
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fiction essays and criticism sometimes illuminate further the recurring 
tropes and themes in her more challenging fictions. Her personal 
reflections on her diagnosis and treatment for breast cancer, for example, 
are worked through in both the short piece ‘The Gift of Disease’ and the 
semi-fictionalised creative piece ‘Eurydice in the Underworld’.51 
Sections of the creative piece are directly linked to ‘The Gift of Disease’, 
and the dream-like sections in ‘Eurydice in the Underworld’ could be 
read as though they are mediations under anaesthesia, offering a sense of 
strangeness and disorientation that function to resist the colder clinical 
exterior of the clinic and operating theatre. Acker wrote that she 
preferred the creative freedom found in writing fictional and creative 
pieces: “essay-writing seems, at least at first glance, to be tied to 
expression”, she wrote, following that the “problem with expression is 
that it is too narrow a basis for writing, for it is pinned to knowledge, 
knowledge which is mainly rational. I trust neither my ability to know 
nor what I think I know”.52 Yet a number of Acker’s supposed essay 
pieces blur into creative mediations, as though her lack of trust in what 
she could or did ‘know’ slipped repeatedly into her preferred ‘non-
rational’ expressions. She stated: “My unease with the essay form has led 
me to try to play, even to destroy, the form” – destruction of traditional 
form is a feature of the vast majority of her work, arguably the most 
often discussed.53 Acker also blurred autobiography and fiction 
throughout her works, a feature that I return to in Chapter 4. She wrote 
that when “writing I become the characters in the novel, but the 
                                                
51 Kathy Acker, ‘Eurydice in the Underworld’ (1997) in Kathy Acker, Eurydice in the 
Underworld (London: Arcadia Books, 1997), pp. 1-26. Kathy Acker, ‘The Gift of 
Disease’ (1996) <http://acker. thehub.com. au/gift. htm> [accessed 2nd August 2005].  
52 Kathy Acker, ‘Preface’, in Bodies of Work, pp. vii-x (p. viii).  
53 Acker, ‘Preface’, p. viii.   
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characters in the novel aren’t me”, commenting further that people 
“always think they’re me, and it’s a drag”.54 Yet the blurring of her ‘real’ 
life and the lives of her characters (several of whom are called Kathy) 
makes the distinctions between fiction and autobiography, fiction and 
criticism, literary and philosophical, difficult to clearly locate and fix. 
Essay, criticism, fact and fiction – all were simply texts to be written, 
destructed, reconstructed, appropriated and re-appropriated for Acker. 
Different types of Acker’s work – early fiction and critical work, essay 
and interview – come together in this thesis as being both worthy of note 
in and of themselves, but also in terms of considering how this boundary 
crossing offers an exploration of how stories are created by individuals, 
how identity is fluidly constructed, and how this might then offer insights 
into narrative approaches to mental health.  
In blurring autobiography and fiction, fiction and essay, critique 
and creation, Acker is a writer who in many respects embraced her status 
as challenging and provocative. The somewhat defiant nature and content 
of her work may in part be due to the historical context within which 
Acker was writing, as both Blake (above) and Carol Becker discuss.55 
Becker argues that the “more that is hidden and suppressed, the more 
simplistic the representation of daily life, the more one-dimensional and 
caught in the dominant ideology the society is, the more art must 
reveal”.56 For the viewer or reader of the works that “reveal”, art 
(including literature and visual arts) “easily becomes the object of rage 
                                                
54 Acker in interview with Lotringer, p. 20.  
55 Carol Becker, ed. , The Subversive Imagination: Artists, Society, and Social 
Responsibility (New York: Routledge, 1994).  
56 Becker, p. xiii.  
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and confrontation”.57 At the same time, “artists, frustrated by the illusion 
of order and well-being posited by society, or angry at the degree to 
which they are unappreciated and their work misunderstood, choose 
rebellion (either through form or content) as a method of retaliation”.58 In 
Acker’s rebellious creations, those that she acknowledged as 
“disoriented” writings, are works of uncertainty of meaning and 
challenges to fixed reading or interpretation; paradoxically, these are key 
elements that allow the development of a theory of literary psychosis, 
which I argue can circularly be read as offering insights into how we 
formulate, listen to and support psychosis clinically.59 
Acker’s work as a whole provides an overarching exploration 
and literary performance of incoherency, dissolution, fragmentation and 
irresolution, rather than a portrayal of clinically recognisable psychosis 
as per diagnostic manual symptomatology. In this way, Acker might be 
viewed as writing a novel rhetoric of madness. Shoshana Felman writes 
on the “rhetoric of madness” in literature, arguing that while literature “is 
the only recourse for self-expression and self-representation of the mad”, 
madness ultimately “always turns out to be mystified and mystifying”.60 
She concludes her detailed examination of the intersections of literature, 
philosophy and psychoanalysis by arguing: 
But even though the discourse on madness is not a discourse 
of madness (it is not strictly speaking a mad discourse), 
nevertheless there still exists in these texts a madness that 
speaks, a madness that is acted out in language, but whose 
role no speaking subjects can assume. It is this movement of 
non-totalizable, ungovernable linguistic play, through which 
                                                
57 Becker, p. xiii.  
58 Becker, p. xiii.  
59 Acker in interview with Lotringer, p. 10.  
60 Shoshana Felman, Writing and Madness (Literature/Philosophy/Psychoanalysis) 
(1985), trans., by M. Noel Evans (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 252, 
p. 4 and p. 252.  
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meaning misfires and the text’s statement is estranged from 
its performance, that I call in this book the ‘madness of 
rhetoric’.61 
 
Felman further suggests that paradoxically “the madness of rhetoric is 
precisely what subverts the rhetoric of madness”.62 I argue that Acker’s 
“statements” are integral to the “performance” of madness in her fiction, 
a literary performativity that enacts psychosis in the narrative form as 
well as the content. In this way Acker writes neither of nor on madness. 
The “madness that speaks” is written into the textual structure of her 
narratives – and it is the subject that speaks both through and from within 
madness. Acker also subverts our current understanding of psychosis as 
codified in clinical discourses. In the next section I offer a brief but 
necessary diversion from Acker’s work in order to explore the way in 
which psychosis is currently formulated within these clinical discourses 
and critical viewpoints, in order to contextualise the concluding chapter 
in this thesis, where I describe how my readings Acker’s work might 
offer clinical insights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
61 ibid. p. 252. Italics in the original.  
62 Felman, Writing and Madness, p. 252. Italics in the original.  
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Chapter 1: Understanding ‘Psychosis’ 
Reductionist models fail to grasp what is most important in 
terms of recovery. The evidence base is telling us that we 
need a radical shift in our understanding of what is at the 
heart (and perhaps soul) of mental health practice.63 
 
To contextualise the clinical elements of this thesis, in this chapter I 
provide firstly a short overview of how the diagnosis of ‘psychosis’ as a 
‘brain disorder’ has developed over the past 125 years or so, before 
summarising the multitude of perspectives that are critical of the 
reductionist potential of a solely biomedical formulation of a complex set 
of personal experiences, beliefs, emotions, expressions and cognitions. 
Some of these critical views emerged within and draw upon 
contemporary postmodern cultural theory, which is noted in terms of 
relevance to contemporary concerns – while literary studies have perhaps 
moved beyond ‘postmodern’ analysis, psychiatry remains at a stage of 
critical deconstruction. I then briefly illuminate the subgenre of literary 
studies focused on literature and madness to situate this thesis within its 
interdisciplinary space, and then draw these diverse readings together to 
situate more clearly my reading of Acker’s work as providing a literary 
exemplar of a perspective that, I argue, is both confirmatory of and 
informative to more critically-minded views on ‘psychosis’. My intention 
here is not to align with a clear pro- or anti- psychiatry perspective – the 
position I, and others, hold when critical of elements of psychiatric 
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Evans, Suman Fernando, Malcolm R. Garland, William Hopkins, Rhodri Huws, Bob 
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paradigm’, British Journal of Psychiatry 201. 6 (2012), 430-434, (p. 432).  
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practice is more nuanced than suggested by such a polarising binary.64 
Instead, I critically interrogate some of the critical perspectives that have 
been proposed in order to clearly situate my argument that ‘psychosis’ is 
a radically individual experience, an argument which focuses on the 
person rather than the tenuous ‘label’ or diagnosis. Indeed one of my 
core clinically-relevant arguments throughout the thesis is that the focus 
in mental health practice needs a radical paradigm shift from the 
homogenising to the heterogenerative, to a view which privileges 
individual narrative content, meaning and interpretation over the more 
typically discussed forms of symptoms that are grouped together as 
denoting a particular ‘illness’. 
 
A Very Brief History of Psychosis: Psychiatry and its critics  
The origin of classifications of mental disorders is widely recognised as 
beginning with Emil Kraepelin in 1887. Prior to this time, madness was 
certainly recognised and attended to, in different ways, but not classified 
in medical terms.65 Attempting to align psychiatry with the better-
respected medical field concerned with the anatomy and physiology of 
pathology, Kraepelin stated in his Textbook of Psychiatry: 
Judging from our experience in internal medicine it is fair to 
assume that similar disease processes will produce identical 
symptom pictures, identical pathological anatomy and an 
identical aetiology. If, therefore, we possessed a 
                                                
64 See also Duncan Double, ‘The Limits of Psychiatry’, British Medical Journal, 324 
(2002), 900-904, and Alastair Morgan, ‘Is psychiatry dying? Crisis and critique in 
contemporary psychiatry’, Social Theory and Health, 13. 2 (2015), 141-161.  
65 There is of course not space here to document the extensive history of psychiatric 
practice - several very good histories of psychiatry are available however. See Roy 
Porter, Madness: A Brief History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) and Edward 
Shorter, A History of Psychiatry (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1997) for useful and 
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comprehensive knowledge of any of these three fields – 
pathological anatomy, symptomatology, or aetiology – we 
would at once have a uniform and standard classification of 
mental diseases.66  
 
Kraepelin attempted to classify psychological disorders, naming the 
psychotic disorders under the umbrella phrase Dementia Praecox which, 
as Bentall states, was characterised by “irreversible deterioration” of 
cognitive and social functioning, consisting of delusions of persecution 
or grandiosity, inappropriate or absent emotional responses, “stereotyped 
behaviour” (for example catatonic posturing), problems with attention, 
and hallucinations, primarily auditory or tactile.67 In comparison, 'manic-
depressive' presentations saw a somewhat less irreversible pathway to 
deterioration. The term ‘schizophrenia’ did not emerge until Eugene 
Bleuler’s work, around 1911, when he identified four key features, 
known as the ‘four A’s’ – loosening of associations, ambivalence, autism 
and inappropriate affect – evident in ‘schizophrenia’.68 Kurt Schneider 
then concretised the cornerstones that hold fast today for the current 
diagnosis of psychotic disorders, and was one of the first documented 
clinicians to assert that the form of a given symptom was more important 
diagnostically than the content of the experience. Schneider developed a 
theorem of ‘schizophrenia’ consisting of what he termed First Rank 
Symptoms, defined as “all forms of hallucination, delusion, or passivity 
experience”.69 Schneiderian first rank symptoms remain one of the 
primary diagnostic indicators of ‘schizophrenia’.70 
                                                
66 Emil Krepelin, cited in Richard P. Bentall, Madness Explained: Psychosis and 
Human Nature (2003) (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 12.  
67 Bentall, Madness Explained, p. 15.  
68 ibid. pp. 23-24.  
69 ibid. p. 31. Bentall provides a clear table of Schneider’s First Rank Symptoms (pp. 
32-33).  
70 See the DSM-5.  
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Despite these attempts to codify psychosis into clinical 
categories, the diagnostic criteria for the variety of ‘psychoses’ that now 
exist, including various forms of ‘schizophrenia’, are significant. Even 
the most recent and vastly extended editions of the ICD-10 Classification 
of Mental and Behavioural Disorders and the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders 5th Edition are unable to confidently and 
cohesively classify or even account for the full range of non-
‘schizophrenic’ psychotic disorders.71 Furthermore, criticism of 
Kraepelin’s original dichotomy between dementia praecox and mood-led 
‘manic-depressive’ presentations, which formed the basis of much later 
classification and have been referred to as the “twin pillars of 
Kraepleinian psychiatry”, is evident.72 As Robert Whitaker argues, 
drawing on the influential work of Mary Boyle, many of Kraepelin’s 
original ‘psychotic’ patients may in fact have suffered from the then-
undiscovered disease encephalitis lethargica.73 The importance of this 
potential error cannot be underestimated – ‘schizophrenia’ remains seen, 
despite the efforts of more recent considerations, as a potentially 
irreversible illness with a potentially deteriorative illness pathway.74 As 
Bracken and Thomas suggest:  
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74 One need only complete a Google search to demonstrate how widespread such a view 
is – see for example the popular and public facing USA website WebMD for the kind of 
perceptions that are likely to be read by people searching for information on the 
‘disorder’: see WebMD, ‘Schizophrenia: An Overview ‘ 
<http://www.webmd.com/schizophrenia/guide/mental-health-schizophrenia> {accessed 
40 
 
‘Abandon hope all ye who enter here’ were the words written 
above the entrance to Hell according to Dante in the Divine 
Comedy. They might just as well have been found inscribed 
on the title page of the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence’s (2002) clinical guidelines for schizophrenia.75  
 
NICE guidance on best practice in working with people with a diagnosis 
of ‘schizophrenia’ are now updated, and include notes towards recovery 
oriented working, but the therapeutic pessimism of the early guidelines 
remains in some areas. 
Where such therapeutic pessimism is particularly criticised is in 
contemporary critical perspectives on psychiatric practice, which 
coalesce into two core areas. Firstly, on what is convincingly noted as a 
set of flawed foundational assumptions surrounding the notion of 
‘psychosis’ as a mental disorder, noting the lack of scientific validity in 
the current ‘official’ nosology of the different psychoses. Secondly, 
critical concerns often note the influence of the psychopharmacology 
industry over the doctors charged with defining ever-increasing new 
disorders, affecting an ever-increasing population of people, providing an 
ever-increasing revenue stream.76 In this respect, mental experiences, 
complex and unique to each person, are homogenised into a series of 
‘symptoms’, which then, if a particular combination are present for an 
                                                                                                                                                            
1st August 2015. The UK equivalent version, NHS Choices, is slightly less pessimistic – 
NHS Choices, ‘Schizophrenia’ 
<http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Schizophrenia/Pages/Introduction. aspx> {accessed 2nd 
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75 Bracken and Thomas, Postpsychiatry, p. 225.  
76 See for example James Davies, Cracked: Why Psychiatry is Doing More Harm Than 
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Books, 2003).  
41 
 
arbitrarily defined period of time, lead to a particular label. ‘Psychotic’ 
disorders are constructed by symptom clusters that are then collectively 
categorised in order for a particular type of psychosis (for example, 
schizophrenia, psychotic depression or schizoaffective disorder) to be 
diagnosed using the DSM-5 or the ICD-10. I would argue that such a 
system in and of itself is adversarial to the contemporarily promoted 
priorities of individualisation and person-centred care provision. As an 
example – if a person disagrees with the diagnostic formulation of their 
experiences, they risk being deemed to ‘lack insight’ rather than 
recognised as having a potentially reasonable and valid alternative 
formulation.  
In terms of clinical psychiatry, the aim of the initial interview or 
period of assessment is to identify and describe symptoms, rather than to 
explain them or to explore their meaning to the person themselves. This 
kind of descriptive psychopathology utilises Jaspers’ work on 
phenomenology as the “study of subjective experience” in order to 
identify and describe the form of symptoms, as opposed to explaining 
them through, for example, a psychodynamic framework.77 ‘Psychotic’ 
symptoms are split into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ symptoms – an 
interesting linguistic deception as none of the symptoms are seen as 
advantageous within a biomedical framework. In this way, ‘positive’ 
symptoms have added something to a person’s experience (such as a 
hallucination), and ‘negative’ symptoms have diminished the person’s 
experience (for example, in anhedonia or with extreme passivity). 
‘Positive’ symptoms are defined as consisting of hallucinations, paranoia, 
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delusions, thought and expression disorders and possibly elevated or 
‘hypomanic’ mood. ‘Negative’ symptoms on the other hand are noted as 
blunting of affect, social withdrawal, thought block or poverty of thought 
and difficulties in effective communication. A range of experiences also 
aligned with psychosis might fall into either positive or negative 
symptoms, such as depersonalisation and derealisation.78  
Karl Jaspers, in the early part of the twentieth century, took a 
slightly different view to his contemporaries around psychosis, one that 
is interesting for the purposes of this thesis. Jaspers followed Bleuler in 
distinguishing between psychoses, defined by ununderstandability, and 
neuroses, understandable through psychological or psychoanalytic 
exploration. This distinction has been described as being, for Jaspers, 
clearly between “two apparently irreconcilable methods of 
comprehending mental symptoms: understanding and explaining” – 
similar to our still-current trend towards identifying symptoms rather 
than explaining them.79 Jaspers declared that psychosis is essentially 
ununderstandable in comparison to neurosis, which can be rationalised: 
Affective illnesses and mental illnesses (natural and 
schizophrenic psychic life). The most profound distinction in 
psychic life seems to be that between what is meaningful and 
allows empathy and what in its particular way is 
ununderstandable, ‘mad’ in the literal sense, schizophrenic 
psychic life (even though there may be no delusions). 
Pathological psychic life of the first kind we can comprehend 
vividly enough as an exaggeration or diminution of known 
phenomena and as an appearance of such phenomena without 
the usual causes or motives. Pathological psychic life of the 
second kind we cannot adequately comprehend in this way. 
Instead we find changes of the most general kind for which 
                                                
78 See Sims; see also Sarah Stringer, Laurence Church, Susan Davison and Maurice 
Lipsedge, Psychiatry PRN (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
79 Bentall, Madness Explained, p. 28.  
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we have no empathy but which in some way we try to make 
comprehensible from an external point of view.80  
 
This fundamental distinction continues to be relevant in psychiatry today, 
and has led to the division of psychological and psychiatric disorders into 
those which are perhaps publically more visible, understood and 
perceived as somehow rational in certain circumstances (the neuroses, 
including depression and anxiety), and those which are less easy to 
understand or explain, and which are stigmatised and often associated 
(wrongly) with violence and uncontrollability (the psychoses, including 
‘schizophrenia’).81 In this thesis, I suggest that the fiction of Acker 
makes the experiences associated with psychosis more understandable, 
subsequently offering novel clinical approaches that refute the reductive 
potential of biomedical and pathological approaches to different or 
unusual emotional, psychological and cognitive experiences. 
Psychiatry, as a medical discipline, has long sought the 
biological cause of psychosis, and professes to have made some progress. 
Nancy Andreasen, in her then-influential 1984 text The Broken Brain: 
The Biological Revolution in Psychiatry, firmly situated the major mental 
disorders within a biological framework by detailing the allegedly 
groundbreaking progress made in neuroimaging, among other areas, 
towards understanding psychotic and affective disorders.82 Yet 
Andreasen’s conclusions were tentative then, and have yet, over 30 years 
later, to be conclusively demonstrated, despite a plethora of research into 
neurostructural, genetic, epigenetic and neurochemical potential 
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‘causes’.83 Similarly, in in the 1980s Martin Roth and Jerome Kroll 
provided a rebuttal to the significant criticisms levelled at psychiatry as a 
flawed ‘medical’ doctrine during the 1960s and 1970s, suggesting that 
the lack of single or multiple biologically identifiable physiological 
causes of mental illnesses did not mean that such illnesses do not exist: 
The phenomena of serious mental illnesses provide 
supportive evidence in that they serve to define with clarity 
what happens when the most specifically human faculties are 
impaired or undermined as in the case of the schizophrenic 
and manic-depressive psychoses. Understanding of 
rationality and affect, autonomy and the unity of integration 
of human personality can therefore be heightened by the 
study of such disordered states. Yet the contrasts between 
those suffering from a psychosis and those not so affected 
and between a schizophrenic or manic person during illness 
and after recovery are among the most powerful testimonies 
for the reality of mental illness.84 
 
Roth and Kroll’s argument here remains relevant, and they are right on a 
simplistic level – the distress caused by strange or unusual experiences is 
very evident to any clinician or practitioner. Roth and Kroll suggest that 
as we can see the effect of unusual experiences, paranoia and delusions, 
they therefore must exist as, and be treated as, ‘illnesses’.  
Yet some 25 years after these publications, there has been very 
little meaningful progress towards isolating biological causes of mental 
health challenges, despite a range of possible theories. Such approaches 
remain not without their critics, and many of these come from within the 
medical profession itself. The majority of these critiques do not deny the 
‘reality’ of the potential distress caused by – or the existence of – unusual 
experiences and altered mood states. Rather, they are firstly critical of the 
manner in which such experiences are formulated and conceptualised 
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within a ‘biological brain disorder’ framework that is unproven and seen 
as not aligning with many people’s own formulations; secondly, they are 
very critical of the influence of the pharmaceutical industry over research 
into treatments of mental health challenges, suggesting that this has led to 
unnecessary medicalisation of the normal range of human experience and 
emotions.85 Critically-orientated views do not deny that people have 
strange, unusual or distressing experiences – their views suggest that our 
formulation and approaches are scientifically flawed, potentially 
unhelpful for some, at best, and have led to the development of medicinal 
treatments that may do more harm than they do good. Given the legal 
reach of psychiatry in containing people physically and chemically, such 
a flawed and potentially biased base is particularly concerning from an 
ethical perspective.  
The majority of clinicians and professionals do not consciously 
reduce the experience of psychosis to a purely biochemical or 
neurological failure. It is now widely accepted that psychosis can be 
induced and affected by psychological, biological, sociological, 
neurochemical, drug-induced and even religious and cultural elements, 
following Zubin and Spring’s widely cited and still-relevant Stress-
Vulnerability Model of ‘schizophrenia’.86 However, contemporary 
medical explanations for and treatment of psychosis remain biologically 
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focused and medicinally orientated. The first line treatment of psychosis 
continues to be in the form of medication. Both the 2010 and 2013 UK 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guidelines on 
the treatment of ‘schizophrenia’ and psychosis in adults and young 
people, respectively, suggest a range of biological, psychological, 
environmental and social possible causes of psychosis (such as genetics, 
substance misuse, perinatal risk factors and environmental and childhood 
adversity).87  
Yet while NICE acknowledge the benefits of psychological and 
social interventions such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for 
Psychosis, these are provided an adjunctive approach – medication 
remains at the forefront of clinical treatment. ‘Antipsychotic’ 
medications, from older ‘first generation’ drugs such as chlorpromazine 
through to newer ‘atypical’ drugs (second and now third generation 
antipsychotic medication) like Olanzapine, Risperidone and Arpiprazole, 
are widely prescribed despite evidence that their efficacy is questionable 
and their side effects potentially life altering, even life threatening.88 
Whitaker illuminates the potentially devastating effects of antipsychotic 
medications, noting the clinical paradox which has led to their 
widespread perceived efficacy: when people stop taking antipsychotic 
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medication abruptly, they often see a rapid return in ‘symptoms’, referred 
to as ‘super-sensitivity psychosis’, leading to a “clinical delusion” that 
because the symptoms returned, the medication had been ‘working’ 
previously.89 The paradox here lies in the increasingly evidenced notion 
that neuroleptic medication causes neurological and neurochemical 
changes which then subsequently lead to longer-term deterioration, 
necessitating longer-term medication, as Whitaker notes when reviewing 
studies that affirm this theorisation: “Initial exposure to a neuroleptic 
seemed to be setting patients up for a future of severe psychotic episodes, 
and that was true regardless of whether they stayed on medications”.90 In 
this case, the treatment may then be more damaging than the ‘disease’.  
In a similar vein, Leader reiterates Whitaker’s view, stating “due 
to the pervasive and crippling effects of long-term drug use, the idea of 
psychosis as a chronic and irreversible brain disease becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy”.91 More recently, longitudinal studies are emerging 
which suggest that people who stop medication sooner rather than later, 
and remain either off medication or on a very small maintenance dose, 
have much better outcomes in terms of general functioning, social 
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It is worth noting here that I am not wholly anti-medication. I do, however, feel that 
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engagement and wellbeing.92 The recent British Psychological Society 
report Understanding Psychosis and Schizophrenia promotes a more 
individual and normalising approach to unusual experiences. While not 
wholly anti medication or biomedically-orientated treatment, the report 
was (unsurprisingly perhaps) received with quite some controversy and 
dismissal in the UK from some psychiatrists.93 
Criticism of psychiatry is certainly not new. The so-called ‘anti-
psychiatry’ movement of the 1960s and 1970s posed a major challenge to 
the growth of psychiatry as a valid medical profession, one with more 
powers than the legal and judicial system with the introduction of mental 
health legislation in 1959 (the Mental Health Act – amended in 1983 and 
2007). The term ‘anti-psychiatry’ implies resistance to the dominant 
medical models – resistance was evident, but not always in the polarising 
manner implied by the common group heading anti-psychiatry. The key 
figures in the anti-psychiatry movement did not form an altogether 
cohesive group, and to state that all of the variety of people involved 
were anti-psychiatry is simplistic. The alternative views on different 
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mental health challenges, but particularly ‘schizophrenia’, came from a 
variety of philosophical, theoretical, psychological and sociological 
discourses. Foucault, for example, from a perspective examining power 
and language in history in terms of the construction of ‘madness’; R. D. 
Laing from the angle of existentialism, humanism and ontology; Thomas 
Szasz from the pre-emptively deconstructive viewpoint of mental illness 
as a whole being a socially constructed myth; Erving Goffman from a 
sociologically concerned perspective regarding individual and group 
identities and resistance to powerful asylum structures.94 The 
fundamental idea that these thinkers shared, from whichever theoretical 
background they came from, was that it was possible to “make madness, 
and the process of going mad, comprehensible”.95 Once the process of 
psychosis was made comprehensible (reminiscent of Jasper’s 
distinction), depathologised perspectives of allegedly idiosyncratic 
expressions, beliefs and behaviours could be proposed – along with non-
biomedicalised models of managing such difficulties, for example 
Laing’s Kingsley Hall, and more recently the humane and ethically-
minded Soteria Project. These two places, created for people to 
experience their distress, elation, fear, anxiety, strangeness or regression 
without fear of punitive treatments or distressing medical interventions, 
shared a similar guiding vision: 
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Perhaps the most important notion that guided practice at 
both Kingsley Hall and Soteria was the shared and innovative 
conception of the psychotic experience – usually viewed as 
irrational and mystifying – as one which, if treated in an 
open, non-judgmental way, could be valid and 
comprehensible. The altered states of psychotics’ 
consciousness, resulting from crises in living, thus were 
potentially healthful steps in reiterative processes. The 
project’s purpose was to find out whether Soteria’s approach 
and milieu were as effective in promoting recovery from 
madness as that provided in a nearby general hospital’s 
psychiatric ward, where the most valued treatment was 
antipsychotic drugs.96 
 
The contemporary relevance of this fundamental approach to people 
experiencing ‘psychosis’ should not be underestimated in terms of its 
humane and ethically minded aims. We could, perhaps, still learn much 
from such an ethos.  
Goffman’s groundbreaking 1961 work had persuasively 
examined the damaging sociological processes and power structures at 
work in hospital-based care provision, specifically the resistive manner in 
which people themselves attempted to regain power and control, albeit in 
small ways, and how the asylum structure served to maintain the inferior 
status of ‘patients’. Therapeutic communities such as Kingsley Hall and 
Soteria stood in stark contrast to the prevailing methods of asylum-based 
‘care’ up to and during this period, which as widely noted in histories of 
psychiatry was, despite the humanistic ideals of the 17th and 18th century, 
by this point in time frankly abusive, cruel and inhumane.97 Goffman’s 
work raised questions about the containment of madness, but a decade 
later the foundational legitimacy and authority of psychiatric diagnosis 
was further challenged. In 1973, David L. Rosenhan demonstrated the 
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erroneousness of psychiatric diagnostic processes through a remarkably 
simple experiment.98 He arranged for the covert admission of eight ‘well’ 
people a range of psychiatric institutions. After reporting only one 
discernible ‘psychotic’ symptom vocally during examination – a voice 
stating ‘empty’, ‘hollow’ or ‘thud’ – each received a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, despite demonstrating no other listed, verifiable or evident 
‘psychotic’ symptoms, and with an initial complaint that resolved on 
admission. It is worth noting here that the diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’ 
requires the enduring presence of several modalities of symptom before 
it can be made, according to the different diagnostic systems seen in the 
versions of the DSM-V and the ICD-10. However, Rosenhan then 
reversed the experiment, informing medical authorities that a number of 
pseudo-patients would be admitted – when none actually were. Around 
43% of ‘genuine’ admissions were suspected by at least one staff 
member, many of these psychiatrists, of being ‘fake’ patients. For 
Rosenhan, this demonstrated that “it is clearly more dangerous to 
misdiagnose illness than health. Better to err on the side of caution, to 
suspect illness even among the healthy […] any diagnostic process that 
lends itself too readily to massive errors of this sort cannot be a very 
reliable one”.99 As I suggest above, psychiatric nosology is both tenuous 
and tentative – yet diagnoses are applied as a ‘given’ or ‘certainty’ and 
people told that they have an illness, often that it is life-long, that they 
will need medication for potentially long periods. 
Contemporaneous critics continue to voice concerns around 
diagnostic validity, reliability, generalisability and the effect on 
                                                
98 David. L. Rosenhan, ‘On Being Sane in Insane Places’, Science, 179 (1973) 250-258.  
99 Rosenhan, p. 252.  
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individuals of being ascribed a particular label that then (potentially) 
leads to a (potentially) damaging course of pharmacological treatment. 
Some of these critics hold potentially powerful positions within 
psychiatric practice. For example, as Consultant Psychiatrist Professor 
Sami Timimi argues: 
For a diagnostic system to establish itself as clinically useful 
it should show that use of diagnostic labels aids treatment 
decisions in a way that impacts on outcomes […] there is 
little evidence to support either position. There is much 
evidence to suggest that instead, they can cause significant 
harm. The only evidence-based conclusion therefore is that 
formal psychiatric diagnostic systems like ICD and DSM 
should be abolished.100 
 
This is not an isolated perspective but one gaining significant momentum 
in the UK and elsewhere. For example, Bracken and a significant range 
of psychiatric colleagues, in a recent and widely cited British Journal of 
Psychiatry editorial, note in their summary of critique of the current 
position of clinical practice: 
Psychiatry is not neurology; it is not a medicine of the brain. 
Although mental health problems undoubtedly have a 
biological dimension, in their very nature they reach beyond 
the brain to involve social, cultural and psychological 
dimensions. These cannot always be grasped through the 
epistemology of biomedicine. The mental life of humans is 
discursive in nature […] Reductionist models fail to grasp 
what is most important in terms of recovery. The evidence 
base is telling us that we need a radical shift in our 
understanding of what is at the heart (and perhaps soul) of 
mental health practice.101 
 
Kind and ethically minded approaches, which are appreciative of 
diversity and difference and contain a core belief in the potential of 
people to recover, should be central to all mental health practice. 
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The late 20th and early 21st Century has seen the development of 
a diverse range of alternative movements which do not involve a wholly 
antithetical or combative stance towards Psychiatry, but which are often 
led by the people who use (or opt not to use) mental health services. 
Parker and colleagues provide an excellent historical introduction to 
these diverse service user led and grass roots movements and groups – 
from the Hearing Voices Network to the National Association of 
Psychiatric Survivors.102 The relatively new Critical Psychiatry Network 
is also a useful site where different perspectives are collected.103 These 
groups not only seek to redress the balance of power in psychiatry, but 
increasingly form powerful spaces for service design and development to 
include the people who use services, although the relative impact of the 
oft-lauded ‘service user involvement’ that National Health Service Trusts 
must consider has been questioned.104 Nonetheless, as Gail A. Hornstein 
amply demonstrates, there is significant healing potential to be found 
through non-medicalised support systems.105 Hornstein weaves a well-
documented history of psychiatry with the stories of people who have 
been touched in some way by mental health challenges of different kinds. 
The need first to tell, and then to have heard and validated, life stories is 
a normal human imperative. It is more acute, perhaps, when those stories 
involve the effects of (sometimes iatrogenic or medically induced) 
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trauma and distress, as well as the healing power of community, 
communication and acceptance of unusual or strange experiences in a 
depathologised way.  
 
Postmodernism, Psychiatry and Philosophy  
A fundamental concern shared by many postmodern cultural theorists, 
such as Fredric Jameson and Jean Baudrillard, is that postmodernity is 
defined through and potentially experienced as psychosis in a range of 
ways.106 There is not space in this thesis to rehearse their perspectives or 
to provide a concomitant reading of Acker’s fiction through such 
theories. Angela Woods provides an excellent and detailed study into 
how versions and representations of ‘schizophrenia’ come to be a 
metaphor for contemporary post-war life in the work of a range of 20th 
and 21st Century thinkers.107 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
comment on the diverse perspectives that attempt to formulate what 
postmodernism actually is or how it is best defined.108  Rather than being 
interested in reading Acker’s work, or indeed ‘psychosis’, as interpreted 
through postmodern theory, instead, like Katie Muth, I am interested in 
“what we can understand about the ‘senseless,’ anti-narrative, poly-
vocal, and self-reflexive” elements of Acker’s work, as read “in the 
context of – rather than through the lens of – ‘literary theory’ ”.109 I also 
                                                
106 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 
(London: Verso, 1991); Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, trans. , by Foss, P. , P. Patton 
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York: The New Press, 1998), for three such illustrations of the challenges in defining 
and commenting postmodernism – or, rather, postmodernisms.  
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agree here with Josephine Hendin’s critique of postmodern theoretical 
readings of feminine and female experience – as she notes, although such 
a perspective “has enabled fresh recognition of the power of language 
and incorporated abstract concepts of the feminine in its formulations” it 
has also “grossly distorted both and failed to address behavioral 
change”.110 In this way, then, with a range of available perspectives and 
communities that accept a pluralised vision of what might be considered 
‘normal’ and ‘pathological’, the stage is set for novel and radical new 
ways of conceptualising ‘psychosis’, revisiting dominant and powerful 
biomedical formulation and moving towards an individualised, ethical 
and less pathologising approach to people’s experiences. 
Alongside the more overt challenges to psychiatric imperialism, 
there is a developing body of thought on the relationship between 
postmodern philosophy, cultural theory, and psychiatry. Bradley Lewis 
conceptualises this well. He suggests that psychiatry can utilise 
postmodern theory, which he argues “provides a liberating effect on 
modernist practices, freeing them from an enslavement to Method and 
Objectivity in order to allow the more human (all charges of 
‘antihumanism’ not withstanding) to emerge as valued and respected”, in 
order to revitalise a pseudo-scientific profession clinging to unproven 
notions of brain disease.111 Lewis proposes that the impact of the 
incorporation of postmodernism into psychiatry could be both radical and 
revolutionary:  
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As a result of the encounter with postmodernism, I anticipate 
several changes to psychiatric knowledge and practice […] In 
the best scenario, the net result will be the emergence of a 
new postmodern psychiatry and a new model for medicine, 
which will be much more enjoyable to practice and much 
more connected to the concerns of patients.112  
 
On a practical level, such an approach places people experiencing mental 
health challenges with the power to develop, grow and manage their own 
experiences and circumstances, while psychiatrists are placed in a less 
omnipotent manner, possessing the tools to assist, rather than to dictate, 
in this process. 
In a similar vein, Bracken and Thomas note that psychiatry has 
been accused of having yet to move on from the vision of inner brain 
(and thus mind) as separate from and unaffected by external social 
context: 
When we use terms such as ‘mind’ and ‘mental’ we are 
referring to some aspect of this world. But this is not 
something internal, locked away inside a physical body […] 
we will never be able to understand the various elements of 
our mental life such as thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and values 
if we think of them as located inside the brain. Trying to 
grasp the meaningful reality of sadness, alienation, obsession, 
fear, and madness by looking at scans or analysing 
biochemistry is like trying to understand a painting by 
looking at the canvas without reference to its wider world. 
[...] Conceptualising our mental life as some sort of enclosed 
world residing inside the skull does not do justice to the lived 
reality of human experience. It systematically neglects the 
importance of social context.113 
 
Bracken and Thomas lead the way in the growing body of thought on the 
relationship between postmodern philosophy and psychiatry. They 
propose their own notably practical and reconstructive manifesto for 
psychiatry in the postmodern age, which they term ‘Postpsychiatry’: 
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Postpsychiatry distances itself from the therapeutic 
implications of antipsychiatry. It does not seek to replace the 
medical techniques of psychiatry with new therapies or new 
paths towards ‘liberation.' It is not a set of fixed ideas and 
beliefs, more a set of signposts that can help us move on from 
where we are now [...] psychiatry, with its strong tradition of 
conceptual debate, has an advantage over other medical 
disciplines when it comes to the postmodern challenge. 
Postpsychiatry seeks to democratise mental health by linking 
progressive service development to a debate about contexts, 
values, and partnerships.114 
 
In developing their “hermeneutic phenomenology”, Bracken and Thomas 
detail postpsychiatry as based on five tentative areas.115 Firstly, it places 
the context – “social, cultural, temporal and bodily” – of experiences as 
the starting point, rather than the adjunct, for understanding what has led 
a person to this point.116 Secondly, it emphasises a need for “hermeneutic 
exploration” of the person’s own meaning, significance and values before 
seeking biological causal explanations.117 Thirdly, diagnosis is negotiated 
by clinician and patient – clinical knowledge does not have superior 
status over ‘lay’ knowledge.118 Fourthly, a consideration of temporality is 
vital, in line with Heideggerian notions of “being-in-the-world”.119 
Finally, it aims to reconsider scientific imperialism and aim for a unified 
but pluralistic theory of mental health and illness, facing forwards to “a 
time when we become more comfortable with dealing honestly with 
different viewpoints and different ways of framing our problems, more 
comfortable with ambivalence”.120 Bracken and Thomas propose a model 
of psychiatric practices that celebrate both plurality and plasticity of 
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perspectives to inform work with people experiencing distress, 
challenges, altered perceptions, strange or unusual beliefs and 
alternations in mood. 
Bracken and Thomas are not the first to combine discourse in 
this way. A decade prior to Bracken and Thomas’ postpsychiatry, Ian 
Parker and colleagues used Foucault and Derridian deconstruction in 
order to critically interpret current psychiatric practices – producing what 
they called a performative “practical deconstruction” in order to examine 
not only more tangible power structures but also the more abstract 
question of “how language accomplishes and reproduces the split 
between reason and unreason in the individual subject”.121 They 
deconstructed binary assumptions that underpin concepts of madness, 
such as reason and unreason, form and content, and lay versus 
professional views, with a specific critique of the use of categorisation in 
psychiatry, arguing that the “views of those we find uncomfortable and 
bewildering can be de-legitimized by locating them within a discourse of 
madness”.122 Critically analysing the power which psychiatry holds, and 
how this is filtered into popular culture and social beliefs, is one way in 
which this kind of postmodern-informed investigation can propose new 
modes of thought about subjectivity and selfhood within a psychological 
sphere. 
Comparably, Dwight Fee, from a social constructionist 
perspective, argues for the psychiatric profession’s mobilisation of 
postmodern discourses in order to address the “pressing and often 
practical need for regarding mental disorder as entangled with social life 
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and language, as well as a palpable, felt condition which damages mental 
functioning, interpersonal relationships, and other aspects of thought and 
behaviour”.123 He continues: 
Confronting illness ontology from an interpretive framework 
is one way that we can begin to discuss mental disorder 
without reifying its metaphysical status […] doing so does 
not have to mean ignoring of minimizing the real effects of 
‘madness’. Clearly (or not so clearly) a non-objectifying 
orientation to mental illness is difficult to imagine. Our 
modern understanding of mental disorder, an Enlightenment 
product, was created through the understanding that disorders 
were ‘alien’ – external and irrational maladies to be fathomed 
and hopefully rectified by the scientific expert, imbued with 
mysterious powers of moral adjudication. Consequently, 
there is no discernable dialogue between ‘mental illness’ and 
human experience.124 
 
The manifestos and philosophic formulations put forward by the likes of 
Bracken and Thomas, Parker and colleagues, and Fee have the potential 
to radically depathologise mental illness, and as Fee suggests, this does 
not necessarily lead to a minimisation of the potentially distressing 
effects of mental disordering. As I will argue in the conclusion of this 
thesis, a similar depathologising and humanising process can occur 
through using contextual, textual and thematic analysis of fiction, here 
exemplified through the early fiction of Acker. This can offer benefits for 
imaginatively and creatively working with people to support them to, 
primarily, narrate their own stories, but also offers other novel modes of 
approaching, conceptualising and responding to people experiencing 
mental health challenges. 
Alongside these types of engagement with postmodern critical 
and cultural theory, a more practice-centred development can be seen in 
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the Recovery Movement, which evolved from people who use services 
and which has, more recently, been co-opted by psychiatric services 
around the globe. Usually noted as stemming from work by Pat Deegan 
in 1988 and William Anthony in 1993, definitions of ‘recovery’ now 
emphasise hope, belief in moving beyond the previously-perceived 
lifelong or devastating effects of mental illness, integration into a 
supportive and non-stigmatising community, and living a life that is 
personally meaningful as the core ethos of Recovery.125 This definition 
from the UK-based Centre for Mental Health articulates the concept 
comprehensively: 
Recovery is about building a meaningful and satisfying life, 
whether or not there are recurring or ongoing symptoms or 
mental health problems. The key themes of recovery are: 
1. Agency – gaining a sense of control over one's life and one's 
illness. Finding personal meaning – an identity which 
incorporates illness, but retains a positive sense of self. 
2. Opportunity - building a life beyond illness. Using non-
mental health agencies, informal supports and natural social 
networks to achieve integration and social inclusion. 
3. Hope - believing that one can still pursue one's own hopes 
and dreams, even with the continuing presence of illness. Not 
settling for less, i.e. the reduced expectations of others.126 
 
Recovery as a concept is not immune to criticism despite noble aims: it 
assumes there is a ‘society’ for people to be integrated into; it has been 
colonised by services and has not led to actual or meaningful changes in 
practice, instead adopting a new name for the same maintenance-and-
medication approach; ‘recovery’ should be personally defined but 
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(through various policy and procedural developments) is still medically 
defined as being without symptoms; developments mental health law are 
increasingly restrictive and coercive, a world away from the notions of 
humaneness, positivity and hope seen in the initial vision of Recovery; it 
remains dominated by binary notions of ‘sickness’ and ‘health’, rather 
than embracing a continuum approach.127 
I argue that movement is needed now beyond ‘Recovery’ and 
towards a version of mental health that offers genuine autonomy, choice 
and space for growth or change if desired. Reformulation is needed 
around how we view the existential and ontological manifestations of 
madness themselves.128 We need to consider human experiences not as 
discrete ‘illnesses’ but as occurrences that unfold along a continuum and 
which can be understood and made meaningful if we prioritise the 
individual’s own narrative framing, produced autonomously or supported 
to be developed in a genuinely balanced relationship of co-production. It 
may be that many experience elements of ‘psychosis’ as positive, 
allowing for growth and change, but as people who are not necessarily 
distressed by their experiences it may be that this population is not often 
encountered by mental health professionals, further narrowing their 
view.129  
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The range of more open and individualised approaches noted 
above, from the critical perspectives on madness and the industry of 
mental health through to reformulations, philosophic perspectives and 
service-user led changes, do not necessarily defy the ‘reality’ of 
experiences which can, and do, cause acute distress, destruction, even 
death. These ideas are reconstructive in their proposals. The fiction of 
Acker is also in some senses reconstructive, at the same time as it 
deconstructs – both bodies of work are concerned with the reality of lived 
human experience. They examine where social and gendered concerns 
induce challenges to mental health and normal-but-pathologised 
reactions to circumstances and events; where texts and voices themselves 
which speak of and about madness should be read differently, rather than 
rejected as ‘mad’ and incomprehensible; where the experiences of the 
person and the way in which these are made meaningful (or can be made 
meaningful through narrative approaches) should be central to the 
concerns of mental health professionals, rather than homogenising 
through label and negative expectation or assumptions. As this thesis will 
demonstrate, such open, flexible and pluralistic approaches have much in 
common with my reading of Acker’s textual psychosis. Furthermore, my 
reading can, I argue, offer insights which marry with a perspective that 
values both people’s stories and their own interpretations of them, and 
which suggests that the use of narrative can be helpful in clinical 
education and practice. I return to the ideas explored here in the 
Conclusion to this thesis, where I more closely discuss the possible 
benefits of reading work like Acker’s.  
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Literature and Madness130 
I have argued previously that finding “new ways of understanding the 
multitude and variety of experiences of madness is as urgent a project as 
it has ever been”, and that literature is a key medium through which we 
can begin to think differently about human experiences.131 Literature 
presents “bizarre or inexplicable experiences, mental distress, 
behavioural disturbances, and interpersonal difficulties”, and “depicts 
elements of fantasy, resistance, resilience, tenacity, resourcefulness, and 
creativity that can be labelled, depending on context and circumstance, 
either as positive qualities or as deviant entities”.132 Of course, I am not 
the first to explore the representation of madness in literature, and before 
returning to Acker I want to acknowledge briefly this subgenre of literary 
studies. 
Literature is one medium that illustrates madness, given its 
focus on the inner world and outer experiences of individuals. As David 
Lodge writes: 
[…] literature is a record of human consciousness, the richest 
and most comprehensive we have […] Works of literature 
describe in the guise of fiction the dense specificity of 
personal experience, which is always unique, because each of 
us has a slightly or very different personal history, modifying 
every new experience we have; and the creation of literary 
texts recapitulates this uniqueness.133 
 
This quote articulates some of the core elements of my reading of 
Acker’s work, albeit in an overt way – that her fictions demonstrate the 
uniqueness of human experience with psychosis and are circularly unique 
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in and of themselves, given their radical departure from traditional 
notions of the ‘literary’ or ‘readable’. Felman, likewise, argued that every 
literary narrative “communicates with madness”, which is generally 
hidden, silenced, feared or unknown: 
Society has built the walls of mental institutions to keep apart 
the inside and the outside of a culture, to separate between 
reason and unreason and to keep apart the other against 
whose apartness society asserts its sameness and redefines 
itself as sane. But every literary text, I argue, communicates 
with madness – with what has been excluded, decreed 
abnormal, unacceptable, or senseless – by dramatizing a 
dynamically renewed, revitalized relation between sense and 
nonsense, between reason and unreason, between the 
readable and the unreadable.134 
 
Acker’s early fiction does not only communicate with madness in terms 
of content, as Felman notes – as I show in Chapter 3, it replicates 
‘psychosis’ through her radically fragmented textual forms. If it is 
accepted that many or most texts communicate in some way with the 
mental world or inner life of the characters contained within them, a 
natural progression to appreciating the communication with different 
states of mind is logical. I argue that it is Acker’s different states of mind, 
her literary unreasonableness, that prompts the new reading strategies so 
as to consider the ethics and practice of not excluding or dismissing very 
real experiences as meaningless or only indicative of a sickness to be 
treated. Acker’s work enacts what Felman refers to as the “dynamically 
renewed, revitalized relation between sense and nonsense, between 
reason and unreason, between the readable and the unreadable”.135 
In a similar way to the work of Felman and Lodge, Branimir M. 
Rieger and Lillian Feder’s work remains important in the subgenre of 
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literary studies on madness in literature. Reiger provides an illuminating 
selection of essays on aspects of “literary madness”, asking, “from what 
better source could one learn about madness, violence, murder, deceit, 
betrayal, lust, greed, loneliness and depression than in writers such as 
Sophocles, Aeschylus, Shakespeare, Dostoyevsky, Faulkner, Genet, 
Nabokov, Burroughs and Stephen King?”136 Rieger is astute in his 
assertion that literature provides insights into madness that are 
unavailable in such a rich and comprehensive way in other textual forms 
such as the clinical vignette. Feder, in her 1980 historical-cultural study 
of literature from Dionysus and Sophocles to John Berryman and Sylvia 
Plath, via Shakespeare and the Romantics, suggests that in “literature, as 
in daily life, madness is the perpetual amorphous threat within and the 
extreme of the unknown in fellow human beings”.137 For Feder, a “mad 
literary character must be approached on his own terms, through the 
verbal, dramatic, and narrative symbols that convey the unconscious 
processes he portrays and reveals”.138 I divert somewhat from these 
theorists in two ways. Firstly, I want to explore the textual psychosis 
evident in Acker’s work rather than diagnosing or otherwise denoting 
particular characters as ‘mad’. Secondly, my aim here is to explore the 
applied clinical utility of a comprehensive reading of an author’s version 
of psychosis.  
Nonetheless, literary focus on ‘mad’ characters is attracting 
attention in clinical practice and education, working within the related 
disciplines of the medical humanities and health humanities. This work is 
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returned to in detail in the conclusion of this work, but it is worth noting 
the narrative context of clinical innovation here. Nurses, psychologists 
and medics are beginning to explore how, in literature, ‘mad’ characters 
can inform clinical education, potentially providing more human and 
humane insights onto the experience of madness than is available through 
medical or nursing textbooks.139 Examples of literary autobiographies 
that focus on madness, for instance, and which can be used in clinical 
pedagogy and practice for illuminating experiences that may otherwise 
be unfamiliar, include texts such as William Styron’s Darkness Visible 
and Elizabeth Wurtzel’s Prozac Nation, both on depression and 
anxiety.140 Similarly, narratives which are semi-fictionalised 
autobiographies – most notably perhaps Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar and 
Janet Frame’s Faces in the Water – can be viewed as offering something 
useful to both literary studies and to clinical practices.141 That is, they 
offer depth and richness for narrative scholarship, while simultaneously 
remaining recognisable in terms of the clinical portrayal. A thesis 
focusing on such texts may have been, in some senses, easier than using 
less explicitly relevant texts, but it is my contention that Acker (and 
potentially other experimental writers) can offer something more to 
understanding of ‘psychosis’, something that goes beyond a simple 
empathetic or experiential reading.  
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Alongside recognition of the use of literature in clinical 
education and practice, a second area of comparatively recent 
development has been in the production and recognition of service user 
narratives as valid sources of knowledge. Such experiences support the 
development of empathetic approaches to experiences that may be seen 
as unusual, unfamiliar or ‘ununderstandable’, often focusing on the 
experience of trauma – either as playing a role in the aetiology of mental 
health challenges or as a response to different experiences and their 
treatments.142 As is tradition in medical history, there are books written 
by clinicians about the people they have worked with – one potential 
criticism of this type of work is they risk situating people who experience 
‘psychosis’ or other unusual mental states as the inactive recipients of 
medical expertise.143 Hornstein’s recent Agnes’s Jacket acts against trend 
somewhat by combining a literary narrative about the autobiographical 
text that Agnes Richter wove into her jacket with the narratives of those 
who use peer support and/or self-define their recovery and survival. The 
potential power that people find through having their experiences 
validated and appreciated as valid is clear in this text.144 
In terms of the direct clinical use of narrative skills and story-
based practice, the clinical practice of narrative medicine, whereby 
                                                
142 Notable as one of the first such collections is Jim Read and Jill Reynolds eds., 
Speaking Our Minds: An Anthology of Personal Experiences of Mental Distress and its 
Consequences (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1996). In the past five years, publisher 
PCCS Books has commissioned a series of similar works. See Alec Grant, Fran Biley 
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clinicians are encouraged to hold not only an interest in the life lived 
outside and around the medical condition, but to have degrees of 
narrative competence that enable them to effectively interpret, 
understand and reflect back people’s experiences and their relationship to 
their illness, is now well-established.145 This body of work focuses 
mainly on physical illness experience and more common psychological 
issues such as stress. Very recently, developments have occurred in the 
practice of Narrative Psychiatry, whereby the intention is to support 
individuals to tell, formulate, re-tell and re-formulate their experiences. 
This practice aims to “co-author a story of success in overcoming 
problems, no matter how small those successes may be”, which SuEllen 
Hamkins describes as follows: “rather than privileging only stories of 
loss, suffering, conflict, neglect, or abuse in someone’s life, I also search 
for stories of joy, connection, intimacy, consistency, and success, for 
these are the wealth of the people who consult with us”.146 In this sense, 
narrative reading and interpretative strategies are woven into the practice 
of psychiatry in a positive and forward facing manner, rather than the 
traditional psychoanalytic foci of backwards exploration into childhood 
using a pre-determined framework for analysis. Elements of narrative 
psychiatry can be utilised when also appreciating the use of extant texts 
to inform practice and pedagogy. Cohering and narrating experience can, 
I argue in my conclusion, offer an active and collaborative way to work 
through experiences and ‘psychosis’, which can be both empowering and 
                                                
145See Arthur W. Frank, The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics (1995) 
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aligned with a hetero-generative clinical practice, appreciating the person 
not the label. Acker’s work of incoherency, fragmentation and trauma 
can provide ways of reading differently that might enable the 
development of skills in supporting people in narrative ways. 
Drawing literary, medical and cultural theory together Louis 
Sass, in his wide-ranging 1992 study excavates both ‘schizophrenia’ as a 
clinical syndrome and an array of modernist definitional elements and art 
forms, taking the central features of each as his organising schemata. His 
“comparison” between the clinical and the artistic, he suggests, may 
seem at first glance to be “arbitrary, perhaps even outlandish”.147 
However, “if schizophrenia is to be comprehended psychologically [....] 
its interpretation must be intimately tied to its very diversity and 
incomprehensibility”.148 He continues, asking what “better place, then, to 
seek analogies than in the culture of modernism/postmodernism – that 
‘tradition of the new’ where bafflement and pluralism are the rule?”.149 
On postmodernism, Sass suggests that: 
Certain theorists who see Western societies as having moved 
into a stage of post-modernity emphasise a somewhat 
different set of developments, among them: the waning of 
affect, the dissolution of the sense of separate selfhood, the 
loss of any sense of the real, and the saturation by images and 
simulacra detached from all grounding outside themselves; 
these obviously are more than a little reminiscent of certain 
schizoid and schizophrenic tendencies, and it is not difficult 
to imagine that such general cultural developments might 
also influence the modes of experience characteristic of such 
individuals.150 
 
His analysis of modernism and madness is detailed and compelling, but 
positions ‘schizophrenia’ as an extant psychopathological entity. The 
                                                
147 Louis Sass, Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature 
and Thought (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 27.  
148 Ibid. p. 27.  
149 ibid. p. 27.  
150 Sass, p. 372.  
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exploration of Acker’s literary psychosis in this thesis differs from Sass’s 
in this important way.  
Sass presents his analysis of the affinities between madness and 
(mostly) modernism along experiential yet symptomatological lines. His 
starting point is the “forms of consciousness and texture of the lived 
world of many schizophrenics”.151 These are points of comparison drawn 
between certain elements of modernity – loss of active, coherent self, 
abstraction of form and content, detachment from community and culture 
– and the experiences denoted as indicative of ‘schizophrenia’.152 My 
aim is to move beyond the identification of textual examples of 
psychological or psychiatric symptom such as paranoia, hallucination, 
delusion, and so forth. I explore the areas of intersection between 
Acker’s depictions and the phenomenological delineation of experiences 
aligned with ‘psychosis’, but this thesis begins with Acker’s texts 
themselves, without either a categorical or categorising reading. Hence, 
in Chapter 3, I explore the form of the text as analogous to psychosis, not 
as demonstrative of the form of any symptom. In Chapter 4, I am 
concerned not with descriptive psychopathology but instead with 
exploring narrative framing, depiction and charactorial presentation in 
terms of experiences that are explicitly or might be viewed as similar in 
some ways to those that have experienced ‘psychosis’ might describe. 
Acker’s early texts actively reject and resist a simple diagnostic or 
symptomatological reading. In many respects, rather than seeing Acker’s 
psychosis as reinforcing the perspective that postmodern culture and 
experience is somehow diagnosable with psychiatric categories, I suggest 
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that Acker depathologises psychotic experiences within her narratives, 
aligning my argument in Chapter 5 with the critical and post-psychiatric 
perspectives on ‘madness’.  
  
Reading Psychosis in Acker’s Writing  
I have previously argued that there is a subgenre of fiction that comprises 
of psychotic texts.153 Acker provides an exemplar of the psychoticisation 
of textual form and content.154 This interpretation has been influenced by 
the work of Evelyn Keitel, who suggests that what she calls 
psychopathographies “first appeal to but then undermine and ultimately 
frustrate the reading habits acquired from consuming contemporary 
literature, so that a vacuum is created in which the specific effect of 
psychopathographies can unfold”.155 The reader is not distanced from the 
psychosis depicted but is instead drawn into the midst of the experience 
where “[r]eading about psychosis becomes a reading psychosis”.156 
Where I divert from Keitel in advancing her theory towards a 
psychoticisation of the text itself is in my argument that Acker writes 
“inaccessible” material through new, rather than “unknown”, textual 
codes and strategies. Texts which offer a literary performance of 
psychosis, like Acker’s, differ from Keitel’s psychopathographies not in 
their effect on the reader, which I suggest is similar at points, but on their 
linguistic and narrative form, structure, context and content. Nonetheless 
Keitel develops a convincing theory of reader response focusing on 
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different types of psychopathography, which I explore in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
Rather than interpreting Acker’s work through Keitel, then, I 
offer a novel approach to the way in which her work might offer clinical 
insights. There are four other potential readings of Acker’s texts that 
could be performed using the theories and approaches elaborated upon in 
this chapter. Firstly, a diagnostic reading of character or author can be 
performed using the psychiatric discourse; this, I argue, is inexact and 
insufficient. While some scholars have performed this type of analysis of 
fictional works, writers of fiction do not aim their texts to be used as 
clinical case studies, to be pored over for specific symptoms to be 
identified.157 This type of reading would also be quite tedious – beyond 
identifying the number of times a particular experience occurs, I am 
unsure of what this reading adds to either literary scholarship or health 
humanities, beyond the oft-repeated suggestion that there is a relationship 
between madness and creativity.158 Retrospective diagnostics of author 
adds a further layer of uncertainty, given the tenuous nature of 
psychiatric diagnostics. Applying a contemporary clinical framework, of 
which I am critical, to texts or authors would not lead to any furthering 
development in either medicine or literature – it is a static process. 
Secondly, given the postmodern questioning of common 
acceptance of various meta- or grand narratives, and the way this is 
illuminated in post-psychiatric theorising, Acker’s fictions could be read 
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as literary examples of the varying ‘anti-psychiatry’ discourses. 
Relatedly, and thirdly, prior to the anti-psychiatry movements of the 
1960s onwards, the psychoanalytic discourse elaborated by Freud 
provided one of the first alternative views of madness.159 
Psychoanalytically analysing the work of Acker, or reading it as 
uncritically ‘anti’ any one thing, is problematic. Psychoanalytic 
interpretation perhaps best belongs to the texts of high Modernist authors 
such as James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, and Henry James, as seen in 
Felman’s excellent study – authors who actively embraced 
psychoanalytic theory in their work.160 It can be argued that 
contemporary fiction is best situation within an era of psychosis rather 
than neurosis, as Jameson asserts, which may be indicative of a more 
general “shift in the dynamics of cultural pathology”.161 A second 
rationale for not using an anti-psychiatric or psychoanalytic approach 
comes in again utilising Jaspers’ distinction – that is, psychoanalysis is 
more closely aligned with experiences associated with neurosis, but less 
so with psychosis.  
Finally, the fields of philosophy and cultural theory utilise 
psychiatry and psychopathology – particularly discourse around 
‘psychosis’ and ‘schizophrenia’ – in order to illuminate their theories in 
an often-metonymical manner. Jameson’s theory of the “waning of 
affect” in postmodernity, due to the transition from neurosis to 
schizophrenia, and the Baudrillardian questioning of reality and 
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subsequent theory of “schizophrenic vertigo” formed of nightmarish 
precessions of simulacrum and “serial signs” are of particular relevance 
to ideas of postmodernism and ‘schizophrenia’, as explored in depth by 
Angela Woods.162 Where relevant, scholarship which use these types of 
theorists to explore Acker’s fiction are referred to, and there exists 
already a substantial body of work on reading Acker through critical and 
cultural theory.163 This type of analysis of Acker’s work may be both 
inclusory and deconstructive in destabilising the binary position of mad 
against not-mad. However, what I propose is a reconstructive reading 
which promotes the potential of text in the development of novel 
interpretative and reading strategies, supporting and further developing 
the clinical and pedagogic implications of post- and critical psychiatry. 
Whilst the impact of different discourses on Acker’s work can 
only be tentatively suggested, it is irrefutable that they form both the 
historical and contemporary languages of ‘madness’ available at present. 
Indeed, within this dominant language system the challenge of speaking 
of a depathologised form of ‘psychosis’ is evident – in using the term 
psychosis, I am already constrained by extant understandings, which 
immediately connote difference from a ‘norm’. As Jaspers suggested, 
“Language has always differentiated affective illness from madness 
proper. For lay persons madness means senseless raving, affectless 
confusion, delusion, incongruous affects, a ‘crazy’ personality”.164 I use 
the term ‘psychosis’ throughout this thesis because, as Ian Parker and 
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colleagues write: “By retaining the term, introducing it to another 
framework, and giving it a different value, the danger of collapsing back 
into the same distinctions can be fended off”.165 A second option might 
be to use ‘madness’, which I refer to at different points but which 
encompasses a potentially broader range of different psychological 
experiences – here I wanted to keep in mind the elements of 
ununderstandability I have illuminated in this chapter. Finally, as Simon 
Cross points out, language in relation to mental health is always tentative 
and fraught with opposition and challenge – the label ‘mad’ for example 
has been wrested from the grips of psychiatry and re-appropriated as a 
positive through events like Mad Pride.166 Cross notes, “the language of 
psychiatry more often than not shapes public discourse on mental health 
to such an extent that its critics have to rely on it in order to 
participate”.167 Using the more ephemeral ‘madness’ exclusively in this 
thesis (particularly in this chapter) may lead to criticism around an 
alleged lack of understanding around what ‘psychosis’ is, as compared to 
different mental states. 
As I will demonstrate, Acker’s work breaks down hierarchical 
binary oppositions of mad-sane, representing instead fluidity of 
experiences that follow on a continuum of reason, without a clear point 
of rupture or departure from ‘normal’ to ‘abnormal’.168 In Acker’s 
novellas, short fragments and transitional text Empire of the Senseless, 
elements that contribute to psychosis-like experience, such as 
                                                
165 Parker and others, p. 110.  
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167 Cross, Mediating Madness, p. 33.  
168 See Leader for discussion on notions of ‘everyday’ madness, and also Bentall, 
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fragmentation and unattainability of a coherent and unified self, are 
positioned neither as revolutionary or celebratory; my argument that her 
portrayal of madness is a continuum one is not to ignore, underrate or 
otherwise dismiss the suffering that experiences conceptualised as 
‘psychosis’ may cause. I am not proposing to deny the existence of 
mental states that have been conceptualised under the umbrella term of 
psychosis – my clinical work tells me this is not the case – but to do two 
things. Firstly, to explore Acker’s visions of ‘psychosis’ in terms of the 
context of gender, formal textual construction, and subjective content. 
Secondly, to offer a view of how a reading such as this can inform the 
clinical context, in line with the extant medical humanities and the 
emerging health humanities disciplines. In terms of situating this thesis 
within a critical discourse, many of the ideas that will be elucidated from 
these fictions have a complex interrelationship with the evolving 
dialogue between postmodernity and psychiatry that I have explored 
above. As I aim to demonstrate, Acker’s writing proposes a new version 
of psychosis, one that can offer a more depathological vision – this 
literary analysis of ‘psychosis’ can be located within and offer 
progression to some of the critical and post-psychiatry formulations 
described above. 
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Chapter 2: Gender, Sex and ‘Psychosis’ in Acker’s writing  
Someday there’ll have to be a new world. A new kind of 
woman [...] Meanwhile things stink, Kathy thinks to herself. I 
have to be two different people if I want to be a woman. I’m 
me: I’m lonely I’m miserable I’m crazy I’m hard and tough I 
work so much I’m determined to see reality I don’t 
compromise I use people especially men to get money to 
keep surviving I juggle reality (thoughts of reality) I feel 
sorry for myself I love to hurt myself and get hurt etc. i.e., 
I’m a person like any goddamn man’s a person.169 
 
In this chapter, I argue that Acker offers a creative telling of feminist 
theories of women’s madness. Acker’s fictional worlds and fragmented 
texts are filled with dispossessed, abused and subjugated characters, both 
male and female. Of interest here is how Acker’s narratives demonstrate 
the socio-political causal and contextual elements of ‘psychosis’ that 
contribute to how it is both formulated in women and more directly 
induced, showing the reasonable development of madness in women. 
Unreason, in women, is in this sense entirely reasonable. In this chapter, I 
examine four areas that contribute to Acker’s overall creative retelling of 
women’s madness. Initially, I explore her subversion of essentialist and 
patriarchally constructed expectations of women; I move on to discuss 
her visions of the double bind caused by romantic relationships; thirdly I 
explore her notions of the analogous nature of sex, orgasm and 
psychosis-like experiences; finally, I examine Acker’s transgressive 
representations of sexual violence. Acker demonstrates and subverts the 
patriarchal knowledge and power structures that position and maintain 
women as potential ‘victims’ of men. I argue that she interweaves the 
bodily and the mental through the parallel experiences of sex, 
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particularly orgasm, and psychosis. Her commentary on trauma offers 
insights that may be under-acknowledged in some psychiatric framings.  
Throughout, and in concluding this chapter, I read Acker’s 
complex examination of the interrelationship of being female and 
‘psychosis’ through the lenses of clinical feminist critiques of women 
and madness. In this way, her telling of female madness most acutely re-
positions women’s madness in a creative and complimentary manner to 
the feminist discourses on female madness that were simultaneously 
emerging during her most radical writing period. These discourses 
continue to be reframed and rewritten; women’s mental health warrants a 
specifically gendered consideration. There is not one singular feminist 
critique of women and madness. While the extensive body of work on 
gender and madness shares some common concerns – the over 
representation of women in psychiatric patient populations, their 
(mis)treatment at the hands of psychiatry, and the causes and cures of 
women’s madness broadly defined – they differ in their perspectives and 
ideological positions. I hope that this chapter can therefore offer 
something new in the debates about women’s experiences of ‘psychosis’ 
– my aim is to show that Acker’s suggests some novel approaches to our 
conceptualisations of female madness. I start this chapter by briefly 
summarising extant feminist-oriented critiques of psychiatry, in order to 
contextualise how such approaches have informed my reading of Acker.  
Detailed and persuasive historical surveys on the positioning of 
women as somehow naturally and /or socially conditioned towards 
irrationality from a historical-literary perspective are evident, particularly 
in Elaine Showalter’s The Female Malady and, more recently, in Lisa 
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Appignanesi’s remarkable Mad, Bad and Sad: A History of Women and 
the Mind Doctors from 1800 to the Present. 170 As such, I will not 
rehearse the well-known history of, for example, ‘hysteria’ in detail 
here.171 Rather, I am interested in the work of clinically oriented feminist 
theorists who focus on the theoretical, philosophical and clinical issues 
that encapsulate women’s madness – in particular, Phyllis Chesler’s 
Women and Madness, first published in 1972 and reviewed and 
republished in 2005, is a classic text, referred to by may of the other 
critics I refer to.172 More recently Jane Ussher’s The Madness of Women: 
Myth and Experience revisits familiar territory and offers a persuasive 
articulation on how women are pathologised because of both their gender 
and their sex.173 Explorations of female madness in literature can also be 
found; simultaneously, much feminist work on madness draws on both 
literature and literary figures, including female authors themselves such 
as Sylvia Plath and Anne Sexton.174 There are also a series of works that 
are concerned with women’s madness as it is presented and contained 
within clinical settings, often with a focus on conditions that are 
epidemiologically more common in women, such as self harm, 
                                                
170 Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture 1830-
1980 (London: Virago, 1987); Appignanesi, Mad, Bad and Sad.  
171 See Elaine Showalter’s Hystories (1997) (London: Picador, 1998) for a detailed 
overview not only of ‘hysteria’ but also of contemporary epidemics of beliefs systems 
that have been controversially and less controversially aligned with ‘madness’. See also 
Hawkins, p. 640 on the way the terms ‘hysteria’ has been applied to Acker’s work, and 
Schlichter, pp. 312-317 for a critical view on Iriguray and “hysterical mimesis” (p. 
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‘borderline personality disorder’ and responses to trauma.175 To note, 
such works are highly critical of these epidemiological differences, 
noting both then over-diagnosis and pathologisation of female 
experiences such as pre-menstrual mood changes.176 Sociological 
readings of women’s mental health provide useful perspectives, as do 
those that use both philosophy and feminist theory to enhance clinical 
understanding.177 There are, also, a wealth of theoretical and 
philosophical texts focusing on female gendered identity, trauma and 
madness, and such theory has been drawn upon to illuminate gender and 
feminist themes in Acker’s work.178  
As Susan E. Hawkins notes, a feminist reading of Acker’s work 
acknowledges that she perceived “phallic power as monolithic and all 
pervasive, everywhere and always already the same”, which places her 
“historically and culturally within a late seventies, radical feminism”.179 
In this chapter I argue that Acker’s work has parallels with some of the 
classical and contemporary clinically oriented feminist work, and that she 
exposes the paradoxes and myths around female ‘psychosis’ in a 
clinically useful way. I argue that Acker overtly undermines claims about 
‘what’ women are and how they are ‘naturally’ equated with madness. 
She plays on ‘feminine’ characteristics in her portrayal of romantic 
relationships, which are always bound up with confusing issues of sexual 
                                                
175 Denise Russell, Women, Madness and Medicine (Cambridge: Polity Press 1995); 
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desire, demonstrating the double bind effect of relationships that induce a 
cognitive dissonance of desire and repulsion, the need for connectivity 
and the desire for isolation. Acker’s vision of sexual desire and orgasm 
can be read, I argue, as inducing forms of dissociation that might be 
aligned with similar experiences in psychosis. Sexual violence is a reality 
for many of Acker’s characters, and her vision of trauma is important 
when considering the external root causes of female reactions to trauma 
and distress, rather than isolating ‘psychosis’ as a solely intrapersonal 
issue. Firstly, I discuss how Acker subverts gendered essentialism in 
terms of irrationality and patriarchal power.  
 
Gender, Patriarchy and Psychopathology  
Acker is, in her fiction and non-fiction, highly critical of the core gender 
ideologies of patriarchal and sexual power, which both create the 
unreasonable world that her characters inhabit, and induces their 
reasonably-unreasonable responses. Unreason in women, in Acker, is 
developed by and because of patriarchy. This ideology may be formed 
from essentialist assumptions about what women are and gender power 
disparities that define how women should be. This damaging ideology 
underlies much reasoning around women’s mental health and illness, 
according to many feminist commentaries. Showalter, for example, 
suggests that there are “dual images of female insanity”: “madness as one 
of the wrongs of women” and “madness as the essential feminine nature 
unveiling itself before scientific male rationality”.180 Showalter further 
suggests that there are two ways that the equating of ‘female’ with ‘mad’ 
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has occurred. First, she notes that more women receive mental health 
labels than men, which offers a simple interpretation of a direct 
interrelationship. The more “prevalent view”, however, notes how 
feminists and other scholars “have shown how women, within our 
dualistic systems of language and representation, are typically situated on 
the side of irrationality, silence, nature, and body, while men are situated 
on the side of reason, discourse, culture, and mind”.181 Acker draws upon 
these two areas – the idea of women as essentially tending towards 
madness, and women defined as mad by a phallologocentric social 
system – in her textual illumination of issues of female ‘psychosis’. This 
is demonstrated through her exposure and destabilisation of the 
unreasonable system of gender dualisms.  
Psychiatry in the broadest sense, including taxonomy, nosology 
and pathologisation, has been formulated of being based on this 
essentialist dualism. Busfield argues that current diagnostic process and 
classificatory systems (the DSM and ICD-10), while formulated as 
gender-neutral, are in fact “related to gender since they construct as 
problems of the mind (that is, as irrationality), feelings, mental processes 
and behaviour which are in themselves gendered”.182 She continues by 
pointing out that individual case histories, the cornerstone of psychiatric 
practice, are constructed precisely by paying attention to “individual 
characteristics” such as gender.183 While a focus on gendered experience 
in psychiatry is (as I will argue) potentially necessary and helpful, an 
issue lies in when women are pathologised because of their gender and/ 
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or when their reasonable responses to gendered inequality, gender 
experience and specifically gendered trauma are deemed pathological. As 
Busfield argues, like Showalter, “the gendered nature of notions of 
rationality and agency, with the strong linkage between what it is to be a 
rational, autonomous individual and being a man and the corollary – a 
tendency to see women as passive, emotional and irrational – underpins 
these processes of categorisation”.184 Busfield later suggests persuasively 
that power – something that Acker is clearly concerned with, not least in 
relation to the position of women and other subjugated groups – is a 
further crucial element of the demarcation of women as inherently 
unstable, irrational, ‘mad’. “Women’s relative lack of power in many 
situations in comparison with men, and the perceptions surrounding their 
lack of power, means they are double disadvantaged”, she writes, 
continuing on the “one hand, their lack of power makes it more likely 
that their behaviours may be viewed as indicative of mental disorder. 
And, on the other hand, it makes certain experiences more traumatic or 
distressing”.185  
It can be argued that psychological response to trauma is 
individually rather than gender-defined – public and clinical awareness 
of female-on-male domestic violence and male rape, for example, is 
developing – but Busfield’s analysis of the double-disadvantage women 
experience is strong, and can be furthered. It is not only an essentialist 
tendency, nor the socio-economic power differentials between men and 
women, that are replicated in psychiatry, which lead to the 
women=madness equation. Women are trapped in a double bind of 
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‘feminine’ behavioural expectations. They are simultaneously expected 
to conform to certain stereotypes – as a nurturing mother or passive 
partner, ‘better’ at expressing emotion, and so forth. Yet, paradoxically, 
if women do not conform to their gender stereotype, displaying instead 
‘un-feminine’ characteristics such as anger or violence (against 
themselves in the form of self harm, others in the form of aggression, or 
against their children), or excesses of ‘feminine’ characteristics (such as 
‘neediness’ in relationships, an excess of self-blame or excess of guilt, 
among others) then they risk being pathologised as ‘personality 
disordered’, ‘antisocial’, ‘histrionic’ or a range of other diagnoses.186 
Russell further suggests that many of the personality disorder diagnoses, 
in particular, amount to “different ways of being female”, and thus that to 
‘be’ female is to automatically be pathological.187 This certainly aligns 
with my clinical experience working with women who experience self 
harm, who risk attracting a ‘personality disorder’ diagnosis simply 
through the physical manifestation of their distress or emotion, despite 
lacking other diagnostic criteria that might indicate further challenges.188 
While such feminist-orientated critical formulations are 
persuasively argued, they risk employing the same notion of difference 
that they critique to make their case, at times paradoxically arguing 
against gender stereotyping while using gender stereotypes to solidify 
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their arguments.189 In contrast, within Acker’s work, biological sex and, 
subsequently, gendered identity and gendered experience, are not 
simplistically represented. Gender in Acker’s work is fluid and 
malleable. Some of Acker’s narrators switch genders, at times literally 
and at others in a way more aligned with an analysis using Butlerian 
theory of gender performativity.190 A second way this is presented is 
through the blurring of first-person narrative voice, where male and 
female narrators speak as ‘I’ in the same sections. Many of Acker’s 
works excavate the ways in which women navigate and subvert their 
socially-ascribed sex roles, gendered identities and risks inherent in 
female experience, alongside portrayals of sexual desire set against a 
morally repressive external context that minimises and places controls on 
female desire.  
Acker was clear that “simple” binary divisions were not 
something that interested her and that patriarchal duality was clear to her 
in terms of in her perception of psychiatry, saying in interview with Beth 
Jackson, “I’m not into that simple division of women or men, goddess or 
god or anything like that. I’m certainly not going into any system that’s 
based on patriarchy; I distrust a lot of psychiatry for that reason”.191 I will 
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return to the notion of a patriarchal psychiatry, but I want to first note 
Acker’s broader distrust of the essentialist binary division on which 
patriarchy depends on. Distrust of a system founded on sex difference, 
which then assigns gender roles that subsequently affect behaviour, 
thought and actions, is something that Acker discussed from her earliest 
work onwards. Ways to dispense with fabricated notions of ‘female’ 
roles, ‘feminine’ behaviour and the ‘correct’ way to think as a woman 
(or, rather, not think) and feel, are evident from her first novella Rip Off 
Red, Girl Detective, published posthumously. In this text, the female 
protagonist Red (after having sex on an aeroplane with a stranger, and 
expressing a stereotypically feminine concern that she will be abandoned 
by this stranger) questions: “This isn’t typical of a hard-boiled detective, 
a detective who chooses intellectual pursuits over emotional ones. I have 
no right to be scared. Well, I’m a female detective I don’t pay attention to 
that shit about intellectual versus emotional”.192 As a detective, Red 
needs to focus her energies towards intellectual pursuits in order to 
successfully solve her cases, yet she is constantly distracted by emotional 
and sexual needs. As explored above, in this way the assumed ‘feminine’ 
characteristic of emotionality (associated with irrationality) overtakes 
intellect (rationality – a ‘masculine’ trait). Russell suggests that if a 
“woman breaks out of the female role” she risks being “regarded as 
mentally unhealthy, as she is not fulfilling her role”.193 Then, however, 
she is caught in a “Catch 22” – if she remains compliant with a socially 
ascribed feminine role, she risks being deemed psychiatrically unwell 
because the standard of ‘wellness’ is defined by allegedly masculine 
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attributes.194 In this respect, then, it is evident that Red is similarly caught 
in a double bind ‘catch 22’ situation here, with desires and needs 
contrasting with cognitions and responsibilities. 
Acker’s concern with deceitful equation of gender in the 
rational/irrational binary can be further aligned with critiques of male-
dominated psychiatry. A tension is evident in much of Acker’s work 
between gendered expectations, assumption and actuality. This tension 
is, in part, formed by the way in which one person’s (usually male) claim 
to knowledge and to knowing is taken as superior to another’s (usually 
female). Acker recognised that such belief systems are foundational to 
patriarchy, leading to oppression, subjugation, and to either an inevitable 
madness (driven to psychosis by circumstance) or to experiences that 
might lead to responses later deemed to be pathological (such as 
psychological reactions to sexual trauma). Joan Busfield, in her 
sociological analysis of men and women’s different experiences of 
mental health and illness, highlights the oppressive nature of such 
equating. She argues that a simplistic ‘male-female/us-them’ binary 
offers limited potential for adequate or accurate theorisation about gender 
and madness, or for politically and socially effective challenge and 
change to occur.195 Busfield instead emphasises six foundational 
suppositions related to gender which she uses to build her critique of the 
differences and synergisms between men and women’s mental ill-health. 
These include the assertion that any theory of gender must be based 
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primarily on feminist foundations, and that gender should be considered 
alongside, not separate from, social systems and relations.196 
While Acker demonstrates an active textual engagement with 
many of the elements Busfield highlights as important to enable critical 
evaluation of gender and ‘madness’, the subject is more complexly 
presented in her fictions. Acker’s intricate portrayal of the patriarchal 
creation of gender conventions is explored in depth by Pitchford, a 
theorisation that has relevance to reading Acker’s analytical enunciation 
of the synergistic relationship between patriarchy and the pathologisation 
of women. Pitchford, in her study of feminist political tactics in the work 
of Angela Carter and Kathy Acker, notes that one critique of 
postmodernism in general is that at the same time marginalised 
subjectivity came to be visible and validated, a predominantly white, 
middle-class, male group of theorists declared the end of subjectivity.197 
Thus, at the very moment that self-defined subjectivity became a 
possibility for women, among others, it was silenced, dismissed. Such an 
erasure need not signal the futility of resistance, challenge or change, 
however, suggests Pitchford: 
Thus, recognizing ‘woman’ as a fiction does not imply 
therefore working against it in the name of some more 
accurate, objective truth. One can reject the usual value 
loaded opposition between fiction and truth by recognizing 
that fictions have the power to create subject-positions and 
alliances – to become true – through the operation of 
framing.198 
 
Identifying the differences between tactics (resistances used by those 
who may be powerless) and strategies (inflicted by the powerful upon 
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the powerless), she suggests that tactics can “disrupt the binary 
construction of otherness by underlining its necessary presence 
throughout the social fabric”.199 In Acker, suggests Pitchford, “society is 
a series of texts written by the powerful” in which resistance and change 
becomes possible via the realisation and understanding that no “single 
text defines anyone, nor tells the whole story of our identifications and 
allegiances”.200 Drawing upon Judith Butler’s work Pitchford suggests 
that Acker’s deployment of pastiche and plagiarism “breaks up the 
homogeneity of culture, exposing the numerous and varied discourses 
that at any moment influence and shape each of us. Contradictions arise 
among these discourses, allowing for new deployments and 
combinations”.201 She then discusses gender dualism in Acker’s Don 
Quixote, suggesting that Acker’s manipulation of the male/female binary, 
combined with her transformation of several characters in Quixote into 
dogs, serves to demonstrate that “dualism is the component of 
rationalism that allows for the establishment of hierarchies, a world 
divided into ‘us’ and ‘them’ ”.202 Schlichter supports this view, 
perceiving Acker’s contribution to the “discourse of critical madness” to 
be to critically expose not only “patriarchal concepts of femininity” but 
also the “cultural conditions of their production” and to “develop 
strategies for the reconfiguration of the representational order”.203 As I 
argue, it is the binary dualism of rationalism itself that serves to allow for 
subjugation of women in this way as lower, lesser, mad. 
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There are two interrelated elements to Acker’s subverting of 
gender dualism that contribute to her subversion of the women=madness 
equation, both of which might be “tactics” in Pitchford’s framing. The 
first tactic is to subvert the gender dualism which positions women as 
essentially contrasted to men, a dualism which leads, as Showalter 
highlights, to the essentialist demarcation of women as embodying 
emotion, instability and irrationality and men as epitomising 
intellectualism, stability and rationality.204 The second tactic is her 
exposure of the masculine attribution of what women are, and how they 
are therefore ‘mad’, as both meaningless and fictional. The two tactics 
are not mutually exclusive, and underpinning both are the related 
expectations placed upon women in terms of relationships, sexual 
identity and gendered notions of ‘victimhood’. In a wider context, it 
could equally be argued that such assumptions damage the perception of 
male responsibility and expectation; equating their experiences of 
distress or disorder as ‘feminine’ and hence something to be ashamed of, 
or that their essentialist physical characteristics should somehow make 
them immune to domestic or sexual violence. This view is relevant to my 
later conclusions in Chapter 5, which focus on how to better work with 
people. Nonetheless, these two tactics form the basis of my analysis of 
Acker’s deconstruction of rationalist notions of woman and madness.  
In many respects Acker’s often-playful dissolution of traditional 
biological sex distinctions might reveal that definitive categorisation 
based on biology alone is impossible; the first tactic she employs. Yet 
such assumptions are concurrently inescapable, a factor that contributes 
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to Acker’s overall positioning of gendered identity as unstable, 
fragmentary and leading to self-uncertainty. This uncertainty is 
illustrated in a non-fiction piece, ‘Paragraphs’. She argued in 1995, some 
time after much of the fiction of concern here, that “there’s a move in 
progress, a move away from this world of duality, precisely, from this 
world defined by two set genders: not everything now has to be coded in 
male of female”.205 Acker’s earlier works may be seen as a precursor for 
this later revelation, where gendered identity is never “anything more 
than performative”.206 Acker’s interruption of the gender binary is 
demonstrated through her literal narrativisation of Judith Butler’s work 
on the performativity of gender identity.207 In I Dreamt I was a 
Nymphomaniac: Imagining, for example, a scene exists where character 
Peter and the narrator switch genders in an extended convolution.208 The 
narrator decides “I’m a woman transvestite who’s wildly in love with the 
most gorgeous fag in town” (IDIN, p. 113). Names and personal 
pronouns are disrupted in this section, leaving the reader in a sense of 
some confusion and demonstrating reliance on stable linguistic form and 
rule to orient not only in literature but also in terms of social 
comprehension more generally.209 Gender is an inherent part of an 
orienting system that Acker interrupts textually, which contributes to the 
sense of psychosis at the level of textual form, explored in Chapter 3. 
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In ‘Paragraphs’, Acker states, “it’s not men who are messed-up, 
though they are; it’s the whole system. The whole system of dualistic 
thinking. I don’t think that any of us would disagree that we, as women, 
are messed-up”.210 Herein lies a tension, leading to an unstable 
positioning on gender, in Acker’s work, which is evident in her fiction 
and was not resolved by the time of her later nonfiction. At the same time 
as she acknowledges that the system of gender dualism needs 
reconfiguring, she re-inscribes it in her discussion of how men, and 
women, are ‘messed-up’ by the very system she professes to be moving 
away from. This is but one of the many double binds Acker 
acknowledges, in the same nonfiction piece, as influencing women’s 
struggle to move beyond the binary of male/female, sane/mad, 
powerful/powerless, victor/victim. The challenge and tension then lies in 
how subversion of gender binaries, essentialisms, gendered assumptions, 
risks leading back to the very same assumptions about gender difference. 
Martina Sciolino identifies this tension in Acker and in the 
reader of Acker’s work, asking “how can one write a revolution to find a 
space for her own desires when she is already written by patriarchy?”.211 
Sciolino suggests that “both identity and gender are social constructions, 
works-in-progress whose very indeterminacy enables a politically 
motivated interruption” in Acker’s work.212 This indeterminacy marks 
Acker as literally writing the early elements of poststructuralist 
deconstruction of both gender categorisation and feminist critiquing of 
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gender for Sciolino.213 As she points out in her analysis of Acker’s Great 
Expectations, one way Acker dissects gender is through the manipulation 
and switching of narrator’s genders, playing on the reader’s expectations 
of and indicating the “tenuous relations between name, gender, and 
identity while simultaneously exposing the sequence that a reader 
engages to orient herself in narrative”.214 The ‘I’ who narrates most of 
Acker’s fragments and stories is rarely stable or coherent, as would be 
expected with a secure sense of selfhood, as discussed in Chapter 4 of 
this thesis. Gendered essentialism impacts not only on the experiences of 
characters, but also on their self-identity and experience of the world, 
creating a disjunction between what is believed and what is known, an 
instability of experience which contributes to the development of more 
overtly ‘psychotic’ experiences – unreason is less unreasonable when 
considered contextually in terms of gender. 
The second tactic is coherently explored in Acker’s later work, 
Empire of the Senseless. Acker presents a more challenging version of 
male / female relationships in this text, which explores both essentialist 
definitions of what women are, and the patriarchal attribution of who 
women are and how they should be. This double vision creates and 
maintains the social and psychological madness-inducing external 
landscape of the dystopia created in Empire. In the beginning, Thivai, the 
male protagonist, narrates Abhor’s story for her – she does not have a 
voice, and her traumatic sexual experiences are mediated through the 
masculine perspective, reminiscent of the way a patriarchal psychiatry 
risks codification of women’s experiences in only pathological terms 
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when it fails to explore either context or personal meaning. In this novel, 
essentialist gender binaries are deliberately employed in order to 
tactically reveal a duplicitous patriarchal hierarchy. At one point in the 
novel, Thivai adopts female ‘drag’ identity to leave his lodging to find 
food and drugs. It is in his adopted female identity that he is threatened 
with rape (ES, p. 178). He muses, “Genders were complex those days” 
(ES, p. 179), yet then reverts immediately back to familiar gendered 
binaries in order to reorient himself after a threatened trauma: “Now I 
didn’t want to be a girl is no more cause girls, being passive, don’t eat 
enough. Cause girls don’t get enough to eat. Now, if girls will meaner, 
they’ld gets whatever they wanted. To eat. Cause the meanest of us all 
get the most. [...] I would rather be dead than a girl” (ES, p. 180-1). For 
Thivai, throughout the novel, communities of people are starkly divided 
by essentialist gender differences; being female is an option worse than 
death. What follows is an archetypal representation of the essentialist 
division between male and female views on sexual relationships, told 
from Thivai’s perspective: “She told me she wasn’t going to become a 
pirate cause she was fucking someone else. I didn’t see that it mattered 
because we weren’t fucking each other. And fucking means nothing to 
me. But Abhor insisted it meant a lot to her, her being a woman. I told 
her she was just emotional, being a woman” (ES, p. 183). Here the 
parallel with Red’s refusal to be defined as either emotional or 
intellectual is made further complex, because it is Thivai that defines 
Abhor, rather than Abhor self-defining. Red, at least, has ownership of 
her own characteristic attributions, strengths and weaknesses. 
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Gender stereotyping affects the possibility of rational, 
autonomous subjectivity in Acker’s work. This is evident in Thivai’s 
treatment of Abhor in Empire of the Senseless. Abhor is assigned certain 
gendered identities by Thivai at various points in the novel. From the 
start of the text, Abhor is codified by Thivai who states she is “part robot, 
and part black” (ES, p. 3). This assignment of identity continues 
throughout the text, drawing on gender, ethnicity and human / machine 
binaries. Later in the text, Thivai describes Abhor as “a chameleon or, 
rather” reverting “to the lizard that was deep down inside her” (ES, p. 
183) – Abhor is seen as sub-human here, animalistic. She is then reduced 
further in Thivai’s eyes to “a diseased, that is, overactive clit” (ES, p. 
185). Abhor has an active sexuality in Thivai’s eyes, one which breaches 
the boundaries of patriarchal constrictions on female desire, making her 
threatening to a male perspective. Thivai’s own ambivalence regarding 
what women are, or should be, and thus what his role should be in 
relation to them, becomes clear with Abhor’s kidnap. Following his 
designating her as sexually voracious, as a “diseased” clitoris, he desires 
to be the emblematic male rescuer of a poor female victim: “I said, 
instead of a penknife” – which in practical terms would be relatively 
useful for a kidnapped ‘maiden’ – “we’ld smuggle Abhor a pen […] That 
way Abhor could write down, with her own blood as ink, how we 
rescued her, how brave our hearts were, how strong our arms” (ES, p. 
200-201). By positioning Abhor as Other, Thivai reverts to gender 
stereotype. In fixing Abhor as powerless, emotional and as sexually 
voracious and a helpless maiden, he can reinstate himself within the 
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extant dualistic system; he is re-situated as the archetypal masculine 
rescuer.  
This is not the end of the story for Abhor. Acker’s exposure of 
Thivai’s gendered assumptions as meaningless, empty constructions 
which, paradoxically, are imbued with meaning within a patriarchy 
framework, eventually allows for Abhor to transition through her own 
‘psychosis’ towards a secure, stable selfhood. Empire of the Senseless is 
in many respects a transitional text, for Acker, which is mirrored in 
Abhor’s own transition through madness to sanity, imprisonment to 
potential freedom. This transition relates to Acker’s desire to subvert and 
deconstruct patriarchal fictions. Acker wrote: 
I thought as I started Empire, there’s no more need to 
deconstruct, to take apart perceptual habits, to reveal the 
frauds on which our society’s living. We now have to find 
somewhere to go, a belief, a myth. Somewhere real. [...] 
Empire of the Senseless is my first attempt to find a myth, a 
place, not the myth, the place.215  
 
Acker also talked of finally struggling to find this mythical place, 
discussing the structure and outcome of Empire with Ellen G. Friedman: 
The first part is an elegy for the world of the patriarchy. And 
I did that partly by finding out what was taboo and rendering 
it in words. The second part of the book concerns what 
society would look like if it weren’t defined by Oedipal 
considerations and the taboos were no longer taboo. I went 
through every taboo, or tried to, to see what society would be 
like without these taboos. Unfortunately, the CIA intervenes; 
I couldn’t get there. I wanted to get there but I couldn’t. The 
last section, ‘Pirate Night,’ is about wanting to get to a 
society that is taboo, but realizing that it’s impossible.216  
   
It is ironic, perhaps, that the CIA (as an American ‘spy’ agency) 
intervenes here in the novel, interrupting the attempts that Acker, through 
Abhor and Thivai, makes towards a non-taboo society, a society where 
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personal freedom of mind and body is impossible. Gender stereotyping is 
one such inescapable taboo, perhaps – it can be made visible, exposed, 
but not ultimately overcome, at least in the time that Acker was writing 
within. 
The two related elements that Acker subverts – gender 
essentialism in a dualistic society and gender stereotyping as forming 
patriarchal power – have been examined in critical clinical feminist 
readings of psychiatry. Phyllis Chesler, one of the first feminists to begin 
to theorise women’s madness as discriminatorily formulated in 1972, 
wrote on these twin issues. While even the revised 2005 version of her 
seminal Women and Madness is problematic in areas, not least 
(ironically) in its tendency towards essentialism, sweeping and 
unsupported generalisation, and its dated use of language, the issues she 
discusses are both contemporary to Acker’s own writing and, in many 
cases, relevant now, some ten years on. Chesler’s study is widely cited in 
more recent feminist critiques of psychiatric practice, and she uses 
interviews and case reports combined with literary myth and legend in 
order to expose the way in which psychiatry serves to reinscribe and 
solidify patriarchal views of women as mad, lending authority to an 
otherwise false construct. Madness may be both caused by the position of 
women in society and wrongly formulated as a pathological reaction, 
leaving women with no exit strategy. This process is clearly enshrouded 
by patriarchy itself whereby women have less power, less presence and 
less agency, she writes: 
Women are impaled on the cross of self-sacrifice. Unlike 
men, they are categorically denied the experience of cultural 
supremacy and individuality. In different ways, some women 
are driven mad by this fact. Their madness is treated in such a 
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way as to turn it into another form of self-sacrifice. Such 
madness is, in a sense, an intense experience of female sexual 
and cultural castration and a doomed search for potency. The 
search often involves ‘delusions’ or displays of physical 
aggression, grandeur, sexuality, and emotionality – all traits 
which would probably be more acceptable in pro-women or 
female-dominated cultures. Such traits in women are feared 
and punished in patriarchal mental asylums.217 
 
The scene is set, then, with such a theoretical background, for the more 
nuanced elements of gender, sex and madness to emerge from Acker’s 
work, demonstrating an overarching concern with the tactical subversion 
of gender essentialism and stereotype. The reactive “displays” that 
Chesler describes are visible in many of Acker’s female characters – 
Janey, in Blood and Guts In High School, for example, is simultaneously 
self-sufficient, aggressive and strong, and abused, subjugated, prone to 
emotional outbursts, and eventually imprisoned. Similarly, Abhor is also 
imprisoned (in a literal sense physically and psychological sense 
socially), and oscillates between a tough, brave and self-sufficient 
persona and more ‘typically feminine’ romance searching, uncertainty 
and panicked stricken sets of responses. Such “displays” in Acker’s work 
are often interlinked with the experience of courtship, sexual relations 
and romantic relationships. 
 
The Double Bind of Relationships 
Romantic love and sexual relationships are difficult territory in Acker’s 
works. The cognitive and social elements of love are intimately bound up 
with physical notions of sexual desire. In this section, I will first briefly 
examine how romantic relationships are presented, with a focus on the 
double bind and cognitive dissonance evident in the concurrent 
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coexistence of love and hatred, need / fear of companionship and need / 
fear of isolation – and how this impacts on the psychological coherence 
and stability of characters. I will then explore how love and sexual desire 
are fused in Acker’s work, how these two elements drives Acker’s 
characters towards an all consuming fragmentation which might be 
aligned with ‘psychosis’. I conclude this section by considering how this 
portrayal might be tied to notions of patriarchy and resistance.  
Kathleen Wheeler suggests that “the myth of romantic love 
which had run through [Acker’s] work since her earliest writing” has a 
“crushing effect on the development of individual identities” in Acker’s 
texts.218 Abhor, for example, can only begin to form her sense of 
coherent self once she is no longer enamoured with the ‘myth’ of love for 
Thivai. The “myth of romantic love” culminates in the inherently 
unbalanced institution of marriage. Wedlock is presented in Acker’s 
work negatively, as literally locking women into a situation with no 
escape. For example, in Empire of the Senseless, Abhor tells the story of 
her grandmother’s first love, commenting on how her knowledge of this 
formed her own attitudes towards love. Her parents force her 
grandmother into prostitution at the age of 10. She meets a young man 
who “loved her by wanting to kill her: to carry her out of the slum which 
is prostitution” (ES, p. 5). The man and Abhor’s grandmother are 
imprisoned, however, and he is executed when he murders the Vice 
Squad who arrested them. The grandmother then marries “a rich man”, 
because, being “poor”, marriage is the only route to her freedom: “The 
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poor can reply to the crime of society, to their economic deprivation, 
retardation primitivism lunacy boredom hopelessness, only by collective 
crime or war. One form collective crime takes in marriage” (ES, p. 7). As 
her grandmother married not for love but economics, Abhor is left in a 
situation whereby “because I perceived what marriage was for my 
grandmother and because I love her, I am not able to sexually love 
another human being or accept another human being’s love” noting if “I 
have to love, out of desperation or desperately, I know love only when 
it’s allied with hate” (ES, p. 7). She is unable to situate her emotions as 
either positive or negative, only experiencing the two contradictory 
emotions simultaneously. No myths of romantic love for Abhor here – 
only a confusing and contrary pull towards polar counterparts of 
emotion.  
Love and hate coexist in the desiring relationship for many of 
Acker’s characters, leaving them caught in a disorientating double bind. 
The notion of a ‘Double Bind’ in clinical psychiatry was first described 
by Gregory Bateson and colleagues as consisting of a series of deceptive 
communication dilemmas where opposing positions are presented as both 
true and both false at the same time, leaving no space for clear 
comprehension.219 Bateson and colleagues argued that this kind of 
communicative strategy is potentially malignant, contributing to the 
formation of ‘psychosis’ in people trapped between contrary positions. 
The experience of the double bind is both acutely painful and confusing 
for Acker’s characters, who switch rapidly (often in the same sentence or 
thought) between desiring and rejecting. A second related experience is 
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also evident in Acker’s character’s response to ‘romantic’ relationships; 
cognitive dissonance.220 Cognitive dissonance is the psychological stress 
and fragmentation caused by holding opposing beliefs or behaving in a 
way that is inconsistent with a strongly held belief. Several of Acker’s 
characters both desire and fear intimacy, concurrently seeking 
cognitively dissociative experiences through sexual acts while 
simultaneously trying to retain their core sense of self-aware subjectivity. 
External characters at times contribute to this push/pull effect 
(particularly parents) by placing contradictory requirements on narrators 
and lead characters in order to manipulate their responses. 
The Rimbaud section from In Memoriam to Identity is a 
particularly overt example of the dissonant position that occurs when 
desiring a sexual or romantic partner.221 All three narratives in this text 
are concerned with the way in which love and sexual acts consume 
identity, and with self-destructive and destructive relationships. Self-
destructiveness is caused in part by the immense tension created by 
paradoxical desire to be with and without (as self-protection from 
rejection) another person. The Rimbaud section is drawn from commonly 
known biographical details about symbolist poet Arthur Rimbaud (named 
R in the story) and his lover, Verlaine (V). Rimbaud’s relationships are 
disrupted from the start – his mother is murderous and “autocratic” 
(IMTI, p. 4), his uncle abuses him, and the married poet Verlaine is 
inconsistent and as self-destructive as Rimbaud himself. The story reads 
in a flat, repetitive manner, where R yearns and mourns for V, who 
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alternately leaves his wife for R and then returns to her. R is aware of the 
instability of their relationship from the off, trying “to destroy his love 
for V, hate V” but realising he “couldn’t because he couldn’t erase his 
need of V” (IMTI, p. 37). R is trapped, eventually abandoned, and this 
too is acutely painful, leading to a desperate need to fill the void left by 
lost love: “To transform absence to presence and to defeat solitude or the 
absence of human values, R wrote without stopping; this was all he could 
do” (IMTI, p. 38). Writing – the act of creation, recreation, memorial, 
memorising and retelling – is all that R is left with. The isolation and 
absence of the lost love leaves R in an “absurd” existence, whereby his 
“breaking point could not be far off” (IMTI, p. 41), demonstrating the 
effect of isolation on psychological senses of safety, coherence and 
stability. When R and V are reunited and travel to Brussels, their belief in 
the longevity of their relationship is reawakened – “In this city R and V 
believed that their love for each other was eternal. They believed that 
their love was eternal because it was. It was that (unknown) region which 
word’s can’t touch” (IMTI, p. 69). Once again, though, V leaves R, 
leaving R in a state where his “only choices were to move from madness 
to death or to realize that the experiment of having a human, an honest, 
relationship had failed” (IMTI, p. 78). Here, then, Acker demonstrates 
the pull towards madness caused by the contrary experiences of 
love/hate, desire/rejection. 
Finally, R talks of being tarnished and somehow doomed, but 
also contemplative and forward facing: “Now I’ve begun to travel in 
order to divert all the obsessions that have become my brain. On the 
ocean – which I adore as if it’s washing away stain – I saw the Cross of 
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Comfort rise. I know lust has damned me’ (IMTI, p. 92). Travelling, 
sailing and water provide a metaphor chain here indicative of freedom 
and cleansing, the possibility of atonement from the damaging 
psychological effects of ‘lust’. After the vision of escape and cleansings, 
however, a brief few lines document R and V’s final meeting, where V is 
jailed after shooting R in the wrist. The final line of the section, a few 
paragraphs after the shooting, is key – “The imagination is nothing unless 
it is made actual" (IMTI, p. 95). Imagination, not intellect, rules the 
passions that lead to madness. Intellect can rule emotion from the cold 
position of the after-relationship – but a life without passion is one in 
which “mental war is constant” (IMTI, p. 95). Desire, in this text, is the 
only route to mental peace – but at the cost of psychological pain, 
dissonance and disintegration. 
Acker illustrates how this contradictory desire for another 
subsumes any sense of identity or existence beyond desire in a 
fragmented and dissociated piece, ‘Russian Constructivism’.222 Here, 
Acker blurs what seem like autobiographical elements (referring to a 
female weightlifter, which she was, and a lover named Peter, which she 
had) alongside the use of poetry, dramatic sequence, scenic description, 
and letters. There is little coherence or narrative framing here, and little 
by way of genre orientation – it is unclear what the purpose of this piece 
is. The narrative fragmentation and incoherence mirrors the fractured 
psyche of the “I” writing the letters. In the letters to Peter in this piece, 
splinters of insight into the self-consuming nature of isolation and 
missing love are evident. “You,”, she writes:  
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[…] kookoo totally untogether, make me as irritable and 
changeable as you are, so I’ve made myself into your Rock of 
Gibraltar in order to capture you but I don’t want you [...] I 
don’t know what I’m doing. You’re the only life I’ve known 
in a very long time. How can I let go of life again? You’re 
my day and night. Forget it, little baby, he’s told you clearly 
he doesn’t want to have sex with you and he only wants you 
so he can revenge himself on his wife ‘cause she once left 
him for a richer man. You are my madness. Come in me, my 
madness, and since you’ve already taken me, I beg with 
everything that is me to take me.223 
 
Love and sexual desire both pulls the ‘I’ away from the male object of 
desire (“I don’t want you”) and consumes her every waking minute 
(“You’re my day and night”). This paradoxical position is overwhelming 
and unbearable, leading to a form of madness, the accusation of the other 
being “kookoo” and “untogether”, where togetherness is a coherent sense 
of whole selfhood. The inner voice that interrupts the middle of the 
paragraph reminds the ‘I’ of the ‘real’ of the situation – that this partner 
only wanted her for revenge on his wife – yet she cannot let go, cannot 
not see him. Later in the piece, further fragments solidify this sense of 
obsession, consumption, the opposing pulls of desire: “in pain I phone 
you I want to suicide you / over and over again my brain revolves you / 
focus obsession I see nothing else”.224 Love tears and bruises; sexual 
desire pulls towards “suicide” of the other to gain some escape. The 
notion of “suiciding” the other, when suicide usually implies self-murder, 
forms a further sense of the individual being so consumed by desire for 
the other person that the self does not exist independently of the other. 
Murder of the other would then be suicide of the self. 
The self-consumptives element of love and desire is also evident 
in another short and fragmented piece, ‘New York City in 1979’. Here, 
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Acker suggests either “you’re in love with someone or you’re not […] 
one thing about being in love with someone is you know you’re in love: 
You’re either flying or you’re about to kill yourself”.225 The emotions 
experienced in love and desire swing between pain and happiness. The 
fear of rejection is consequential here, as Janey says to her partner 
Johnny – rejection leads to Janey getting “‘dangerously physically sick’”, 
but also to mental sickness: “ ‘Everytime I hurt I feel so disgusted with 
myself – that by following some stupid body desire I didn’t HAVE to 
follow, I killed the tender nerves of someone else. I retreat into myself. I 
become frigid’ ”.226 But physical desire – the same desire which leaves 
Janey open to the risk of rejection, leaving her isolated, self-introverted 
and alone – takes over for Janey, driving her into madness:  
This is the way Sex drives Janey crazy: Before Janey fucks, 
she keeps her wants in cells. As soon as Janey’s fucking she 
wants to be adored as much as possible at the same time as, 
its other extreme, ignored as much as possible. More than 
this: Janey can no longer perceive herself wanting. Janey is 
Want.227  
 
Janey’s self, during the sexual act, becomes consumed (“Janey is want”): 
Janey is no longer a subject but a need, only desire. Such bodily desires 
are also inescapable: “This is the nature of reality. No rationality 
possible. Only this is true. The world in which there is no feeling, the 
robot world, doesn’t exist. This world is a very dangerous place to live 
in”.228A world without desire is impossible to reach. In the sensual and 
social realm, where bodily desire displaces rationality or coherent 
introspection, this holds risks for the psyche – no rationality is possible.  
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The risk of extreme mental strain, leading to ‘madness’, induced 
by the cognitive dissonance of conflicting desires, does not only exist for 
female characters, as seen in Rimbaud. For Acker, though, patriarchal 
power is intimately tied up with control of female sexuality. Acker 
suggested, “everywhere, men have used women’s sexualities and sexual 
needs and desires in order to control women. For until recently, a 
women’s work was her sexuality: motherhood or prostitution”.229 
Women’s ‘work’, then, left them in subjugated position, domesticated or 
as an object used by men. Acker goes further with her analysis, though, 
suggesting that female sexuality is seen, within patriarchy, as “the 
opposite of virginal: vicious and evil”.230 Thus the “result of this 
historical situation is that heterosexual women find themselves in a 
double-bind: if they want to fight sexism, they must deny their own 
sexualities. At the same time, feminism cannot be about the denial of 
female sexuality”.231 The object of female sexual desire is sometimes 
reduced to a purely physical entity, desired for relief of painful sexual 
yearning, or at times more rounded, with relationship ethics coming to 
the fore.  
Yet Acker’s more transgressive portrayals of sexual 
relationships can be challenging from an ethical perspective. In Blood 
and Guts in High School, for example, the sexual and romantically 
desired object of protagonist Janey, a young girl, is her father, who she 
has regular sexual intercourse with, causing a descent into all-consuming 
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anxiety when threatened with his abandonment.232 As Kathy Hughes, in 
her reading of the significance of Janey’s age in this text, notes, Acker’s 
graphic portrayal of child abuse here might in some ways intend to 
subvert the disturbing reality of child abuse by making it visible, and that 
Acker’s “choice of a child as the heroine increases the visceral intensity 
of her words and corresponds with her use of experimental language and 
technique to reflect the injustice toward women in a patriarchal, capitalist 
society”.233 Janey’s incestuous relationship with her father is a graphic 
example of patriarchal power over women – the father controls Janey’s 
sexual, emotional and intellectual desires. It is significant that Janey only 
develops her coherent self once she escapes her incestuous ‘relationship’. 
Hendin’s reading of this transgression is interesting here. She notes that 
“patriarchy takes a hit in Blood and Guts in High School” when Janey 
reduces her father to “just another sex slave featured in cartoon doodles 
in her notebooks […] Externalizing and objectifying sex by treating it as 
a doodle drawn by a detached observer is an aspect of the need for 
dominance, the need to talk about ‘bodily slavery,’ but to be above it all 
by force of externalizing it as a ‘subject’ ”.234 It is worth noting that 
Janey’s doodles of her father do not show a powerful phallus, but often a 
flaccid and somewhat pathetic penis. In this way, she retains some sense 
of agency despite her desiring, able to graphically reduce her father’s 
power.  
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Some of Acker’s romantic relationships are reminiscent of 
Hendin’s perspective around the challenge of any sort of simplistic 
affectionate relationship in the contemporary world. She writes: 
Interactions with those who may not be the direct objects of 
violence are affected by a destructive egotism that shapes a 
vision of the world as a rapacious and hostile place that 
warrants aggression. From that perspective, no relationship is 
positive, and any display of weakness may provoke attack. 
Because of this it is as necessary to destroy anything 
vulnerable or compassionate in oneself to protect against 
being attacked as it is to attack others. Efforts by others to 
thwart this process – to help or relieve anger – are perceived 
as duplicitous ploys to weaken resolve.235 
 
Indeed, many of Acker’s characters only develop a coherent self-
narrative when they acknowledge that their worlds are hostile and 
dangerous – and enact violent rebellions against this. Abhor is a key 
example of this, leaving her ‘rescuers’ behind to forge her own path 
towards the end of the novel. Janey, in Blood and Guts in High School, is 
thwarted, though, when after her imprisonment, when a possible self-
narration and coherency of identity is possible (through her relationship 
with Genet), she dies. Hendin suggests, though, that despite her death 
Janey represents Acker’s “inversion of values”, by “subverting the 
charged meaning of the words that capture and impale”.236 In this way, 
Janey transgressively “sees herself not simply as an incest victim or 
prostitute but as someone who can use her body as a weapon that 
inflames the dependency of men and her speech as a tool for redefining 
relationships of power and subordination”.237 Through Blood and Guts in 
High School, Hendin suggests that Acker “conveys an evolutionary 
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genealogy for narratives of modern female fury”.238 Her other narratives 
– particularly her earlier work – offers a less evolutionary reading of 
female experiences with love, sex and romance, however. Other 
characters, such as in ‘Russian Constructivism’ or ‘New York City in 
1979’, that are less fully developed in narrative terms, instead exist in a 
series of self-obsessions and circularly inescapable situations. They are 
not afforded the realisation illuminated by Hendin, instead seemingly 
trapped in their confusing inner worlds. This portrayal, on a basic level, 
affords insight into the ways in which relationships are vital but 
potentially damaging, and into the psychological effects of loss, which 
might afford useful creative demonstration and reflection for clinicians 
who encounter people struggling in similar situations.  
It is the vision of madness, hostility and danger then enables 
Acker to transgress codified notions of not only ‘what love is’ but also 
‘what sanity is’ and how it is attained. Acker portrays textually a vision 
of the world which Hendin formulates as “entirely hostile” and 
symbolised by “pipe-bombed building, the death of the child, the 
husband, the lover, the stable self” which “all add up to a raid on ideals 
of citizenship, love, and pleasure”.239 Hendin describes how the 
“narrative richness” of contemporary fiction – and I would suggest Acker 
is rich in narrative terms – “can illuminate the more subtle currents, 
conflicts, and pressures at work” in contemporary culture.240 Acker 
demonstrates the way in which “accounts of women’s retaliatory 
violence can only be understood in the context of those male 
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provocateurs who do women wrong. Male malice grounds the violence 
of women in a culture of patriarchy” as Hendin argues.241 Hence, Acker 
portrays the psychologically dissonant effects of belief in the myths of 
romantic love and companionship alongside and the psychological 
impact of sexual violence. Rather than foregrounding her characters as 
simply demonstrative of stasis of women (those who are passive are 
attacked – those who are active are doubly attacked) Acker instead 
complicates their experiences through her textual fragmentation and 
dislocated interior monologue representations of narrative voice.  
Transgressive themes of incest and frank depictions of sex have 
led to accusations that Acker is pornographic, with her books 
occasionally banned.242 Pitchford suggests that dismissing Acker as 
pornographic results “in a static, oppositional mode of difference that 
leaves women without agency and threatens to erase the differences 
among them”.243 Anti-pornography debates, such as Andrea Dworkin’s 
Pornography: Men Possessing Women, in which pornography itself is 
seen as reproducing oppression may instead function to reproduce the 
very same male-strong, female-victim dynamic it allegedly calls into 
question.244 Critiquing Coleen Kennedy’s reading of the ‘pornography’ 
in Acker’s work, Pitchford draws on Catherine MacKinnon’s well-
repeated assertion that pornography is violence against women.245 
Pitchford moves on to discusses a model of pornographic readership that 
is both provocative and develops debates around sexually explicit 
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material away from a simple allow/ban opposition.246 Both Pitchford (in 
terms of sex) and Hendin (in terms of violence) offer readings here of the 
potential strategies available to women as illuminated through Acker’s 
fiction. Both of these strategies relate to ways in which the dominant 
discourse on women=madness can be deconstructed from its foundation, 
not least when considering women’s positions in romantic relationships. 
Acker’s portrayal of the emotional and cognitive elements of sexual acts 
offers a further challenge to the way ‘psychosis’ is constructed as 
ununderstandable, other and alien to common experience.  
 
Sex and ‘Psychosis’  
I have discussed relationships in Acker’s work, which are always bound 
with issues of desire and sexual need – this section examines Acker’s 
portrayal of sexual desire and ‘psychosis’. Sex and psychosis are 
intricately bound together in Acker’s work – as Colby notes, the 
“complicity of libidinality and psychosis in the narratives of her female 
protagonists is evident in every one of her texts”.247 In particular I 
explore Acker’s view of sex work; the emotional and psychological 
effects of unfulfilled sexual desire; and the way in which sexual desire 
and orgasm might be aligned with experiences akin to a dissociation of 
sexual-selfhood from rational-selfhood, which may mirror some of the 
elements of depersonalisation and derealisation experienced in psychosis.  
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One repeated theme in Acker’s work is her portrayal of women 
working in the sex industry, of which Acker had personal knowledge.248 
Acker, in several of her fictions, turns the dominant male figure in the 
sex show into explicitly embodying a father, a psychiatrist or Santa 
Claus. All three of these figures represent potentially powerful male 
figures in women’s lives. The figure of the psychiatrist / therapist is of 
particular interest here. Chesler was one of the first writers to document 
the deeply unethical yet allegedly common occurrences of sex between a 
patient and (male) psychiatrist (termed therapist in Chesler, representing 
the US view of psychiatrists as primarily performing an analytic function 
in the therapeutic relationship).249 “Psychologically”, she suggests, in 
instances where the therapist engages in sexual contact with his client, 
“the female is as much – if not more – a dependant supplicant here as she 
is elsewhere. [...] The male transmits ‘unconscious’ signals of power, 
‘love,’ wisdom, and protection, signals to which the female has been 
conditioned to respond automatically”.250 Chesler refers to this 
“transaction” as being “euphemistically termed ‘seduction’ or ‘part of the 
therapeutic process,’ ” when it is actually “legally a form of rape and 
psychologically, a form of incest”.251 Given the contemporary nature of 
Chesler and Acker’s work, the way Acker uses the figure of the 
psychiatrist in a powerful sexually dominant position is noteworthy. 
Similarly, the suggestion that women are ‘conditioned’ to 
respond in a particular way to strong male figures, as Chesler notes, 
appears in Acker’s work through her repeated sex show scene. In The 
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Childlike Life of the Black Tarantula by the Black Tarantula, a distinctly 
childlike female figure looks up to the father-like psychiatrist in the sex 
show, providing a further layer of transgression (CLBT, p. 83-84). In this 
section, the ‘I’ speaks in a child’s voice, stating “I tell the psychiatrist 
how Santa Claus fell out of the chimney told me I should always be a 
good girl I talk baby talk I should always do what he tells me” (CLBT, p. 
83) before proceeding to the sexual act. The infantilisation of sexuality 
here is disturbing, blurring incest and power, as Chesler notes.252 Santa 
Claus and the psychiatrist are equally blurred in the Airplane section of 
In Memoriam to Identity (IMTI, p. 134-141). The dialogue between the 
two in this second piece is comparably reminiscent of a child-adult 
conversation; the male figure is clearly dominant to a vulnerable female. 
The sex show in these two pieces might be read as emblematic of a wider 
critique, not only of the sex industry itself but of a patriarchal society 
where women might not only be seen as objects to be abused, but 
secondly, might be perceived to be active participants in their abuse, 
even as children or as people seeking psychological help who might be at 
a particularly vulnerable time.253  
Female sexuality in Acker is controlled and defined by men – 
fathers or other powerful male figure often feature in her character’s first 
sexual experiences. This leads to a further dissonance between externally 
codified codes of ‘correct’ sexual behaviour set against bodily desires, 
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which can be overwhelming. In Empire of the Senseless, this confusion is 
narrated as being integral with a mind-body dialect noted in 
psychoanalytic readings of sexual repression as a cause of female 
psychosis.254 Abhor, alone in war-torn Algeria, searches the ruined 
cityscape in a quest assigned by the mysterious Dr Schreber, finding 
pause to reflect upon her childhood experiences. She focuses on a time 
she was locked in an attic at the age of 14: 
1. In the attic, I forced my finger up my cunt so I could pierce 
my own cherry. 2. I crave someone loving me just as a junky 
craves junk. Did No 1. (physical desire) have a relation to No 
2. (mental desire)? This limitless and mad-making craving 
was a reaction to, and an act of anger against, those who had 
shut me in. (ES, p. 51)  
 
Sexual desire is here questioned as related to cognitive desire – both 
induce “mad-making” cravings, related to oppression, to being shut in, to 
anger against “moralists” who Abhor feels constrain her (ES, p. 51). 
Later in the novel, Abhor is raped after becoming a nude model and, 
following this experience, she concludes: “Mentality is the mirror of 
physicality. The body is a mirror of the mind. A mirror image is not 
exactly the same as what is being mirrored” (ES, p. 65). Mental desires 
may reflect physical desire, and vice-versa, but these reflections are not 
identical. Her sexuality, in her “isolation and in my desperation in that 
dead city”, is a “source of pain” (ES, p. 65). She learns that: 
[…] sexuality was the crossroads not only of my mind and 
body but of my life and death. My sexuality was ecstasy. It 
was my desire which, endless, was limited neither by a solely 
material nor by a solely mental reality. In that city dominated 
by commodities, more and more unsatiated I cried. (ES, p. 
65).  
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Desire is painful, acutely so, when unfulfilled – but also enduring, and in 
a society of limits (patriarchal, social, moral, psychological and 
material), fulfilling ones desires requires disposal of an externally 
proscribed identity. The dissonance here comes in the form of the 
‘ecstasy’ of sexuality desire, which might not fully satiable within a 
moralistic society that defines acceptable female behaviour and 
pathologises sexual behaviour that breaches arbitrary, male-defined 
limits.  
Repressed or unfulfilled sexual desire has been long associated 
with disruptions to female psychological wellbeing, and in many respects 
Acker’s repeated use of the psychiatrist as the male powerful figure in 
sex shows is symbolic of the purported correlation of sex and madness. 
As Chesler writes: “Women have already been bitterly and totally 
repressed sexually; many may be reacting to or trying to escape from just 
such repression, and the powerlessness it signifies, by ‘going mad’ ”.255 
Chesler elaborates, stating, “women are sexually repressed by patriarchal 
institutions which enforce fear, dislike, and confusion about female 
sexual and reproductive anatomy in both men and women”.256 
Furthermore:  
One psychoanalyst, Marie Robinson, has characterized the proper 
female orgasm as one in which the woman may be rendered 
unconscious for up to three minutes. Women have been seen as 
sexually ‘insatiable’ by witch-hunters and modern scientists; they 
have also been seen as not really ‘needing’ orgasms as much as 
they need love, maternity, and fine silverware. Nevertheless, the 
psychoanalytic tradition (combined with a growing addiction to 
instant pleasure) has viewed ‘neurosis’ and even ‘psychosis’ as 
stemming from sexual repression. Consequently, most clinicians 
have tried hard to help their female patients ‘achieve’ heterosexual 
orgasms – usually by counselling a joyous and/or philosophical 
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acceptance of the female role as envisioned and enforced by men: 
as Madonna-housewife and mother, or as Magdalene Earth 
goddess.257  
 
Not only the psychosocial context but also the content of female 
sexuality and orgasm is in this way medically codified, not least in 
psychoanalytic terms, but also in patriarchal psychiatric practice, as seen 
in some of the traits associated with predominantly female ‘disorders’ 
such as ‘borderline personality disorder’ such as ‘seductiveness’ or 
‘inappropriate’ boundaries in professional and personal relationships.258 
Sexual desire is not always presented as pushing characters 
towards a painful or disturbing ‘madness’, though, in Acker’s work. It is 
also presented in a way that allows enhanced knowledge of the limits of 
both cognitive and bodily experience. In this way the multidimensional 
physical and mental nature of sexuality is vividly depicted. In the short 
piece ‘Algeria’, Acker comments on notions of the immediacy of sexual 
pleasure and desire, a kind of being-in-the-immediate present. Freedom 
comes in the mental calmness induced by the “vibrations” and “jagged” 
sexual sensation, in which “ ‘I’ move so fast, I can no longer feel” .259 “I” 
here is displaced, as existing outside of ‘self’ in a sense of 
depersonalisation, where sensation rather than emotion is primary. In this 
experience, the urge/need is to “base myself on immediate strong action 
reactions, not on thoughts”.260 Cognitive dimensions of the mind are 
displaced, again as might be seen in depersonalisation, with only 
immediate sensations, both emotional and bodily, desired. Such desire is 
all consuming and controlling of any rational selfhood – it takes over the 
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mental space where cognitive processing occurs. Once desire is present, 
intellect becomes fragmented and fractured, in its place a world of pure 
sensation; “there will be no idea, without responsibility duty 
appointments. My world: the world will be total ruin. My mind obeys 
only emotion, not emotion as opposed to intellect, but passion joy 
madness” because passion “is the breaking up of rationality”.261 Such 
depersonalising elements of sexual desire are also overtly linked to a 
fracturing of rationality by Airplane in In Memoriam to Identity, who 
later states, “ ‘I learned something else about this thing, sex. You don’t 
understand your own wants but at the same time you can’t deny your 
own wants without going so crazy that you can no longer bear your own 
craziness’ ” (IMTI, p. 113). Denial or displacement of desire is not an 
option for Acker’s characters – the body overtakes the mind. 
Furthermore, for Acker’s characters, attempts as denial of sexual needs 
results in ‘craziness’.  
It has been suggested that the sexual act in Acker’s work calls 
into question the limits and transcendence of selves as coherent beings. 
As Robert Glück notes, sex in Acker is a “blissful jailbreak from the 
confines of the self” whereby it “is the pleasure happening, not the 
self”.262 Yet because the self is unrecognisable as a coherent or stable 
entity in Acker’s work, any pleasure is one that is denied for the self, 
existing only as pleasure itself – a “double bind” experienced as a 
“grievance” by her characters.263 Glück suggests that Acker’s refusal to 
accept the “terms of our confinement” (as subjects) leads to her 
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expressed desire for the “freedom to have no ego boundaries”.264 The 
freedom which Glück situates as between the text, within the “silence and 
emptiness between juxtapositions” causes “anguish” because sex 
“stabilizes the self / text as much as sex destabilizes it”.265 In her 
depiction of sex, Acker “creates extra-literary conflict that does not build 
character either on the page or in the world, as most fiction intends to do, 
but instead destroys it”.266  
It is not only the extra-literary relationships that Acker builds 
and effaces through her texts that simultaneously builds and effaces 
notion of subjectivity at any level other than a one dimensional 
physicality. Sex itself can be, as Angela Carter suggests in her study of 
the works of the Marquis de Sade, a “uniquely unselfing experience”.267 
In Acker, this ‘unselfing’ causes a loss of rationality, control, intellect 
and temporal coherence – the self is dislocated from the body and the 
external world, experiencing derealisation and depersonalising not on the 
sense of pathological experiences but as both a desired and feared 
departure.268  
Red, for example, is a voraciously sexual character, defying the 
struggle that elements of feminist theory had (at the time Acker was 
writing this novella) with simultaneously liberating women as objects of 
male desire while repositioning women as actively desiring subjects. 
Acker, with varying degrees of success, negotiates this tension in much 
of her work. In a textual incarnation of both Glück and Carter’s notions, 
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Red experiences a loss of selfhood through the sexual act. Red’s 
assertion that she affects a “play with rhythms” in the sexual act is 
similar to Acker’s play with language, as I explore further in the next 
chapter.269 Both involve a cadence, peaks and troughs, a sense of 
distortions. Red continues, “now I’ve lost consciousness; I’m a machine 
of throat, mouth, tongue hand symmetries and pressures”.270 Her 
consciousness is dislocated from her bodily actions. During sex on an 
aeroplane, Red experiences again this unselfing – the entire external real 
is lost as sensation remains the only focus: “The plane disappears, the 
seat which I’m sitting on falls out from under me; I’m suspended in 
space by strings of diamonds the paws of cats rub against my ears”.271 
There is a beauty to the language used to describe derealisation here, 
visceral imagery forming the description of the physical sensation. Later 
still, during intercourse with the mother of the woman she has sex with 
on the plane, elements of the desire to be possessed by the other person 
are clear: “I look up at her face, at her huge eyes which mirror me I want 
her to possess me, to enrage me my muscles are quivering”.272 This 
possession again allows for the self to not need to be in control, instead 
controlled, consumed – Red wants the “huge eyes” to devour her while 
simultaneously wanting her body to be “enraged”, a potential double 
bind of desiring controlling and anger against control.  
The unselfing, derealising and depersonalising elements of 
sexual desire and actions are also apparent in The Childlike Life of the 
Black Tarantula by Black Tarantula, and are more explicitly aligned with 
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psychosis in this text, where physical desire displaces rationality and 
selfhood. The narrator dissolves into a stream of consciousness style 
monologue that simultaneously tells the story of the sexual encounter 
while showing the rhythm of the act through the uninterrupted textual 
flow:  
I have no identity I can feel the hand softly running up and 
down my leg inside the leg against the sand softly spreading 
my legs my buttocks against the burning sand the sand rises 
into my ass tiny diamonds every touch causes all people think 
about when they meet me is sex ripples of flesh to collide 
against the returning ripples as they enlarge into waves I give 
myself entirely to each desire because there’s nothing else to 
give myself to nothing else exists (CLBT, p. 48)  
 
In this act, for Acker, sexuality starts from within the mind, from the 
intellect, with a solid and knowable self – “I play with my disbelief, 
feelingless, until I’m almost insane. I can feel nothing, and have no mind. 
I can do nothing for myself, nor do I know what I need done” (CLBT, p. 
60). The cognitive ‘I’ here is present, though present-in-absence through 
‘not knowing’. It becomes displaced when sensation begins to take over: 
“nowhere needles start rising in me and outside of me through my skin; I 
have no idea what comes from inside and what comes from outside; I 
descend into the mental and physical blackness” (CLBT, p. 60). When 
orgasm begins, the “I” dissolves into a torrent of physicality – “I’m both 
liquid and solid. I’m completely pleasure” (CLBT, p. 60). The self is 
opened outward, no longer contained or restrained, and is energised: 
(1) I’m opening enough to contain all identities, things, 
change everything to energy, a volcano. (2) I’m constant 
energy and I can never be anything else. (3) I have no 
emotions; I sense textures of everything against textures; 
I’m completely part of and aware of the object world. I 
don’t exist. (CLBT, p. 60).  
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This sensation – the self-displacing sensation of orgasm – has 
hallucinatory tactile elements that work to displace selfhood entirely. “I” 
no longer exists, reduced to sensation. Acker’s eloquent descriptions of 
sexual sensation are not only metaphorical but involve becoming rather 
than describing; tactile sensation forms a somewhat hallucinatory, 
otherworldly narrative tone and textual style. 
The multiplicity of desiring I’s in Tarantula also experience an 
array of fears, anxieties and strange experiences that are clinically 
aligned with psychosis in contemporary formulations. Orgasm and fear, 
for example, are linked: “for hours I come and come until there’s no 
difference between coming and reality. I have to be careful for they may 
visit me at any moment, and take away my writing; I’m still me, I’m still 
scared by my passion and sex” (CLBT, p. 49). Other narrators become 
caught in a pendulum-like cyclothymia that mirrors Acker’s depiction of 
the cognitive dissonance element of relationships: “I’m scared all the 
time. I don’t know what to be scared about. I love I don’t love I hate I 
don’t hate I’m scared I’m not scared I kill I don’t kill” (CLBT, p. 8). The 
desire for connection with another is connected to the desire to murder, 
most clearly in the first part of the novel where Acker re-writes the 
stories of female murderesses (CLBT, p. 19). Hallucination-like 
experiences are presented, though it is unclear as to whether these are 
metaphoric or actual visual and tactile experiences:  
The windows are two huge eyes staring at me, any person can 
become part of these composite insect eyes, I sit against the 
white walls of the enclosed room and gibber. The walls are 
all white. The walls of an asylum. The walls of a hospital. 
The walls are going to close around me, are closing around 
me: crush me. I start to scream. The walls are the legs of a 
huge spider. (CLBT, p. 36) 
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Metaphoric or literal, the effect described is one of fear and 
claustrophobia. The content here is clearly aligned with fear of both 
containment and control, of being locked in an asylum. There is no 
simple alignment of sexual pleasure with a vision of ‘madness’ as 
desirable here – the picture is complicated by the oscillation between 
pleasure and pain, as in many of Acker’s sexually explicit sections.  
As Watten suggests, in his reading of the historical framing 
Acker borrows from and disrupts in I Dreamt I Was a Nymphomaniac: 
Imagining, sexuality in Acker is “not necessarily liberation”.273 Rather, 
he writes: 
[…] it is the energetic disturbance of a wound and an attempt 
to repair it. Acker’s interest in literary pastiche and repetition 
begins here: with the disturbance of identity occasioned by a 
historical event. In the event, identity is dissociated and 
revealed; Acker continues to write the event. More precisely, 
Acker continues to look at writing as the dissolution of an 
event within a structure that can heal it.274  
 
It could be that Acker demonstrates how actively desiring sexuality 
might heal some of the wounds inflicted by history, both personal 
(experiences, particularly traumas) and social (patriarchally codified 
sexuality). In contrast to the disturbing experiences in Childlike Life of 
the Black Tarantula, in the opening sections of I Dreamt I Was A 
Nymphomaniac: Imagining Acker manipulates the ‘insanity’ of pure 
desire into a preferable alternative to the social real. Her ‘I’ character 
asserts: “I need to love someone who can, by lightly, lightly stroking my 
flesh, tear open this reality, rip my flesh open” and again, “I wanted him 
to rip off my skin, take me away to where I’d always be insane” (IDIN, 
p. 96-97). The violence of this image relates not to a masochistic 
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sexuality, although this is a formulation of Acker’s wider work that has 
been written on.275 I agree with Hawkins who suggests that such readings 
“occlude, and thus refuse, the fundamental interconnections between 
heterosexual violence and its intimate construction within and through 
patriarchy”.276 A metaphoric reading, rather, relates to the elements of 
patriarchal social control Acker criticises. Acker assigns sexuality in the 
above section to the internal realm of physicality and sensation, with skin 
representing the containment of internal desires and the external 
restrictions placed on female desire. In tearing off the external reality, 
desire can be experienced in a way that transcends a controlling exterior 
real. This is demonstrated more directly further on in this text during one 
of the repeated sections: “I see everyone taking off their clothes, flinging 
their limbs around without control until they have some sense of their 
bodies; transcending every possible barrier then every barrier […] I see 
ecstasy everywhere, and I want to be there totally insane” (IDIN, p. 116 – 
repeated on p. 124). The transcendence and boundary crossing is first 
literal – stripping naked in the streets of Paris – and then mental, 
descending into “ecstasy” to be “totally insane”. It would be simple here 
to draw a conclusion on madness as representing freedom; this section, I 
argue, rather represents a transgression of social norms that might be 
aligned with depersonalisation and derealisation.  
The unselfing, depersonalising effects of sexual desire and 
orgasm that I have explored in this section are not directly aligned to 
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psychosis in a traditionally defined sense, and a risk here is reading this 
experience as symbolising the myth that psychosis (particularly 
schizophrenia) is a ‘split personality’. That is, the experience of complete 
unselfing, whereby the core personality may be absent while an ‘alter’ 
replaces it (usually as a result of extremely traumatic experiences in 
childhood) is one that was previously formulated and named as Multiple 
Personality Disorder, now known as Dissociative Identity Disorder.277 I 
will return to notions of fragmented selfhood, but it is worth noting here 
that Acker, rather than being concerned with taxonomic or nosological 
accuracy, instead presents creative portrayals of experiences that she 
describes, repeatedly, as being aligned with psychosis, ‘craziness’ or 
‘insanity’. It is these unselfing elements that might best be read here as 
an illustration of how elements such as depersonalisation, hallucinatory 
dislocation of ‘real’ perception and fracturing of stable selfhood can be 
shown, rather than described, in creative ways, by juxtaposing the 
common with the apparently unusual. In this case, desire and irrationality 
are twinned, both as effecting a sense of unreality, or at least dissonance 
from an externally framed ‘real’.  
   
Sexual Violence 
In one sense, Acker reclaims female sexuality as linked to madness by 
absorbing this madness into the experience itself. However, this is not 
entirely successful, given the negative emotions and experiences that her 
characters also suffer through or during the sexual act. Her success in 
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depicting female sexuality free from the constriction of patriarchy is also 
interrupted by the intrusion of sexual violence and trauma inflicted upon 
women and the psychological impacts of this. In this section I explore 
Acker’s portrayal of sexual violence and note both feminist and clinical 
literature on the psychological effects of trauma, offering a more direct 
clinical interpretation of Acker’s representation. I also examine how 
Acker transgresses socially ascribe ways in which ‘victims’ should act, 
think and feel. Firstly, however, the way that Acker juxtaposes sexual 
pleasure and sexual violence is worth further exploration. 
The psychological impact of rape and sexual violence is 
frequently portrayed in Acker’s work. Carolyn Zaikowski, drawing on 
the work of Caruth and various trauma theorists, notes that the literature 
of trauma traverses the treacherous terrain around: 
[…] how to navigate language when we are attempting to 
articulate not only the unsayable, but its very unsayableness – 
when we are inscribing, on the space and time of the page’s 
body, events which transcend and shatter normal containers 
of space and time, events which are defined by their very ‘de-
scribing’ of the body. We confront the quandary of how to 
witness the unwitnessable through language.278   
 
In Acker’s Blood and Guts in High School, which Zaikowski uses as her 
exemplar traumatised body of text, the central cohering features of Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder – PTSD – (hyperarousal, intrusion and 
constriction) might be usefully employed in reading Acker’s disrupted 
and dissociated heroine Janey’s narrative. Acker’s textual methods 
reflect “not only the dissociation and confusion of identity; it also 
highlights the disruption of linear time and narrative so prominent in the 
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minds of trauma survivors”.279 Such a fractured text, “if examined 
through the lens of PTSD” might then “offer us invaluable information 
about language, society and healing”, information that can lead to 
“compassionate witnessing that will make real the possibility of healing, 
integration and, ultimately, a new world”.280 The stark reality and 
endemic nature of sexual trauma coexists with women’s sexual pleasure 
in Acker’s writing. Persevering through the radical dislocations of her 
works enables, in one sense, a witnessing of both women’s trauma and 
subjugation – in inscribing trauma into the text, Acker enables a 
demonstration of trauma in both textual form and language.  
Leslie Dick suggests that Acker’s depiction of sex “works to 
bring the reader back to her body in a way no other literary strategy quite 
does”.281 Commenting on the arguments around pornography and 
pleasure that informed Acker’s work, Dick highlights the “paradoxical 
proposition that a specific body was always implicated in the 
construction of identity (and yet did not restrict the possible 
identifications and fantasies that that very body might enjoy)”, 
suggesting that this “was itself a feminist idea”.282 He suggests that 
Acker “took some of these ideas and played them out, like a card game, 
to display their operation, to make them work”.283 Dick’s formulation of 
the interaction of both the bodily and the intellectual is evident in the 
many forms that sex itself takes in Acker’s work. When involving a 
second person, it is a commodity; an interaction to counteract the 
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alienating effects of acute isolation; painful but actively desired; and 
sometimes forced upon unwilling recipients. However, as Dick notes, sex 
acts in Acker do not only exist in terms of interpersonal relations, but 
also as mental and physical intrapersonal experiences. As Pitchford 
suggests, Acker’s portrayal of “acutely painful bodily desires” and the 
“search for a language that can break free of existing codes to express 
those desires” have led to a range of work focussing on post-structural 
and psychoanalytic readings of such desire.284 For Pitchford, such focus 
can ignore the deeply feminist “historical and material aspects of the 
reading practice Acker’s novels might offer”.285 One such interesting 
“material” aspect of Acker’s portrayal of sex lies in the relationship 
between the sexual act and the loss of selfhood during orgasm. The 
second important historical and contemporary “material” aspect of 
Acker’s portrayal of sex and psychosis is her portrayal of sexual 
violence.  
As Peter Wollen suggests, Acker’s presentation of sexuality is 
“always bound up with issues of power, violence, and pain, whether 
explicitly through sadomasochism and rape or implicitly through a 
generalized oppression”.286 Women in Acker’s work are thus “both 
sexually exploited and sexually voracious”, creating for Wollen an 
“antimony” which “generates a cascade of complex discourses, 
crystallized in the figure of the outlaw heroine, both flaunting her 
independence, defying her oppressors and bolting in desperation, abject 
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and humiliated”.287 Wollen suggests that this paradox has at its heart the 
family, with society acting as an external controllers, a “macro-family of 
powerful rulers and powerless subjects, terrorizing and terrorized, driving 
and driven mad – an extreme projection of the psychotic family, and its 
values, across the whole landscape of interpersonal relations”.288 
Strategies of resistance are evident in Acker’s works, as Wollen points 
out: pirates, for example, who make frequent appearances in Acker’s 
fiction, oppose the “prison of femininity” that is offered to women.289 As 
I have explored throughout this chapter, this is a prison that drags women 
towards madness while simultaneously codifying their otherwise 
‘normal’ reactions as pathological, leaving them in a double bind.  
Acker’s female characters are often in stasis, desiring sexual 
freedom and autonomy but constrained by not only societal and familial 
restrictions on sexuality, but by the risks posed by sexual violence. Her 
portrayal of sex, sexual pleasure and sexual violence does not always 
conform to the prevailing feminist discourse of her more radical feminist 
contemporaries, of whom she was critical.290Abhor’s ontological 
development, for example, occurs both because and in spite of the 
gendered injustices she experiences. The “society of disgust” (ES, p. 
227) that Abhor despises is the society that designates women as passive 
objects (to be done to) rather than desiring, active subjects (who do). 
Abhor is raped in the text. The rape by the photographer in Paris is told 
in unemotional and cold tone, as is her initial rape by her father, which 
the reader initially learns about through Thivai’s re-telling. This almost 
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clinical retelling could be read as indicative of two interrelated responses. 
Firstly, the ‘everyday-ness’ of rape for women in a patriarchal society; 
secondly, the dissociative elements of the psychological response to 
trauma. 
Pitchford, commenting on the function and role of Abhor’s body 
in the text, suggests that Abhor has “learned young that she cannot rely 
on her body for any truth value” and that her learned-yet-paradoxical 
desire for her raping father “keeps ownership of her body unsettled”.291 
Neither Abhor’s body nor her mind are owned by Abhor – she is 
assigned multiple identities by others. As Pitchford suggests, this 
unsettling of bodily autonomy and ownership is “an important strategy 
for women and other historically oppressed people” because it 
problematises the notion that women can ever be free or autonomous, in 
body or mind, despite the “concept of human freedom” that is “so central 
to rationalism”.292 In many respects, the novel can be seen as telling the 
story of Abhor’s struggle to develop her own identity, outside of those 
that are given to her. Abhor’s struggle for bodily and intellectual 
autonomy, which coexist, is threatened when another interrupts her 
bodily ownership through sexual violence. Abhor learns from a young 
age that bodily desire is tied up with intellectual desire, offering an 
example of how Acker offers a complex vision of ‘I want’, where desire 
holds multiple meanings. ‘I want’ is often removed, replaced by a 
powerless set of ‘options’; Abhor has only one ‘option’ when raped as an 
adult – “I quickly chose a raped body over a mutilated or dead one” (ES, 
p. 64).  
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The ‘choice’ is here one that offers only potential damage to her 
bodily and mental integrity. This (lack of) choice leaves her considering 
the discourse of heterosexual relations more widely: “I didn’t know what 
to do about the useless and, more than useless, virulent and destructive 
disease named heterosexual sexual love. I’ve never known” (ES, p. 64). 
Abhor discovers that a phallocentric sexuality annihilates the possibility 
of not only a self-owned and self-defined sexuality, but the possibility of 
selfhood itself outside of the frame of male sexuality: “He did everything 
to me to such an extent, I no longer was. In order to live again, I had to 
stop fucking the fucker” she discovers (ES, p. 127). Abhor is done to 
here, in all aspects. Sexual pleasure is intricately related to sexual pain, 
yet is possible within the confines of powerlessness:  
Physical pleasure can only be pleasurable if it is pleasurable, 
not the cause of suffering and fighting all the time. I’m 
beginning to believe that physical pleasure can be pleasurable 
now. A man’s power resides in his prick [....] Since I don’t 
have one thing, a dick, I’ve got nothing, so my pleasure isn’t 
any one thing, it’s just pleasure. Therefore, pleasure must be 
pleasurable. (ES, p. 127) 
 
Abhor here intellectualises pleasure into power relations between men 
and women, discovering that sexual pleasure for women can only exist if 
disconnected from its patriarchal context, residing in a purely sensational 
realm. This, though, dissociates the cognitive elements of sexual desire, 
the ability to own the ‘I’ that actively desires as a subject.  
The Airplane section from In Memoriam to Identity provides a 
further unsettling picture of rape and sexual violence, transgressive 
through the relationship that Airplane forms with her rapist which also 
offers commentary on (lack of) ‘choice’. This is a text that Kennedy 
explores in detail, critically suggesting that “how successful these 
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simulations of pornographic sexual relations” are at freeing “women 
from object-status” is questionable at best.293 Airplane fears bodily 
invasion and possession that occurs during rape – “I wanted my body to 
be mine. Deep in me I didn’t want it to be theirs. Something in me was 
revolting. Something in me was screaming. ‘No. No. No.’ ” (IMTI, p. 
107). It is indicated that the rape occurs as she is first discovering the 
opportunities and limits of her the ability of her body to provide pleasure, 
hence she simultaneously, like Abhor, learns “this kind of revolt” (IMTI, 
p. 107) against the dispossession of her own body. The body that offers 
pleasure is one that can also be possessed and violated by another person, 
a dissonant and traumatic experience. Her psychological and emotional 
resistance to the rape is not enough to overcome the physical reality, 
however: “No one was going to touch me but me. That’s how all of me 
felt with a scream. But it didn’t matter how strong I felt it cause the slimy 
man lifted up my right breast and looked at it” (IMTI, p. 107). Post rape, 
Airplane decides she can no longer live without the rapist as he offers her 
a way to survive:  
She was clinging to him because she had decided to survive. 
Somewhere in sexuality was her strength. Later on, everyone 
would hate her for this. Somewhere in absence, between an 
act only feeling remembered and a flight, the activity that 
was her mind decided that males have the power. That for a 
female to get her power or to survive, she had, at least at first, 
to get it from a man. Love is free. She didn’t know what love 
was. She would survive. This male, the one who had taken 
her virginity or raped her, it didn’t matter which, was as good 
as any other man. She’d use him if things worked out, she 
wouldn’t be a dumb cunt all her life. (IMTI, p. 114)  
 
She is confused by her decision however, experiencing a sense of 
dissociation between choices which leaves her confused, actions 
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inconsistent with the divided consciousness: “I didn’t understand why I 
was saying what I was saying, but my consciousness had gone 
somewhere” (IMTI, p. 116). Airplane could be seen to be subverting his 
physical power over her by making the decision to use him to gain her 
own social and sexual freedom. Airplane resorts to gendered assumptions 
though to codify her decision making process: “Perhaps it’s men who 
dream of love and women who dream of survival” (IMTI, p. 114). Later 
in the text, after starting work in the sex industry to support the man who 
raped her, she questions her sexual desire for the rapist, questioning her 
own sexuality. Here sexuality is identity: “ ‘Maybe I didn’t want R 
[Rapist] sexually as much as he wanted me because I was really lesbian’ 
” (IMTI, p. 143). She continues by questioning the relative safety of a 
homosexual identity – “If I was a lesbian, I would have control over my 
life, my vulnerability, the thing between my legs, my need to be touched 
though not my need to touch [...] If I had control over my vulnerability, I 
couldn’t be hurt as profoundly as I was being” (IMTI, p. 143). A non-
heterosexual identity may be safer, offering less vulnerability. There is 
less otherworldliness in these portrayals of sexual violence than in some 
of the other psychosis-like depictions Acker offers. The reality of 
Airplane’s life is bound to her sexual choices and lack of choices: 
“Sexuality must be closely tied to reality because by being a lesbian, I 
could make the reality I wanted. Not drugged up in a bed or a sex show” 
(IMTI, p. 143). In patriarchal sexuality, Airplane cannot make her own 
reality – she lacks the ownership and power over her own body to do so. 
In one of Acker’s most commented upon works, the abused 
protagonist also actively engages in violence against other people – 
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Janey, in Blood and Guts in High School, is both victim and perpetrator, 
and neither in any simple sense. Issues of sex and trauma in this work 
have been amply explored elsewhere.294 Here, I want to note how Janey 
represents how Hendin suggests violence by women in fiction 
“constitutes an attack on the critical theory that has guided much 
academic discourse about the position of women in literary art, relegating 
them to anonymity and silence by definition”.295 Hendin suggests that far 
from “lacking agency in speech or mastery of language […] violent 
women are masters of logic games and invention, using narrative skill to 
express their own take on violent action and its meanings”.296 Janey 
could easily be read in ‘victim’ terms – taking her experiences of incest, 
rape, forced prostitution and sexually transmitted infection in their 
simplest form: awareness of the vulnerabilities of young people, and 
particularly young women, is high currently, following well-publicised 
reports into grooming and child sexual exploitation over recent years, 
offering the potential for transformation around how ‘complicity’ and 
‘innocence’, of who should and should not be offered support or be 
believed, are theorised.297 Awareness of the fundamental psychological 
effects of child sexual exploitation on mental health, potentially leading 
to violence against others, self harm, suicidality, psychosis and a range of 
addiction disorder, is also well noted in public inquiries and reports. This 
is a welcome move forwards from the recent past where young people 
were denigrated as ‘criminals’ in their own right – relegated to silence 
                                                
294 See Hendin; see also Zaikowski.  
295 Hendin, p. 13.  
296 ibid. p. 25.  
297 See Alexis Jay; see also OFSTED, ‘The sexual exploitation of children: it couldn’t 
happen here, could it?’ (2014), <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sexual-
exploitation-of-children-ofsted-thematic-report> [accessed 7th August 2015].  
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and anonymity. The Alexis Jay and OFSTED reports offer young people 
a voice in terms of how their experiences are conceptualised. 
Challenging the discourse of survival, resistance, violence, complicity 
and pathologisation in this way, then, aligns with Hendin’s perspective 
on the way violence by women attacks the institutions that formulate 
how women should act, think and feel.  
Janey, in Acker’s text, resists any simple ‘victim’ assigning, 
instead taking agency in rebellious ways. Janey in particular can be 
viewed in a more emancipatory way, rather than colluding with a 
designation of young women as ‘victims’ with associated connotations of 
powerlessness and damage. Instead, Hendin argues that, through Janey, 
Acker “conveys an evolutionary genealogy for narratives of modern 
female fury”:  
Acker establishes an inversion of values through subverting 
the charged meaning of the words that capture and impale. 
Her young girl sees herself not simply as an incest victim or 
prostitute but as someone who can use her body as a weapon 
that inflames the dependency of men and her speech as a tool 
for redefining relationships of power and subordination.298 
 
In this way, victimhood is subverted, and the myth of the passive victim 
forever stained and scarred is overturned. In terms of contemporary 
discourse on vulnerability (particularly in young women at risk of sexual 
exploitation), it is important to focus also on strength, resistance and 
tenacity, a point I return to in the conclusion to this thesis.  
Demythologising of myths about rape and ways that women 
who experience it react and respond is evident throughout Acker’s work. 
In her fiction she demonstrates and subverts some of the theory that 
Susan Brownmiller famously documented in 1975, not long after Acker 
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began writing.299 In the early work The Burning Bombing of America, 
which was published posthumously, Acker writes in a free association 
stream-of-consciousness style, creating the first of her fragmented 
narratives with only fragile thematic strings holding the piece together. It 
is worth quoting this segment at length to fully demonstrate how Acker 
combines literary strategies with psychotic fragmentation (as I explore 
more fully in the ensuing chapter) in response to extreme fear:  
black kid sneaks in the door in back of me arms grab my 
arms just as I’m opening the elevator DON’T TOUCH ME 
WHY ARE YOU TOUCHING ME come into the elevator 
with me I won’t hurt you race up stairs second floor going to 
race up back stairs elude rapist back stairs are less open stand 
by three doors doorbells protection look around black kid 
comes out of elevator I’m about to press three doorbells he 
disappears super’s house there’s a guy in the building 
somewhere he attacked me once a clack kid go away I don’t 
want anything to do with anybody out comes my police 
whistle [...] Jerry’s apartment a guy attacked me in the front 
hall he’s somewhere in the building will you come down here 
don’t have any clothes on go to hell after a while you learn 
the rules of the jungle you don’t wear heels that click you’re 
always ready to scream.300 
 
Acker here depicts the ‘rules’ women have to live by – to wear sexually 
chaste clothing, to be in a state of perpetual preparedness for attack. The 
fear of rape, instilled in women from a young age, is transmitted by the 
fractured and frenetic narrative tone here, reading like a stream of acute 
panic. There is also a lack of voice – imagination, fear and vocalisations 
blur. Being female is a task, with its own male-defined rules, one that 
women have to work at rather than exist in, lived “constantly on guard” 
yet “as independent as possible”, offering a further double bind where 
                                                
299 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Fawcett 
Books, 1975).  
300 Acker, The Burning Bombing of America, p. 152.  
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women cannot ‘win’.301 Female solidarity provides one strategy of 
resistance against male power, when men are “humans who are bred 
trained they can do anything they are almighty they must not be 
concerned with daily life”.302 There is mention of a “secret language” 
owned by women, one that realises that in “certain ways sexual gender 
no longer exists” and also that women have to “know you have to be 
strong at every moment”.303 For men, “their essence is rape. their desire 
is murder. they are forced to destroy”.304 This early work is almost 
entirely written in stream of consciousness style and, despite its lack of 
narratively clarity, it offers a stark vision of patriarchal power and the 
psychological anxiety and perplexity inherent in women’s double bind 
existence. The disparaging vision of men, inherited by women and 
inscribed into their psyches, is punctured by rare interruptions to the 
narrative flow: the meaning is frank.  
One direct impact of sexual violence on Acker’s character is 
their enacting of self harm and feelings of suicidality, often via laceration 
of wrists. Self harm is not always associated with clear mental health 
challenges involving psychosis or otherwise: this is a view that is 
apparently antithetical to psychiatric formulation, but borne out by 
narrative accounts of self harm and suicidality expressed by people with 
lived experience.305 Self harm as a possible expression of distress or 
disorder has recently been (wrongly) formulated as a disorder in its own 
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304 ibid. p. 190.  
305 See Baker, Shaw and Biley; see also Grant, Biley and Walker, and also Grant, Haire, 
Biley and Stone.  
137 
 
right.306 Self harm can be associated with traumatic experiences, and in 
this sense, the recent formulation of self harm into a disorder – Non-
Suicidal Self Injury – adds a further level of pathologisation to an issue 
that affects a significant proportion of young people and adults.307 Self 
harm in Acker’s work, then, might not be clearly associated with her 
version of ‘psychosis’, but it can and does occur in response to psychosis 
in clinical practice, and her exploration of this issue is worthy of note 
given the focus of both this chapter (pathologisation of women) and the 
thesis (ways which Acker’s portrayal can offer clinical insights).308 For 
Acker’s female characters, self harm is a physical manifestation, a 
tangible bodily wound, of psychological trauma.  
While self harm might, in some cases, be viewed as self-
destructive, it has also been noted that in Acker’s characters such “self-
destruction is always bound up with a utopian if somewhat solipsistic 
                                                
306 Marie Crowe, ‘From expression to symptom to disorder: the psychiatric evolution of 
self-harm in the DSM’, Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 21. 10 
(2014), 857-858.  
307 See Mental Health Foundation, ‘Truth Hurts: Report of the National Enquiry into 
Self Harm among Young People’ (London: Mental Health Foundation, 2006). This 
widely cited report focused on young people up to the age of 25. As the Report notes: 
“The statistics on self-harm are unreliable for a number of reasons. Many young people 
who self-harm will treat themselves or will be treated at home and will not reach the 
attention of services or professionals. Their self-harm will not therefore be recorded and 
counted. Young people who self-harm and present at hospital accident and emergency 
services are predominantly cases of self-poisoning. Substantial anecdotal evidence that 
the Inquiry heard strongly suggests that this is only a small sub-population of young 
people who self-harm. Finally, figures on self-harm are confusing as definitions of self-
harm used varies across the different research” (p. 20). As such, I have not commented 
further on epidemiology here – suffice to say, it is widespread, common and – most 
concerningly – highly stigmatised and often treated with indifference or contempt.  
308 Self harm in psychosis has been reported in studies globally – see for example A. 
Nishida, T. Sasaki, Y. Nishimura, H. Tanii, N. Hara, K. Inoue, T. Yamada, T. Takami, 
K. Shimodera, M. Itokawa, N. Asukai and Y. Okazaki, ‘Psychotic-like experiences are 
associated with suicidal feelings and deliberate self-harm behaviors in adolescents aged 
12–15 years’, Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 121 (2010), 301–307. See also S. B. 
Harvey, K. Dean, C. Morgan, E. Walsh, A. Demjaha, P. Dazzan, K. Morgan, T. Lloyd, 
P. Fearon, P. B. Jones and R. M. Murray, ‘Self-harm in first episode psychosis’, British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 192, (2008), 178–184.  
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desire for a radical transformation”.309 In this way it might represent a 
reclaiming of the body that has been abused, as well as a rebellion 
against the constricting and abusive family. Self harm often is enacted by 
Acker’s characters following a repeated pattern of events – after sexual 
assault by, or due to the absence of, the father figure, and often involving 
a mother figure who is emotionally absent at best and cruel at worst. For 
both Red and Abhor, self harm is induced following attempted rape by 
the father figure, and is treated dismissively by the mother figure. Red 
narrates a conversation with Mother: 
I’m selfish I’m insane I have to see a psychiatrist. I should be 
dead. I tell her to stop bugging me, I’ve been having a hard 
time: I show her my wrists which I’ve cut up rather badly 
with razors, trying to punish myself. She tells me not to talk 
about nasty things at the dinner table.310  
 
A near-identical silencing of the visible, outward manifestation of acute 
emotional pain is repeated in both Acker’s short pieces ‘Requiem’ and 
‘Translations of the Diaries of Laure the Schoolgirl’.311 The response of 
others is one which is not uncommonly seen in clinical reactions to self 
harm, where approaches can vary from supportive and tender to hostile 
and ignorant of what the visible wound may indicate, instead reacting to 
the ‘behaviour’ as ‘attention seeking’.312  
It is in Empire of the Senseless that self harm is most vividly 
written onto the body of Abhor and into the narrative: 
                                                
309 Redding, p. 285. See also Redding on body modification in Acker’s work as distinct 
from harmful body control and development such as cosmetic surgery. Finally see 
Kathryn Hume, ‘Voice in Kathy Acker’s Fiction’, Contemporary Literature, 43. 3 
(2001), 485-513, (p. 504-505) regarding pain and self harm in Acker’s work.  
310 Acker, Rip Off Red, Girl Detective, p. 66.  
311 Kathy Acker, ‘Requiem’ (1997) in Eurydice in the Underworld, pp. 151-188. Kathy 
Acker, ‘Translations of the Diaries of Laure the Schoolgirl’ (1983) in Hannibal Lecter, 
My Father, pp. 104-113.  
312 See Baker, Shaw and Biley for discussions of the wide variety of clinical reactions to 
self harm, some helpful, some verging on neglectful and abusive ‘care’.  
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Then he [Father] taught me a final trick. He showed me how 
to insert a razor blade into my wrist just for fun. Not for any 
other reason. Thus, I learned how to approach and understand 
nature, how to make gargantuan red flowers, like roses, 
blooming, drops of blood, so full and dripping the earth under 
them, my body, shook for hours afterwards. During those 
afterhours, I fantasized my blood pouring outwards. This was 
my relief that there were no decisions left. (ES, p. 9). 
 
This the passage here Abhor indicates a degree of relief at the bodily 
experience she experiences when translating her intangible emotional 
pain into an externally facing physiological trauma. The metaphoric 
linking here of blood and nature is not uncommon for people 
experiencing self harm – blood flow can afford a feeling of cleansing or 
of physiological release, literally (from the loss of internal fluid) and in 
physiological terms (the physical pain offers a release of sometimes 
extreme tension, or distraction from, or manifestation of, psychological 
turmoil).313 Abhor’s drive to hurt her body emanates from her 
relationship with her father, which induces acute anxiety, fear, and panic: 
“Daddy left me no possibility of easiness. He forced me to live among 
nerves sharper than razor blades, to have no more certainties […] Daddy 
taught me to live in pain, to know there’s nothing else” (ES, p. 9-10). In 
this way, for Abhor, self harm translates inevitable emotional pain into 
physical pain. Self harm might afford a degree of relief from tension but 
at the cost of accepting that there is “nothing else” other than pain 
available to her in her existence. This is her life lesson from a young age.  
Self harm rarely occurs in isolation from emotional pain, 
psychosocial stressors and, sometimes, as a response to sexual abuse or 
                                                
313 Self harm holds multiple unique meanings for individuals and, as attested to in 
Baker, Shaw and Biley, each person’s experience is unique, each person’s reason for 
self harm is individual. My reading of Abhor’s self harm here does not intend to assume 
a degree of certainty over the effects of her harm; I am interpreting from a position of 
having worked with many people who experience self harm both clinically and 
academically.  
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assault in childhood and/or adulthood. The action, the physical 
manifestation of psychological wounds, is often silenced, dismissed or 
ignored as an ‘attention seeking’ behaviour, more often seen in women 
and more often formulated in this dismissive way when seen in 
women.314 Self harm is not only experienced by female characters in 
Acker’s work. Rimbaud, for example, lacerates his wrists and considers 
suicide because of psychological effects created by the disparity between 
the “desire of the mind and body and the society outside that mind and 
body. From impossibility of any desire’s actualization” (IMTI, p. 9-10). 
His self-laceration is not an attempt to suicide, but an attempt to feel 
something in an existence where the freedom to exact one’s desires is 
unobtainable. Acker here writes the physicality of pain, expressed as a 
self-inflicted bodily wound, as a reasonable response to different 
traumas, particularly sexual trauma. Her character’s responses make 
manifest, in bodily exterior ways, the internal turmoil induced by trauma 
and by existence in the “society of disgust” that Abhor inhabits (ES, p. 
227).  
Violence, child abuse and sexual trauma are well documented as 
contributory factors to men’s and women’s experiences of distress, 
depression, psychosis and a host of other mental health issues; some have 
suggested that mental illness in both genders has a significant causal 
                                                
314 See, for example: Armando R. Favazza, Bodies Under Siege: Self-mutilation and 
Body Modification in Culture and Psychiatry (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1992); 
Anna Motz, ed. , Managing Self Harm: Psychological Perspectives (London: 
Routledge, 2009); Helen Spandler and Sam Warner, Beyond Fear and Control: 
Working with Young People who Self Harm (Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books, 2007); 
Marilee Strong, A Bright Red Scream: Self-Mutilation and the Language of Pain 
(London: Virago, 2005); Maggie Turp, Hidden Self Harm: Narratives from 
Psychotherapy (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2006). All of these texts note the potential 
for dismissive and unhelpful reactions, and offer alternative ways in which clinical staff 
might support people experiencing self harm.  
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relationship with sexual and other types of abuse in childhood.315 Ussher 
exposes the ways in which depression, ‘borderline personality disorder’, 
post-traumatic stress disorder and premenstrual syndrome are constructed 
by a patriarchally-orientated psychiatry to pathologise women’s 
understandable responses to the violence and misogyny inflicted upon 
them.316 She suggests that the very act of labelling women through their 
various diagnoses “acts to deny the social and discursive context of 
women’s lives, as well as the gendered nature of science, which defines 
how women’s madness is defined and studied”.317 The reality of 
women’s experiences of oppression and trauma risks being ignored in 
formulations of female distress that pathologise their very reasonable 
responses to subjugation and the omnipresent risk of sexual and other 
violence.318 Ussher argues that the very real internal and external 
manifestations of women’s distress in response to violence and abuse 
should not be pathologised as symptomatic of mental illness. She argues 
that distress is “not about weakness, inherent vulnerability, or pathology 
in women” but is instead a “ ‘reasonable response’ to the materiality of 
abuse, within the gendered construction of heterosexual relationships, 
where sexual violence against women and girls continues to be 
enacted”.319 Ussher further suggests: “we need to understand the material 
conditions of women and girls’ lives that facilitate such abuse – 
                                                
315 See Russell, pp. 45-50. See also John Read, Lisa Goodman, Anthony P. Morrison, 
Colin A. Ross and Volkmar Aderhold, ‘Childhood trauma, loss and stress’, in Models of 
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317 ibid. p. 46.  
318 See Ussher, p. 129-152 and Russell, p. 47-50.  
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powerlessness, patriarchy, and absence of voice (or refusal of others to 
hear)”.320 I have argued in this chapter that Acker makes evident in her 
texts the power structures which position and maintain women as 
‘victims’ of men, providing a portrait of the external social conditions 
from which female experiences of distress and disorder emerge. It is 
these represented realities that allow Acker to demonstrate the causal and 
reasonable development of madness in women. Unreason is often 
entirely reasonable for Acker’s characters – particularly when unreason 
comes from the experience of trauma.  
Ussher suggests that through a process of subjectification, 
“truths about women’s madness are reproduced and lived by women; the 
fictions framed as facts that serve to regulate women’s experience of 
distress, and through this process, our very experience of what it is to be 
‘woman’ ”.321 The key suggestion here – that “fictions framed as facts” 
are internalised and reproduced by not only men but by women – is 
evident in Acker’s work. Acker’s focus on trauma and violent sexuality 
is not always reproduced with the recipients of violence acting in the way 
they ‘should’ as ‘victims’.322 There is distress and disorder, but also 
growth, reflection, change and introspection. Airplane, for example, 
discovers that she can consider her own singular and coherent identity, 
violently interrupted as it was through her induction to a powerless 
sexuality, through escaping her destructive relationship with the man 
who rapes her:  
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321 ibid. p. 7.  
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Sexual Trauma through Angela Carter’, in Ethics and Trauma in Contemporary British 
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I became two people: I was (still) a child who wanted caring 
parents and I was a human I had made. The human I was 
making had a will as strong as a god’s, like those gods in 
Norse mythology, cause the one I was making had to. The 
will isn’t ferocious or uncontrollable; it’s an adult. Whereas 
the child’s freedom in geographical terms is sexuality. That 
got me mixed up for a long time: being two people or rather, 
being the same person as a child and as an adult. And I knew 
I was hurting and I clung to my hurt (IMTI, p. 148-9).  
 
In her freedom, she can consolidate her child and adult identities into her 
own secure personhood, moving forwards without reliance on a male 
care giver. Recognition of her pain and nurturing of her self offers a 
positive potential when trauma is worked through. Airplane narrates 
much of her own story in the first person, enabling a sense of personally 
constructed formulation and reflection – an important element in terms of 
narrative approaches to psychiatry, which I return to in Chapter 5.  
A similarly positive future is offered in Empire of the Senseless, 
where Abhor might be read as reacting against trauma in perhaps 
traditionally defined and reasonable ways (with distress and confusion) 
but also by escaping her patriarchal prison towards an individually 
defined and hopeful future. As Mitchell Ward argues, referring to Abhor, 
“by disavowing victimhood and by carefully controlling her own reaction 
to abuse, she is able to retain the agency that she otherwise does not 
possess”.323 In this way, Ward suggests, because the post-war Algerian 
landscape offers no psychological sense of working through her 
experiences, she owns her circumstances and experience, distorts her 
own accounting not in order to deceive but as a “rationalization that 
saves her from being stuck in the role of victim”.324 Both Abhor and 
Thivai struggle to find ontologically secure, non-dualistic identities in a 
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decaying landscape. The final section of the text is given to Abhor and 
the beginnings of her turning her insanity into anger. She speaks, 
privately but then publicly via a letter, about the injustice she suffers 
throughout the text as a consequence of her gender, which include rape 
and assault. Abhor insightfully, unlike Thivai, recognises early in the text 
that the “multinationals along with their computers have changed and are 
changing reality” (ES, p. 83), and that masculine power both controls and 
creates the reality she experiences. This realisation does not initially 
allow her to develop an independent, ontologically secure self; she starts 
from a position of being “panicked” about the instability of her 
relationship with Thivai (ES, p. 112) and “confused to the point of 
psychosis because I wasn’t sure what I was” (ES p. 110). Here, she talks 
of not knowing “what” rather than “who” she is; she initially she has no 
way of being except as Other, through other people’s designation of what 
she is. Abhor has the final words in the text, though, establishing herself 
as an autonomous human, rather than an automaton (as designated by 
Thivai): “I didn’t as yet know what I wanted. I now fully knew what I 
didn’t want and what and whom I hated. That was something” (ES, p. 
227). The novel closes on Abhor’s hope that “one day, maybe, there’ld 
be a human society in a world which is beautiful, a society which wasn’t 
just disgust” (ES, p. 227). Before this potential offering ending, Abhor’s 
self harm can be seen as a resistance to her father’s attempts to induct her 
into chaos and confusion – she controls her body through her self harm. 
In giving Abhor voice through the art at the end of the text, as well as the 
words she finally finds to ask Thivai why he inflicts pain on her, and 
through her appeal to let “anger be anger: neither self-hatred nor self-
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infliction” (ES, p. 221), Acker provides a more encouraging potential 
future for at least one half of the population. Abhor might find her 
“society which wasn’t just disgust” (ES, p. 227) through a self-aware, 
active, reflective, liberated and desiring self rather than a socially 
constructed sexual self to be desired. 
 
‘Women = Madness’ 
In this chapter, I have argued that Acker offers a creative telling of 
feminist theories of women’s madness. Acker’s narratives demonstrate 
the socio-political causal elements of ‘psychosis’ that contribute to how 
it is both formulated in women and more directly induced, showing the 
reasonable development of madness in women. It would be simplistic 
and reductionist to view Acker’s rich and diverse portrayals of madness 
as either women’s rebellion-through-madness, or as their nihilistic 
descent into the only route available for them within a patriarchal society 
– both views have faced some criticism.325 Carol Siegel, writing on 
Acker’s Don Quixote, suggests that to “reinfuse madness with its former 
power to challenge the bourgeois order, not merely escape into its 
despised fringe, to resignify it as an alternative source of vision rather 
than a miserable failing to achieve normalcy”, Acker must “resanctify 
madness”.326 Yet as Schlichter notes: 
The madwoman, one of the stereotypes of femininity in 
Western culture, holds a central position within the gendered 
system of representation, enabling and outlining the locus of 
the masculine subject of reason, while simultaneously 
epitomizing a negation of women’s discursive authority. In 
this sense, the association of women and madness 
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146 
 
dramatically exposes the role of an irrational, feminine 
Other-of-man, which cannot occupy the place of a subject of 
culture.327 
 
Acker, then, “stages her paradoxical politics of enunciation through the 
madwoman”.328 While these disaligned views on the functions of 
madness in Acker are interesting, I argue that one of Acker’s key 
messages in writing through and from within the apparent incoherency of 
psychosis, as I explore in the next chapter, is to appeal to the reader to 
attend to the content, to deconstruct the destructive, to challenge 
accepted forms of logic, coherence and understandability. This motif has 
a striking relevance for clinical practice, whereby the context and content 
of experiences remains secondary to the form and structure of 
‘symptoms’ in terms of reaching a diagnosis of ‘psychosis’ – and 
particularly where women are doubly pathologised before and in 
displaying their ‘symptoms’.  
Acker does not suggest that ‘madness’ does not exist – nor does 
Chesler, as the first feminist writer to explore gender and psychiatry. 
Despite her view that demonstrably and vocally ‘mad’ women are 
detained in “patriarchal” institutions, Chesler is clear that she also 
believes “that what we call ‘madness’ does exist”.329 She argues that it 
can be “caused or exacerbated by violence and by certain social and 
environmental conditions; that people in it’s grip suffer terribly; that it 
doesn’t always last forever [...] and that the ‘helping’ professions have 
been both helpful – and far from helpful”.330 In her revised text, she 
argues that women remain unfairly pathologised by dint of their gender – 
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“Perhaps what we call ‘madness,’ whether it appears in women or in 
men, is either the acting out of the devalued female role or the total or 
partial rejection of one’s own sex-role stereotype”.331 This focus on sex 
roles stereotyping and how it is interweaved into clinical perspectives on 
madness is explored in more depth in Busfield’s text, where she 
comments on Chesler’s evaluation that women are “doubly 
disadvantaged”, both in psychiatry and generally, by either being ‘too’ or 
‘too little’ feminine within their socially prescribed roles.332 Through my 
analysis in this chapter, I have demonstrated Acker’s concern with 
women’s disadvantageous positions in patriarchal society, and 
documented some of the tactics of resistance to this process that her 
characters employ. Furthermore, Acker’s writing of women’s sexual 
pleasure serves to undermine the patriarchal assumption that women 
should be passive, desirable objects rather than desiring, active subjects. 
Through her demonstrations of the unreasonableness of the ways women 
are positioned and powerless in sectors of society, Acker demonstrates 
how their unreasonable responses are, conversely, both reasonable and 
understandable, whether such reactions be caused by romantic 
relationships, sexual pleasure or sexual trauma.  
Chesler suggests that one possible route forward for women is to 
work towards a “frank passion for achieving the power necessary to 
define oneself – a power which is always predicated on the direct control 
of worldly realities”.333 This is a universal goal, irrespective of gendered 
factors such as motherhood, political alliance or sexuality: “Any 
                                                
331 ibid. p. 116, italics in original.  
332 Busfield, p. 99-102.  
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woman”, she writes, “who successfully becomes interested in and 
achieves various powers directly, and not through or for a man or a 
family, is, within the psychological kingdom of patriarchy, committing a 
radical act, i.e., and act that risks ‘winning’ ”.334 Chesler, however, risks 
placing the emphasis on women changing, women developing, women 
seizing power. Within our current clinical framing, it is difficult (though 
not impossible) for men to do this from within psychiatry, when they are 
positioned as mad – women are at a double disadvantage here. If they 
speak out about their treatment or challenge their diagnostic label, they 
risk being deemed non-compliant, hysterical, manipulative, hormonal, 
risk being denied treatment (which they may need), or contained 
physically and chemically like their predecessors. 
As a range of female-authored autobiographies of encounters 
with madness attest, hospitalisation, even self-sought therapy, is not 
generally an empowering experience, least not in the early days – authors 
from a range of diverse social, educational, political and historical 
backgrounds such as Sylvia Plath, Marya Hornbacher and Rachel 
Reiland provide testimony to this.335 Ussher notes autobiographies as 
being one source of resistance and challenge, suggesting that women’s 
accounts of madness are:  
[…] far removed from medical or psychological descriptions 
of ‘symptoms’, ‘diagnostic categories’, or ‘interventions’. 
They bring women’s distress and despair to life: the messy, 
murky, painful feelings and complex web of relationships 
that extend out from the woman who is invariably the sole 
object of the psychiatric gaze.336  
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Such writing can effect “a catharsis that makes sense of experience, and 
keeps madness at bay”.337 I would extend this, given that Acker’s writing 
blurs the boundaries of autobiography and fiction, to suggest that writing 
and narrative by women can offer such a space for exploration, 
challenge, resistance and deconstruction. On Acker and other’s work 
depicting violence by women, Hendin notes: “Language and perspective 
are primary instruments of revolt […] Through the denial of innocence 
and the protected and nurturing roles once played by women – the 
mother, the daughter, wife, sister, lover – a new set of core roles is 
harshly affirmed”.338 In this respect, learning clinically to identify, 
understand and listen to the context of women’s lives and their potential 
distress, even when violently expressed to self or others, rather than 
reaching too swiftly for the diagnostic manual or prescription pad, might 
offer narrative ways of working that honour individual experience, 
interpretation, meaning-making and strength. 
As Pitchford suggests, Acker demonstrates that madness is not a 
revolutionary alternative or successful mode of subversion. Pitchford 
notes that Abhor “cannot, in rejecting rationalism, risk falling into its 
dualistic opposite, irrationality. Irrationality cannot acknowledge the 
power imbalances rationalism has created”.339 ‘Psychosis’ or ‘madness’ 
is not rebellion. Felman, reviewing Chesler’s 1975 version of Women 
and Madness, writes: 
Depressed and terrified women are not about to seize the 
means of production and reproduction: quite the opposite of 
rebellion, madness is the impasse confronting those whom 
cultural conditioning has deprived of the very means of 
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protest or self-affirmation. Far from being a contestation, 
‘mental illness’ is a request for help, a manifestation both of 
cultural impotence and of political castration.340  
 
It is astonishing that 40 years after Felman noted this, a biomedical view 
continues to view psychosis and mental distress as (yet-undiscovered) 
biological entities, potentially separate from context and with content that 
is irrelevant to diagnosis. This formulating alienates personal meaning of 
the experience and expression of a ‘disease’ process. It remains 
concerning that women are in a position of double pathologisation, as 
this risks dismissing women’s expressions of distress, trauma, discontent 
and rebellion as ‘sickness’, as Ussher, Nyquist Potter, Motz and others 
argue. An open and critical dialogue about the violence inflicted upon 
women, rather than the silencing of this, would be useful in terms of 
deconstructing the discourses within which ‘victimhood’ is currently 
narrated. Acker wrote these social and personal realities: her writing can, 
as I argue in Chapter 5, offer significant reminders as to the importance 
of the socio-political context of women’s lives (as much and equal to the 
experiences of all people experiencing oppression or subjugation), the 
significance of personal content, meaning-making, storytelling and 
interpretation, and of the need to believe in women’s and men’s 
experiences of trauma. Her narrating of sexual experiences might offer 
readers an experience somehow analogous to psychosis - much of 
Acker’s fragmented and challenging narratives offer a similar de-centring 
effect on the reader, which might further offer insights into the 
experience of the chaotic, fragmentary and confusing elements of 
psychosis. This reading process might also offer the development of 
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interpretative and narrative skills that can be employed in clinical work. 
These dual elements are the focus of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Acker’s Writing Psychosis – Textual Form 
There’s a lot of power in narrative, not in story.341 
 
Acker’s stories exude strangeness – they are non-linear, fragmentary, 
with fractures and ruptures throughout, diversions and tangents that 
interrupt traditional literary flow and form. In this chapter I explore how 
Acker formally creates what I refer to as a ‘textual psychosis’ via 
structural devices and literary techniques, which demonstrate psychosis 
for the reader at the level of form. Using elements of Evelyn Keitel’s 
notion of the psychopathographic text, I argue, that Acker’s work offers 
more than a simple mimicking of psychosis. Acker does not only write 
about psychosis – though she refers to it in different ways often in her 
work. Acker writes psychosis. In this way, I argue, her work offers 
insights into how it may feel to experience fragmentation, confusion, 
mistrust, loss of internal coherence. The experience of reading Acker’s 
work might then prompt novel understanding and interpretation skills for 
clinicians. 
Throughout this chapter, my overarching argument is that 
Acker’s writing psychosis offers a literary analogue of psychosis. She 
takes an ununderstandable (in Jasper’s terms) condition and psychoticises 
textual form, through fragmentation, repetition and the depiction of 
inaccessible languages. Her texts replicate at the level of form a certain 
kind of mental state which is chaotic, disordered, difficult to comprehend 
and interpret – challenging to simply ‘read’. Acker does not write stories 
about psychosis. Nor does she invite a simple ‘symptom-spotting’ 
reading; there are few clinically discernible or discrete psychotic 
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symptoms evident in her work, and identifying psychosis in characters 
via a clinical discourse produces a reductive application of 
interdisciplinarity that denies the artistic function of literature itself. 
Acker’s work, alternatively, structurally translates certain elements of 
psychosis into the written narrative form. Acker offers up a mirror to 
psychosis, which not only contests easy interpretation but which contests 
the foundations of a psychiatry based on formulating complex mental 
experiences into identifiable symptomatology, leading to diagnosis based 
on a certain correlation of symptom clusters. In this chapter, I examine 
Acker’s literary form, before discussing her use of narrative fragments 
rather than coherent ‘story’; use of repetition; and depiction of 
inaccessible languages and the ‘language of orgasm’. 
 
Acker’s Textual Form 
Acker’s distinctive form, textual destruction and lack of easy readability 
has attracted much critical attention, including creatively critical pieces 
which mimic Acker’s own deconstruction of the reader’s expectations of 
stability and coherence.342 Acker’s writing can seem almost casually 
thrown together, a jumble of seemingly unrelated fragments, sections 
repeated from her own other works, plagiarised from pre-existing texts, 
auto-plagiarised, containing multiple voices that transcend time and 
space, existing within but not exterior to the narrative. Fragments are 
sometimes self-contained interior monologues with limited exterior 
fixing. Yet Acker’s work, including her early work, is formed of very 
carefully constructed patterns of language and narrative, involving 
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significant work far beyond a casual bundling of words or stream of 
consciousness thrown into a vague story.343 Peter Wollen suggests that 
Acker “used to read her own texts too, each one eight times, re-drafting it 
after each reading – once for meaning, once for beauty, once for sound, 
once to the mirror to see how it looked, once for rhythm, once for 
structure, and so on”.344 For the reader, this leaves texts in which they 
can make their “own montage”, to “appropriate and re-order”.345 In this 
respect, and particularly in her most radically fragmented short pieces, 
where the psychoticisation of text is most evident, Acker’s literary 
analogues of psychosis leave the reader able to create their own meaning, 
to re-construct the mental state presented in the text. The reader can 
respond by dismissing the text as incoherent, ununderstandable and 
‘unreadable’, or can construct meaning and coherence from the 
incoherence, potentially using Acker’s non-fiction work and considering 
the context and content of the text to support coherence formulation. The 
way that Acker has been described as offering readers a personalised 
montage of fragments may offer an invitation to a clinically-minded 
reader to consider how they form a montage out of people’s own stories 
– how they chose what to hear, how to formulate this, which framework 
to apply, or, more radically, acknowledging which framework the person 
themselves applies and considering how differing discourses might be 
equally valid and meaningful. 
Noting Acker’s simultaneous deliberate construction and 
deliberate destruction of textual form, Wollen suggests that, far from 
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creating apolitical or nihilistic texts, destruction and construction is 
indicative of Acker’s dissolution into a “torrent of textuality” in which 
she became, and was, a “ceaseless explorer of the disorientating potential 
of language”.346 Acker borrowed, appropriated, re-appropriated and 
plagiarised an array of diverse sources, as documented in much 
commentary on Acker’s work and by Acker in interview.347 She also 
breached the boundaries of generic form and content, subverting 
orienting factors that the reader uses to situate him or herself in the 
reading process. As Dick states, “Kathy shoved it all together: great 
literature, pornography, schlock novels, movies, poetry of many lands, 
science fiction, detective stories, and other genres”.348 William 
Burroughs is noted as one author who provided Acker with inspiration 
and textual methodologies which could, as Wollen suggests, be used as 
“an example of how a literary technique could be given a political twist 
as a mode of resistance, envisaged as a way of subverting the control 
system inherent in verbal discourse”.349 In my reading, Acker’s writing 
of psychosis at the level of form offers resistance to contemporary 
discourses that formulate complex experiences, beliefs and expressions 
into an over-simplified system. Similarly, Muth, exploring how 
contemporary American fiction might be best read in the context of 
literary theory, suggests that reading Blood and Guts in High School “as 
a roughly linear narrative centered on the liberatory struggle of heroine 
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and author alike” risks upholding the “very binary we want the novel to 
undermine”, arguing then that “we tend to classify the genuinely 
disruptive elements of the novel as politically unreadable”.350 Much like 
describing Blood and Guts in High School as a simple coming of age 
story (or, worse, as ‘unreadable’ because of its disruptive and fragmented 
nature) would miss the political, social, feminist, linguistic and artistic 
messages inherent in this multi-layered text, homogenising and reducing 
someone’s multifactorial and complex mental, social and interpersonal 
experiences to only be indicative of ‘psychosis’ denies the context, 
content and personal meaning of such a personal and multifaceted 
phenomena.  
Ebbesen, reflecting specifically on Acker’s The Adult Life of 
Toulouse Lautrec by Henri Toulouse Lautrec, suggests that in this text 
Acker “challenges dominant ideology through the textual form itself”.351 
Ebbesen asserts that Acker “holds form partially accountable for gender 
oppression and oppression of the poor. In form, she sees a fundamental 
thought process which structures all of life. Indeed, this attack on 
narrative form is a paradigmatic feature of her oeuvre”.352 He suggests 
that one of Acker’s textual methods is “defamiliarisation”, whereby she 
“consciously employs intertextualized texts to violate boundaries of 
identity and gender”.353 De-familiarisation also works in Acker to “break 
down the numerous and interrelated binaries [...] (e.g. identity/non-
identity, self/other)”.354 The madness / sanity boundary equally requires 
rethinking, and as such Ebbesen’s thoughtful analysis can be furthered. 
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Acker’s deconstruction, and destruction, of coherent narrative form and 
structure functions in one way to demonstrate as hollow the arbitrary 
dualistic division what we consider as logical or rational expression, and 
what are considered expressions indicative of ‘madness’. 
In this chapter, my focus is on how Acker’s textual form 
produces texts which structurally and formally are analogous to the 
disorienting effects of psychosis and how this translates for the reader a 
sense of familiarisation and defamiliarisation with psychosis (drawing on 
Keitel). As I have argued elsewhere, with reflection on Keitel, fiction is 
one literary form which can either tell madness via diegetic narrative, 
including intradiegetic narration – this process risks objectification, 
presenting madness as a spectacle of otherness where it remains 
something outside of the reader, happening to an other.355 Acker, on the 
other hand, often shows madness at the level of the textual form, leaving 
the reader potentially disoriented and ‘defamiliarised’ (in Ebbesen’s 
terms) from the orienting features of linear narrative and stable (even 
when digetically unstable or unreliable) narrative or narrative voice. 
Acker was aware of the disorientation that her work can effect 
on the reader. In interview with Lotringer Acker talks about “not writing 
for the reader” because, if a text is constructed with the reader in mind, 
“there’s no distance. If there’s this distance between the reader and the 
text, the reader’s just an observer. I want the reader to come right into 
the text because that’s the only way you can take the journey”.356 She 
admitted that this “probably” makes her “texts a bit unreadable”.357 Yet it 
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is the invitation to “come right into” the narrative that I argue enables the 
reader to take something clinically useful away from the reading 
experience. Acker, further, noted the influence of conceptual artists on 
her work, learning that form is:  
[…] determined not by arbitrary rules, but by intention. And 
intentionality is all. That’s what I mean by this emphasis on 
conceptualism, on intentionality. So I had really been trained 
in the idea that you just don’t sit down and write, you have to 
know why you write and why you use certain 
methodologies.358 
 
This suggests that Acker’s disorienting form was at least partially 
constructed with a deliberate aim, at a minimum to explore traditional 
narrative linearity as inconsistent to and insufficient for representing 
contemporary existence. 
Acker referred to herself as “the most disoriented novelist that 
ever existed”.359 Disoriented offers a vivid and accurate description of 
Acker’s work, perhaps rather than conceptual or experimental. As Acker 
noted, ‘experimental’ can be a designation used to dismiss or deride a 
writer’s work: “I think that sometimes the word ‘experimental’ has been 
used to hide the political radicalness of some writers. Oh, they’re 
‘experimental’ means they’re not really important”.360 For Acker, writers 
themselves have a role to play in maintaining this dismissal, noting, “it is 
not only the major publishing houses who support the ‘experimental’ 
equals ‘marginal’ equation. It is the ‘experimental’ writers themselves, 
for they have and are internalizing the literary conventions and 
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restrictions that support the status quo”.361 Acker, not only in her 
portrayal and textual re-creation of psychosis, but also in her active and 
relentless engagement with major themes (gender, poverty, capitalism, 
inequality, the deceptive and subjugating power of language, the effects 
of societal repression of sexuality), is neither marginal nor ‘merely’ 
experimental. In offering an interpretation that focuses on psychosis in 
her work, her portrayal of the apparently marginal and ununderstandable-
therefore-Other (psychosis) as actually far from marginal demonstrates 
ways in which ‘marginal’ experiences are both meaningful and important 
for her narrators and characters. 
I argue that Acker writes psychosis. This does not mean 
potential difficulties in reading psychosis in her texts necessarily leads to 
a reading that is unable to make sense of senselessness or failing to take 
away something clinically useful from her non-clinically narrated or 
represented psychosis. Ebbesen suggests that if we “look at Acker’s 
textual production [...] we see numerous attempts to unveil and criticize 
ideology within texts”.362 However, he argues that her “morally 
committed textual activism is directly at odds with the very theories she 
idiosyncratically employs” – from Baudrillard to Derrida and feminist 
postmodernism – leading to a conflict for Ebbesen.363 He suggests that 
Acker “believes that postmodern writing strategies (e.g. deconstructive, 
Lacanian) are useful within texts because they facilitate liberation from 
patriarchy and capitalist oppression in the conditions of 
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postmodernity”.364 Because, for Ebbesen, such “poststructural theories” 
stand “in direct opposition” to any “ethical-political purposes”, a 
question arises: “whether or not formally radical art can transform reality 
and change the political status quo”.365 Ebbesen –“against Acker” – 
believes it cannot.366 Like Pitchford, I believe that the transformative and 
revelatory potential power of radical art and literature lays in the reading 
practices they encourage.367 As I argued in Chapter 2, Acker’s political 
engagement is aligned with (though not easily situated directly within) 
feminist discourses on women’s madness.368 Her political engagement 
can also be aligned with the work of post-psychiatry, as I demonstrate in 
the conclusion to this thesis. 
In effect, what Acker does with her literary-in-extremis writing 
psychosis is to provide strands of knowledge for her readers – reading 
experiences and possible interpretations that deconstruct and reconsider 
dominant discourses on madness, much like those provided in a different 
medium by writers such as Bracken and Thomas.369 Before I move on to 
demonstrate how Acker writes psychosis, I want to briefly turn to Evelyn 
Keitel’s work on psychopathography to offer a method through which 
reader response might afford the reading experience of psychosis, which 
prompts novel interpretative reading skills. Using Keitel’s work, I have 
argued elsewhere that there is a subgenre of mid to late twentieth century 
fiction that comprises of psychotic texts.370 Acker provides an exemplar 
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of this psychoticisation of textual form and content. Psychotic texts, as I 
define them, are fictions of “incoherence, dissolution, and 
irresolution”.371 The fragment and the idea are of more concern in the 
psychotic text than the narrative whole or its adherence to generic 
conventions (although this subgenre of fiction invents new generic 
conventions of its own and can be seen not only in the work of Kathy 
Acker but also William Burroughs and texts such as J. G. Ballard’s The 
Atrocity Exhibition).372 Psychotic texts are not easily readable – they can 
be, at times, ‘unreadable’, resisting comfortable or familiar 
comprehension. The words on the page dissolve into an anti-narrative 
babble of voice and voices, abruptly ending, withholding resolution and 
leaving the reader unsettled and questioning. Keitel’s work on 
psychopathographic texts provides a useful reader-response frame in 
developing my reading of Acker’s textual psychosis. Keitel’s work on 
psychopathography is most closely aligned with my reading of what 
reading Acker’s fragmented form can offer, though my reading both 
converges and departs form Keitel’s. Nonetheless, Keitel offered a 
significant influential background to this chapter, and as such is worth 
exploring in some detail. 
 
Psychopathography 
Keitel excavates a subgenre of texts that focus on madness, which she 
names “psychopathography”.373 Keitel’s theory contributes to 
psychoanalytically orientated reader-response criticism, which she draws 
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up early in her theorising.374 Her primary hypothesis is that 
psychopathographical texts are distinguishable from pathographical 
texts by virtue of their effect on the reader. When reading 
psychopathographies such as Doris Lessing’s The Golden Notebook, the 
reader is not distanced from the psychosis depicted, able to maintain a 
relative distance from their position as ‘not-mad’, but is instead drawn 
into the midst of the experience where “[r]eading about psychosis 
becomes a reading psychosis”.375  
This process occurs in a complex way. The “emotional 
dimensions involved in psychotic experiences are conveyed to the 
reader” via psychopathographies, which explore “human borderline 
situations” which lie “beyond the margins of discourse”, reacting to the 
“problem of communicating something which lies beyond 
communication” (i.e. in psychosis).376 Hence, psychopathographies, as 
distinct from pathographies, “deal with an area of experience which 
resists linguistic representation”.377 Keitel suggests that pathographies 
“are written in a highly conventional linguistic style which leaves the 
capability of language to represent ‘reality’ unquestioned”.378 
Conversely, the “literary strategies whereby psychotic experience is 
communicated are not – or at least, are not all – marked by unfamiliarity 
and strangeness of the subject matter” because “inaccessible material 
cannot be communicated in an unknown code”.379 Hence, she argues, 
psychopathographies “rely for their effect on textual strategies which are 
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in part taken over from their literary context, and on experiences with 
reading other contemporary texts”.380 One area where I depart slightly 
here from Keitel is that throughout this chapter I argue that Acker’s texts 
do rely on strategies of unfamiliarity and strangeness through textual 
form (and content), and that it is this distance from ‘known’ textual 
strategies that might serve to prompt reflection on diverse 
communicative and interpretative strategies.  
Psychopathographies “first appeal to but then undermine and 
ultimately frustrate the reading habits acquired from consuming 
contemporary literature, so that a vacuum is created in which the specific 
effect of psychopathographies can unfold”.381 Intertextuality is key to 
Keitel’s proposal, forming in part the “virtual dimension” of reading.382 
In this dimension “extra-textual components” are called upon by the 
reader, induced by the reading process, to produce the effects of the 
psychopathography.383 Psychopathographical novels are, for Keitel, 
dividable into three subtypes, which mirror the subtypes of mediating 
texts that Keitel explores – literary, theoretical and imitative. Mediating 
texts differ from psychopathographies, in that the mediating text offers a 
“stabilizing effect” for the reader, whereas psychopathographies induce 
instability.384 The imitative and “degenerate” theoretical subtypes are 
less successful in their induction of the reader’s experience of “the 
emotional elements inherent in psychotic personality dissolutions: 
pleasure and unpleasure, creative playfulness and a sense of paralysis or 
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oppression”.385 The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, because they 
rely on a “naive spelling out” as seen with, for example, Fromm-
Reichman’s case histories (theoretical psychopathographies).386 In 
theoretical psychopathographies, the theoretical is not only presented as 
theoretical, but is juxtaposed with a literary illustration of the theoretical, 
an “over-powering discourse” which is “certainly stabilizing (if not 
boring)”.387 The reader can only opt to accept or reject the case material 
presented as “true or false”, with no alternative reaction possible, because 
the primary intention of theoretical psychopathographies is “didactic”.388 
Secondly, the “imitative type of psychopathography draws upon and 
takes over the textual strategies of and perspectives of both the literary 
type of psychopathography and schematic literary genres, and employs 
them in a trite way”.389 Thus imitative psychopathographies, such as that 
provided by the omniscient narrator in Hannah Green’s I Never Promised 
You A Rose Garden, which Keitel uses here, work to maintain the 
reader’s position as removed from the text, and the madness, and thus 
stable. Therefore, the “imitative type schematically reproduces the form 
of the literary type of psychopathography” but “displays no formal 
innovations of its own and, in turn, cannot give rise to any unusual and 
interesting effects”.390 In this respect Acker certainly does not fit the 
theoretical psychopathography or the imitative – elements of her work 
offers an imitation of the form of psychosis, but I argue that her texts do 
not automatically distance the reader, placing them in the stable or 
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authoritative external position. Acker’s writing psychosis instead can 
offer a literary analogue that moves beyond the imitative functions Keitel 
identifies.  
There are texts that cross the boundaries of the three subtypes of 
psychopathographies. It may be that Acker would be best situated 
somewhere between the imitative and literary subtypes. This positioning 
is possible when comparatively noted alongside Keitel’s reading of Doris 
Lessing’s Briefing for a Descent into Hell as illustrative of the use of R. 
D. Laing’s psychological theories in producing a creative text. Keitel 
argues that this is one of “very few literary texts relating to and 
interacting with a theoretical system”.391 In fact virtually all of Acker’s 
texts could be read as interacting with various theoretical systems, 
though it is antithetical to the purpose of her texts to consider them solely 
through a theoretical lens, as I have explored in Chapter 1 when 
discussing the types of theoretical system that could be employed to 
analyse Acker’s narratives.  
In reading literary psychopathographies, Keitel argues that a 
“sense of an enveloping oppression felt during reading, a sensation of 
being trapped in the text, is further enhanced by the virtual dimension of 
the literary type of psychopathography”.392 This “virtual dimension”, 
argues Keitel, “comprises proliferations of phantasies relating to be 
subject, which are expense factors, as well as intertextual references to 
the conventions of the mediating texts”.393 Keitel suggests that this 
“dimension” is “virtual” because, though it is induced by the text, it is 
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“not contained in any definite textual strategy, and must be supplied by 
the reader, who may well feel ‘lost in the infinite’ ”.394 The “reader’s 
expectations of stabilization, however, is thwarted, and the 
disappointment of his expectations reinforces his sense of an enveloping 
oppression to an even greater degree”.395 In Acker, her overt 
intertextuality offers an initially stabilising or orientating possibility for 
the disoriented reader – but this is constantly subverted via her 
manipulation of existing texts towards her own textual aims, her 
miscellany of textual and generic references, and the textual strategies 
she employs to de-situate her work from the familiar or known.  
Psychopathographies do not merely use a psychotic character or 
narrator for their effects: “If the author is able to convey in literary 
discourse dimensions of experience not directly accessible to us in real 
life, then his work must do more than offer a superficial, naive depiction 
of mental illness”.396 Acker rarely creates clinically recognisable 
intradigetic, ‘tellings’ of madness, or showings of madness in characters 
defined as such by an omniscient other-narrator. Keitel suggests that the: 
[…] communicatory situation pre-structured by the textual 
strategies of psychopathographies is expansive and open [...] 
expanding and contracting, dedifferentiating and 
redifferentiating forces, are at work simultaneously. No 
choice between mutually exclusive possibilities has to be 
made.397  
 
Leaving – or rather, initiating – open possibilities for interpretation 
means that the literary type of psychopathography offers, for Keitel, “a 
way into those dimensions of experience which are situated in the deep 
                                                
394 Keitel, p. 112.  
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levels of our unconscious and constantly repelled by any conscious 
perception”.398 In terms of what literature can offer for clinical purposes, 
I suggest that Acker’s fragmented and disorientating texts do not leave 
the reader suspended in a place where their responses are somehow 
“repelled” by conscious perception. The reader of Acker’s work can 
make the choice to dismiss any discernable reader effects in much the 
same way a clinician might dismiss a person’s seemingly ‘mad’ 
expressions as only indicative of an illness. Or, as I argue in the 
conclusion to this thesis, they can learn from Acker’s work empathetic 
reflection (the sense of what psychosis might be experienced as – from 
the literary analogue offered by Acker) and communicative and 
comprehension strategies (the novel reading and interpretative skills 
gleaned from making sense of incoherence), which might be useful in the 
clinical interaction, both in terms of supporting people to cohere their 
stories and in interpersonal responses to hearing those stories. 
In textual terms, Acker’s work is not only about psychosis – 
following Keitel’s thesis, I argue that it takes the reader inside psychosis, 
offering them a translation of some of the emotional responses the 
anxieties inherent within psychosis. I depart from Keitel in reading these 
responses through a psychoanalytical framework however, and I disagree 
with some of the statements she makes about psychosis clinically, though 
I can appreciate their psychoanalytic origins.399 My exploration here 
examines how Acker re-presents ‘inaccessible’ material with new – 
rather than ‘unknown’ – textual codes and strategies. I propose Acker’s 
                                                
398 Keitel, p. 113.  
399 Examples can be found on p. 30 and p. 34, regarding anorexia as a “schizophrenic” 
illness, for example, and references to “normal” as opposed to “psychotic” people.  
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texts can be interpreted from a starting point that employs Keitel’s 
theory, but moves beyond this, using mediating texts not as any 
stabilising force in the texts but subversively, for example, in the way 
that clinical feminist accounts both intersect and divert from Acker’s 
work, as I explored in Chapter 2. A clearer example of such subversion is 
evident in how descriptive psychopathology might offer one stabilising 
mediative text for interpreting Acker’s characters experience of 
psychosis, but such a reading leaves the reader no further forward in 
understanding, empathising or developing new skills.  
The following sections of this chapter aim to demonstrate how 
Acker provides a textual analogue of psychosis. There are three areas that 
convene to produce effects on the reader that I return to in the conclusion 
section. Firstly, her use of narrative fragment, often with only a loosely 
connecting overall narrative framing, replicating textually – and thus 
giving the reader the sense of – elements commonly associated with 
‘psychosis’ such as thought disorder, loosening of associations and 
tangential thinking. In Acker, the fragment is powerful, not the 
overarching story.400 Secondly the use of repetition, within individual 
texts and between texts, induces a sense of insecurity, doubting of 
reading memory. Finally, I explore Acker’s use of inaccessible language, 
both through use of foreign languages and characters and through her 
mediations on the loss of language that is available (or not) in orgasm 
and sexual desire, drawing a parallel here with the challenges of 
representing what Keitel noted as ‘inexpressible’ experiences. I then 
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return to Keitel briefly in concluding this chapter to demonstrate the two 
clinical effects that can be taken from Acker’s writing psychosis.  
 
Narrative Fragments  
Ebbesen notes that Acker disrupts “the traditional realistic narrative”, 
evident in her “shifts in genre, as well as moments of interdiscursivity 
and intertextuality within those genres”.401 For Ebbesen, Acker’s The 
Adult Life of Toulouse Lautrec by Henri Toulouse Lautrec “parodies 
genres in order to unmask – at the levels of form and content – what she 
feels these constructions attempt to conceal or repress, namely, 
destructive social relations under patriarchy and capitalism”.402 He 
continues by suggesting that, for Acker, “this state of affairs has much to 
do with reason, notions of static and autonomous subjectivity, as well as 
reified social relations”.403Acker’s formal experimentations with 
narrative, genre and textual form have been interpreted in one way, then, 
as functioning as an ‘unmasking’ of the destructive nature of social 
relations (particularly gendered) and the unobtainability of an 
autonomous and flexible personal identity. Acker’s fragments 
demonstrate a fluidity of experience which denies the desirability or 
achievability of coherent rationality in expression or experience. The 
cumulative effect of reading Acker’s radically disjointed, incoherent 
fragments serves two core functions in contributing to overall reader 
response. Firstly, they disrupt coherent notions of story and linear 
narration, mirroring the way that people experiencing their self-narrative 
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disruptions might express those experiences. Secondly, and following 
this, they offer an opportunity to cohere fragments into something 
meaningful and useful. 
As a core element contributing to Acker’s writing psychosis, her 
use of narrative fragments owes much to the cut-up fold-in techniques of 
William Burroughs. Acker’s ‘Politics’ was, she states, formed when 
“doing a lot of Burroughs experiments. It was all about the sex shows, 
with cut-in dreams, cut-in politics, cut-in everything”.404 Acker admired 
Burroughs’ work. In the essay ‘A Few Notes on Two of my Books’, she 
writes, “Burroughs’s writing is ‘immediate.’ ‘Immediate’ has something 
to do with the sentence ‘I want to read something that means something 
to me.’ Burroughs never bores me”.405 She expands upon what she means 
by immediacy, the individual meaning of work upon the reader, in a 
second essay, ‘William Burroughs’s Realism’, noting that in “terms of 
content and formally, William Burroughs’s writings are those of 
discontinuity and dissolution […] Due to these psychotic realities, 
Burroughs, in his writing, was able to portray futures which are now our 
present”.406 The “discontinuity and dissolution” in Burroughs, which 
contribute to his portrayal of a “psychotic” reality, comes from the Cut-
up / Fold-in technique best displayed in Naked Lunch, Soft Machine, The 
Ticket that Exploded and Nova Express. In Naked Lunch, Burroughs 
suggests that the reader can cut into the text at any point, given that there 
is very little in the way of linear structure.407 Burroughs’ description of 
                                                
404 Acker in interview with Lotringer, p. 5.  
405 Acker, ‘A Few Notes on Two of My Books’, p. 6.  
406 Acker, ‘William Burroughs’s Realism’, p. 2.  
407 Burroughs, Naked Lunch, p. 176.  
171 
 
his work practices offers insight into his writing process and a further 
suggestion of how to read his texts: 
I started my trip in the morgue with old newspapers, folding 
in today with yesterday and trying out composites – When 
you skip through a newspaper as most of us do you see a 
great deal more than you know – In fact you see it all on a 
subliminal level – Now when I fold today’s paper in with 
yesterday’s paper and arrange the pictures to form a time 
section montage, I am literally moving back to the time when 
I read yesterday’s paper, that is traveling in time back to 
yesterday – I did this eight hours a day for three months [...] I 
made fold-ins and composites and I did the same with photos 
– 408 
 
Burroughs suggests that skimming and thus reading on subliminal level, 
rather than linear detailed reading, is how his texts might best offer 
something useful. In this respect, the experience of reading Burroughs 
might be one of temporal disruption through his lack of linearity and 
suggests recognition of the importance of ideas, of the fragment itself, 
rather than story of the whole. This is something that Acker clearly 
offers, and which may have been directly adopted from Burroughs’ 
techniques. Acker demonstrates the power of the fragment of narrative 
over the textually coherent whole. Instead of dismissing the formal 
fragment as incoherent when viewed without the exterior contextual, 
content-driven or linear framing, there is much to be noted from the 
fragment itself. The same can occur when working with people 
experiencing psychosis – the form of expression might be deemed to 
‘only’ indicate ‘psychosis’, but the importance of the framing and the 
content of the fragment are of vital importance in understanding the 
overarching themes that contribute towards cohesion of the whole.  
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Acker’s narrative fragments, like Burroughs’ cut up/fold in 
texts, translate through textual form certain elements that have been 
formulated as indicating psychosis, such as thought disorder and 
tangential thinking, through their loosening of associations and 
fragmentation of linear structure. Such a structure is mirrored in Acker’s 
most radical fragmented short pieces and texts. There are, similarly, 
elements of repetition with regards Burroughs’ four cut-up fold-in texts – 
he used the same body of written and recorded material to form the texts, 
and hence certain characters reappear at points in each novel and his 
thematic concerns remain similar throughout. This again is very evident 
in Acker’s use of repetition and re-appropriation of her own (often 
already appropriated) material.  
Acker’s psychoticisation of text through the cut up / fold in 
technique is especially apparent in The Burning Bombing Of America. 
This short fragment contains many of Acker’s recurrent themes and 
tropes – gender roles, madness, capitalism, violence and sex. There is a 
direct concern with notions of madness expressed in this piece, a typical 
example of Acker’s fragmented narrative flow and depiction of interior 
consciousness: 
I’ll just talk  forget it  inspiration gone  energy high  general 
feeling in the consciousness: can’t get myself together  what 
are you doing  I’m flying into outer apace  I’m going insane  
25mg. Valium one seconal. 50mg. Benzedrine unknown 
chemicals in the food  personality changes result. hospitals 
are for getting well. don’t believe it  don’t believe anything 
you hear. Be as paranoid  schizophrenic  as possible. all 
sentences suspect. Stupid Man says the universities are in 
league with the evil magicians  the so-called Death Wards  
Columbia deals arsenic-napalm  DD3 welfare means 
lobotomy  nurses are robotants. Allow people to do whatever 
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they want allow the streets to be covered with silk  people 
will dance wildly in the streets 409 
 
The disjointed and tangential nature of this fragment offers a clear 
example of how people experiencing inner confusion and disjointedness 
might express such ideas. Themes of paranoia are also evident, a 
commonly depicted experience in Acker’s work which I return to in 
Chapter 4 to explore the personal meaning of such phenomena. Acker’s 
use of triple spaces within the textual structure, between words and 
segments, is also interesting here. They indicate not a pause, as would be 
expected by a full stop, but have a curious reading impact, enhancing the 
sense of narrative flow (there is little actual pause) but also creating a 
sense of panic and franticness through frenetic condensing of multiple 
ideas into one segment of text. These spaces might also indicate a violent 
interruption, a literal fracture, in the stream of consciousness narrative 
flow. In this section, my furthering of Keitel’s work is evident – there is 
no mediating or stabilising orientating text here, despite the loose 
association that can be made with the stream of consciousness textual 
style. Acker (like Burroughs) here creates a new textual strategy that 
forms part of her development of a literary analogue of psychosis – the 
replication of what might clinically be considered ‘psychotic’ interior 
monologue, but where attention to the individual fragments and the 
overall segment might offer insights into the particular concerns of that 
person. 
The very early piece, ‘Politics’, provides a further exemplar of 
Acker’s psychoticisation of the text through the use of fragment rather 
than linear story. ‘Politics’ was written while Acker was working in the 
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sex industry and hence echoes many of her later thematic concerns, such 
as the unselfing process of orgasm and the synergism this holds with 
‘psychosis’.410 It is formed of a stream of consciousness style, deeply 
fragmented, and with very minimal punctuation to prompt pause. The 
narrative is crowded and condensed with ideas, with only the mention of 
“dream sequences” providing any narrative thread or sense of purpose: 
“this is the third dream sequence I’m not going to do anything for the 
next two days put down my actual dream” for example offers an 
orienting element for the reader (this is a dream section, I expect a sense 
of unreality here perhaps).411 The reference to dream sequences calls to 
mind psychoanalytic ideas of free association, whereby a person writes 
or speaks without active cognitive processing or the need for overall 
coherency. This, in turn, potentially provides a semblance of generic 
ordering for the reader: the piece might, then, be aligned with the 
‘known’ strategic textual employment of stream of consciousness as a 
narrative device. 
In terms of the psychoticisation of the text, ‘Politics’ again 
textually demonstrates various elements that are thought to be indicative 
of ‘psychosis’, such as thought disorder, tangential thinking, pressured 
speech and disinhibited content. This segment provides one example: 
Lenny didn’t leave me some dead tired Bob is disgusting a 
destroyer of human minds the second dream sequence written 
at 11.40 I’m feeling like shit get along with Hannah (I am) I 
can’t cite down peacocks my nightmares all these 
invulnerable thoughts my great beauty I can try to talk to 
Hannah third dream tomorrow tell her Lenny says she’s 
scared I should do everything to help her relax I want to be 
                                                
410 Acker in interview with Lotringer, p. 5.  
411 Kathy Acker, ‘from Politics’, (1968) in Hannibal Lecter, My Father, pp. 25-36, (p. 
30).  
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alone Greta Garbo Scylla and Charibdis I don’t know how to 
return 412 
 
The flow here is disjointed, chaotic, tangential, disordered. The reader 
(like the clinician) does not know who Lenny, Bob, or Hannah is, or why 
they should have such significance in the interior monologue. These 
‘others’ crowd the narrator’s world and expressed thoughts, but do not 
exist in any charactorial sense. A reduction of a complex narrative 
expression to a series of symptoms would potentially deny the narrative 
function, content and significance of this piece, however. The stream of 
incoherence that forms ‘Politics’ contains fragments of insight into the 
narrator’s experience and existence, which might be missed if only 
searching for symptomatological examples of disorder that correspond to 
a particular taxonomy. Lines such as “my basic problem is I can’t quite 
believe anything and cant react to anything similarly I never react to 
things when they happen but only later when they’re less threatening” 
might, for example, be indicative of the wider existential concerns of mid 
to late twentieth century life – loss of certainty, concerns about emotional 
flatness and superficiality, anhedoneic response, loss of meaningful 
reaction to events.413 The final line of the piece screams out from the 
page, “it doesn’t mean what it should no one else thinks like this 
anymore I say angelic I’m sick of fucking not knowing who I am”, which 
might indicate problems with defining and securing an identity, a theme 
that Acker returns to frequently.414 Persevering through the anti-narrative 
of ‘Politics’ demonstrates the potential of fragments to both contribute to 
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theoretical material such as that by Fredric Jameson and Jean Baudrillard – see also 
Woods, The Sublime Object of Psychiatry.  
414 Acker, ‘from Politics’, p. 35.  
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a sense of cohering a whole and to demonstrate the importance of 
meaningfully acknowledging the content, rather than concentrating on 
only identifying the form. A reading here could have more clearly 
pinpointed different psychiatric symptoms in the two pieces noted above. 
I argue that they offer examples where narrative fragments might offer a 
sense for the reader of franticness, fear, anxiety, instability of belief, 
incoherence of thought. In Chapter 5 I return to what such fragments can 
offer clinically and pedagogically.  
Much like in psychosis, Acker’s fragments do sometimes hold a 
loose narrative structure – Blood and Guts in High School and Empire of 
the Senseless are two such structured texts, where fragments form parts 
of the story but there is a narrative thread throughout. These texts, 
though, do not function wholly as ‘stories’ in any traditional sense. In 
interview, Acker stated: 
What I have always hated about the bourgeois story is that it 
closes down. I don’t use the bourgeois story-line because the 
real content of that novel is the property structure of reality. 
It’s about ownership. That isn’t my world-reality. My world 
isn’t about ownership. In my world people don’t even 
remember their names, they aren’t sure of their sexuality, 
they aren’t sure if they can define their genders [...] There’s a 
lot of power in narrative, not in story.415 
 
Acker does not write ‘stories’, or follow any traditional realist novel plot 
formation. Reading, interpreting and discussing Acker’s texts, in a 
critical sense, becomes challenging for precisely this reason: there is little 
by way of orientation for the reader or certainty in interpretation. Even 
these more ‘readable’ texts retain elements of the fragmentation that 
characterises much of Acker’s early work. Acker’s texts open rather than, 
as she suggests above, closing down to one vision of reality. For Acker, 
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the narrative fragments, rather than coherent story, offer powerful 
reading and re-reading potential. In not presenting a coherent ‘story’, 
Acker opens the narrative space in which the effects of her writing 
psychosis can unfold. As Keitel notes, traditionally written texts might 
offer a description of psychosis – Acker’s texts instead offer, through the 
effect of fragmenting linear or coherent interior vocalisation, a reading 
experience in itself analogous to psychosis.  
It is not always within the narrative fragment that the creation of 
written psychosis occurs – it also emerges both between the fragments 
and because of the fragment. Ebbesen suggests that in the lisible or 
‘readerly’ narrative, a “gap” occurs because “the writer uses various and 
contrary components from different discourses” – thus the “act of making 
ideology into literature (its form) creates a gap, which is the 
unconscious”.416 He suggests that “Acker wants to make this gap visible” 
– that in her “interdiscursive” use of the detective genre, she upends the 
generic conventions and thus demonstrates from inside the genre the 
genre’s “hidden ideology”.417 Ebbesen’s reading demonstrates Acker’s 
subversive play with genre, and the identification of a ‘gap’ made visible 
is of use here to inform my argument. Acker’s psychoticised texts are 
constantly in tension – the individual fragments are uncomfortably 
placed alongside each other, overtly incoherent in their own right and 
doubly so when placed in seemingly random sequences. This, then, 
leaves the reader struggling to situate narrative within context, time, 
space, character, and narrative voice. This space or gap might be where 
the effect of reading Acker’s writing psychosis occurs.  
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The struggle towards coherent meaning making of fragments, 
then, offers for the reader one part of what Keitel has termed “reading 
psychosis”.418The cumulative impact of the effect of immersion into 
incoherence might offer two potential responses that may aid 
reformulation of how the experience of psychosis if considered, and how 
best to respond to dialogue that alienates the reader/listener from the 
content precisely through its apparent illogicality or confusion. Firstly, 
such fragments, while unfamiliar, might be paradoxically familiar to a 
clinical reader. That is, they replicate forms of expression that likely will 
have been heard elsewhere. Such fragments might mirror the way that 
people experiencing disruptions to their sense of self, belief and 
cognition might express those experiences. One possible response is to 
dismiss them as ‘mad’ writings in the way a person expressing such 
thoughts and beliefs might be codified within a biomedical framework as 
‘mad’. A different and more ethically minded response might, instead, 
take the time to consider the content of each fragment, to find the thread 
that ties the fragment to the whole, to consider the meaning of the 
individual element to the person. Secondly, and following this, the 
fragments might offer an opportunity to cohere different parts of a story 
together – this is something I return to at length in the conclusion to the 
thesis, considering how narrative-based approaches to people 
experiencing disruption and challenge to their sense of certainty and 
coherence in ‘psychosis’ might be both beneficial and, importantly, more 
in line with contemporary person-centred and personalised approaches. 
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Repetition 
A second narrative feature that contributes to Acker’s writing psychosis 
is the use of repetition. It has been suggested that Acker uses repetition to 
“strip syntax of meaning”.419 A second reading can be offered which 
draws a parallel between Acker’s use of repetition and what Arthur Frank 
has called ‘chaos narratives’. Chaos narratives, one of three types of 
narrative self-storying following acute or serious illness, are clearly 
described by Frank: 
Chaos is the opposite of restitution: its plot imagines life 
never getting better. Stories are chaotic in their absence of 
narrative order. Events are told as the storyteller experiences 
life: without sequence or discernible causality. The lack of 
any coherent sequence is an initial reason why chaos stories 
are hard to hear; the teller is not telling a ‘proper’ story. But 
more significantly, the teller of the chaos story is not heard to 
be living a ‘proper’ life, since in life as in story, one event is 
expected to lead to another. Chaos negates that 
expectation.420 
 
The lack of sequence or linearity in the chaos narrative offers a sense of 
perpetual present-ness to the story. It is this “and then and then and then” 
feature of the chaos narrative is resonant with Acker’s use of 
repetition.421 Instead of enabling a consistent and logical self-story that 
follows a linear pathway, acute illness might prompt a disruption in 
temporal certainty, leaving the person in a state of continuous present, 
with past interrupting present and future hesitantly, if at all, envisioned. 
The past intrudes into the present; events are unexpectedly repeated. I 
argue this is certainly true for different types of relapsing and remitting 
illnesses, but also for episodic experiences where the fear of relapse can 
impact upon a sense of forward movement or growth. Frank, who 
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concentrates mainly on the experience of bodily sickness, suggests that 
chaos narratives are “anxiety provoking”, both to experience and to hear, 
revealing “vulnerability, futility and impotence”.422 Further congruence 
can be seen here with Keitel’s “reading psychosis”, which she notes can 
induce a sense of “enveloping oppression” and hence anxiety for the 
reader.423 The psychopathography should induce in the reader “the same 
ambivalent or negative emotions that accompany psychotic attacks: 
pleasure as well as oppression, paralysis and anxiety”.424 In Acker’s texts 
the repeated appearance of sections and sequences, both within the same 
text and between different texts, adds to an overall disruption of 
temporal-logical certainty both within the text or texts themselves and for 
the reader who may experience their own sense of ‘and then and then and 
then’.  
Repetition, then, contributes to the cumulative effect of 
fragmentation and forms a further element of Acker’s writing psychosis. 
Repetition has much to do with notions of memory for Acker, who noted, 
“I began to work with memory and with repetition. How does the reader 
remember, or what does the reader remember when you repeat something 
over and over again? How do language and memory work even in the 
most logical, well constructed texts?”.425 The effect of Acker’s repetition 
on the memory of the reader forms a kind of reality rechecking. 
Repetition in Acker forces questioning by the reader of the actuality of 
their reading practice – have I read this before, have I a misprinted copy, 
why the repeated image – it must be of significance, but what?  
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There are two tropes that Acker returns to that are of particular 
relevance in her writing psychosis. Both thematically offer insights into 
the contextual circumstances from out of which the fractured inner 
monologues of her fragments occur. Firstly, the repeated appearance of 
the murderous, abortive, and sometimes suicidal Mother. This section, 
from Translations of the Diaries of Laure the Schoolgirl, appears in 
various modalities throughout Acker’s work: 
My mother tells me why I was born: she had a pain in her 
stomach, it was during the war, she went to some quack 
doctor (she had just married this guy because it was the war 
and she loved his parents); the doctor tells her she should get 
pregnant to cure the pain. Since she’s married, she gets 
pregnant, but the pain stays. She won’t get an abortion 
because she’s too scared. She runs to the toilet because she 
thinks she has to shit; I come out. The next day she has 
appendicitis.426  
 
Acker repeatedly manipulates this mother figure as inducing the inherent 
instability of her ontologically insecure characters. Parents, who always 
hold a particularly vicious, destabilising presence in Acker’s work, cast 
their children loose into the world – literally in this fragment, where the 
child is excreted rather than born – before a secure sense of self has been 
developed. The same Mother is portrayed in the Rimbaud section of In 
Memoriam to Identity, as a mother who again “would have had an 
abortion if a quack doctor hadn’t informed her that pregnancy would kill 
or cure all her physical problems” (IMTI, p. 3). This mother is also 
murderous:  
[…] in spite of God this draconian woman who could tolerate 
no slight to her authority decided to become the Mother of 
Maternal Crimes (MMC): she was going to murder pitiful R, 
not exactly by killing him, but by destroying and annihilating 
every shred of his will and soul while he still lived on. (IMTI, 
p. 4) 
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The repetition of this passage could offer a commentary on patriarchal 
notions of maternity and motherhood as women’s purpose and goal in 
life, subverting the image of the caring mother and desired child. 
Alternatively, it might offer a perspective on how parenting (or lack 
thereof) effects the development of a fractured sense of self. Other 
repeated tropes regularly appear in Acker’s texts, such as the sex show 
montage that often features a father figure, Santa, or psychiatrist. In this 
respect, both repetition of the segment, adding to reading anxiety, and the 
content itself, forces a consideration of meaning, implication and 
interpretation of depictions of events that later contribute to characters 
destabilised sense of who they are, what experiences are ‘real’ and their 
internal emotional consistency. 
Secondly, Acker re-appropriates her own material, repeating 
sections of her work in other texts, sometimes with minor variations. 
This is apparent when comparing sections of her 1982 work Great 
Expectations (itself an appropriated version of Dickens’ classic tale) and 
the short piece ‘The Birth of the Poet’ from 1981. ‘The Birth of the Poet’ 
is a drama, written in a performance style. In Great Expectations, Acker 
changes the same spoken passages to prose. These two passages provide 
a good example of the effects of re-appropriated repetition, given their 
thematic concerns: 
(Cynthia lies down on the street and sticks razor blades up 
her arms. The bums ask her if she needs a drink.) 
CYNTHIA: Madness makes an alcoholic sober, keeps the 
most raging beast in an invisibly locked invisible cage, turns 
seething masses of smoke air calm white, takes a junky off 
junk as if he’s having a pleasant dream, halts that need 
FAME that’s impossible. 
I am only an obsession. Don’t talk to me otherwise. Don’t 
know me. Do you think I exist? 
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Watch out. Madness is a reality, not a perversion.427 
 
Cynthia lays down on the street and sticks razor blades 
vertically up her arm. The bums ask her if she needs a drink. 
Madness makes an alcoholic sober, keeps the most raging 
beast in an invisibly locked invisible cage, turns seething 
masses of smoke air into calm white, takes a junky off junk 
as if he’s having a pleasant dream, halts that need FAME 
that’s impossible. 
I am only an obsession. Don’t talk to me otherwise. Don’t 
know me. Do you think I exist? 
Watch out. Madness is a reality, not a perversion.428 
 
Other repeated sections from ‘The Birth of the Poet’ blur into Great 
Expectations as prose and drama, destabilising generic expectation and 
coherence of individual text or stable characterisation. Madness in these 
two passages is twice presented – or rather, re-presented – as somehow 
inevitable; it is the reality for the character here. The change in narrative 
from drama to prose offers a challenge to the reader – in dramatic form a 
further layer of distance form the narrative might be present, where the 
lines and staging are imagined rather than immersive as might be seen in 
psychopathographic reading. The thematic concern with self harm has 
been noted in the preceding chapter; through its repeated textual 
appearance it becomes a theme worthy of consideration, but the stark and 
recurrent portrayal might contribute to a further sense of oppression, 
confrontation and anxiety for the reader. The repetition of sections, and 
of images, leaves the reader with no escape from what is presented. 
Repetition also forces a re-reading. As Pitchford argues, it is the 
act of re-reading that forms a viable tactic in the contemporary era, 
suggesting that Acker’s “model of identity – a model based on rereading” 
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provides one possible way in which individuals can obtain agency 
despite the existence of oppressive power structures.429 Alongside 
induction of re-reading, the function of repetition in Acker is twofold. 
Firstly, it forms a sequence of repetition which, while the contents of the 
repetition may not always be nightmarish, causes the experience of 
reading becoming akin to hearing a stuck record, with the reader 
descending what may be akin to a Baudrillardian “schizophrenic vertigo” 
of “serial signs, for which no counterfeit, no sublimation is possible, 
immanent in their repetition”.430 Secondly, a certain numbness might be 
induced in the reader, a Jamesonian lack of affect and a blunting of 
emotional response.431 This blunting could be interpreted as being 
analogous with the ‘negative symptoms’ of psychosis. Where we can 
view Acker’s destruction of narrative into fragments as reproducing the 
frenzied aspects of psychosis, repetition instead might induce a re-
presented version of the experiences of unreality (or dissociation from 
the external real), anhedonia, demotivation and emotional absence or 
flatness.  
Such blunting effects might also be induced through Acker’s 
sexual representations and explicit language – eventually ceasing to hold 
any outrage value, transcending their socially inscribed derogatory 
meanings to become merely words on a page. One reading here of 
response to Acker’s repeated graphic sexual scenes is that they become 
neither arousing nor shocking, devoid of their ability to provoke 
emotional response in the reader, leaving the mechanistic interaction of 
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bodies without selves. McGann notes that Acker’s language, “if it does 
not horrify and disgust at both these extremes”, leaves our reading “from 
her text’s point of view” as already passing “over into the night of the 
living dead”.432 He follows with the suggestion that Acker’s language 
“destroys its own shock effect” and “will finally be judged boring”.433 
Similarly, in a feminist reading of Acker, Kennedy argues that not being 
shocked by the explicit passages in Acker “is to serve unreflectively the 
patriarchal establishment that determines relationships between men and 
women”.434 Alternatively, Wheeler posits a more positive view of “the 
importance of shock in awakening her readers from the sleep of 
familiarity”.435 Familiarity might be that certain words are shocking, 
graphic, offensive – unfamiliarity on the other hand, and Acker’s purpose 
here might be most aligned with this reading, realises that it is not the 
word that demeans, exploits and controls, but the context of the usage. In 
this respect, as with my reading of gender, sex and psychosis in Chapter 
2, repetition of graphic sex and language might further serve to prompt 
readers to consider their beliefs, values and expectations when 
responding to individuals with diverse circumstances or expressions.  
The endless repetition of interacting genitals – what Wheeler 
refers to as the “primitiveness of the body” taking the place of “the ‘I’ as 
subject in many of Acker’s early works” – and hitherto scandalous 
language enables the reader to be blunted but, I would argue, not 
bored.436 Wheeler suggests that one of Acker’s purposes with her writing 
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was to make the reader “explicitly aware of social programming” which 
she believed has “dehumanized us, and has created a ‘reality’ more like a 
‘hyperreal’ realm of codes and simulacra, where desire has been 
programmed in a certain, repressive way”.437 Social programming 
invokes our initial shock at Acker’s language and graphic representations 
of physicality and desire. Realisation about this social programming 
enables shock to pass and the reading journey to continue – and, 
furthermore, deeper exploration of constructs previously deemed as 
‘certain’ or ‘known’ (in my reading, subverting the binary duality of 
‘rational / irrational’ to consider a continuum of experiences which might 
be both understandable and meaningful). Wheeler further suggests that 
Acker’s “experiments represent a quest to find out what could liberate us 
from those habitual fictions we call reality and ordinary life”.438 This 
highlights one of Acker’s potential purposes with her literary 
experimentations; repetition is one such ‘experiment’ that might effect a 
response to Acker’s writing psychosis that offers acknowledgement of 
the potential insights afforded by otherwise ‘shocking’ or ‘incoherent’ 
textual repetitions and fragments. 
A further element in Acker’s work, following from repeated 
tropes, text or graphic presentations, is a concern with dream, dream 
states, and separating unconsciousness and consciousness. In Acker’s 
texts, dream-like unreality can often not be situated as a dream, but 
instead is blurred with conscious existence, displaced from the physical 
surrounding world, isolated and enveloped in an uneasy unreality. This 
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semiconscious-dream style, particularly when used in a recurring 
manner, contributes to Acker’s writing psychosis, affecting a sense of 
unreality at the level of reader response, offering a further sense of 
disorientation for the reader. Furthermore, repetition itself might evoke a 
sense of dream-state reading. I Dreamt I Was A Nymphomaniac: 
Imagining, for example, contains one section consisting of a scene 
repeated twice, and another comprised of four repetitions of a specific 
dream sequence. The second segment includes autoscopic 
depersonalisation – “I (outside the dream) look at myself (inside the 
dream)” (IDIN, p. 102). Temporal stability is displaced in this repeated 
section, as it is in dreams:  
Last night I dreamt I was standing on a low rise of grassy 
ground; Dan was standing next to me facing me. He put his 
arms around my neck kissed me, said ‘I love you.’ I said ‘I 
love you.’ Two years later I’m riding through a forest with 
my two younger sisters. (IDIN, p. 101).  
 
The orienting presences of consciousness, where past present future can 
be cohered, are lost here. Time juts from past to future, with the present 
indeterminately situated, much like in Frank’s chaos narrative. The 
repetition of these segments within the same section of text, though, 
forces the reader to reread the repetitions searching for differences, to 
meaning for the repeated text. The dream-sense then is created doubly for 
the reader – by the repetition and by the disorientating content.  
Glück argues, with reference to this specific passage, that 
Acker’s “strategies keep the reader off balance”, making it difficult to 
write about Acker’s work “because the best reading is always an 
uncertain reading”.439 He continues: 
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Acker creates a reader who is lost in strangeness. She pitches 
the reader into a welter of contradictions that do not resolve 
themselves, but replace each other continuously: a text that 
hates itself but wants me to love it, sex that dissolves and 
amalgamates, a disempowered self that tops its heated 
bottom-act with cold manipulations, a confession that is 
therapeutic without the possibility of health. Her aesthetic is 
founded on double binds whose brilliance captivates me as I 
struggle against them.440 
 
Acker’s reader is left disoriented and lost in “strangeness”. Glück 
illuminates the effect of Acker’s writing psychosis here. Dream, wake-
states and ‘psychosis’ collide – particularly when this occurs extra-
textually in the repetitious appearance of sections with minor, almost 
undetectable alterations within and between texts. None are certain – it is 
not possible to assert that a particular depicted scenario is dream, 
psychosis or fantasy / daydream. Characters are temporally and 
cognitively as disoriented as the reader might then become. Through 
repetition, the reader is trapped, in Glück’s words, in a literary 
“aesthetic” founded on “double binds” which simultaneously present 
conflicting and often negating messages. The textual double bind that 
Glück notes is one which presents the reader with a series of repetitions 
with no overt purpose, trapping them in an unending present, much like 
in Frank’s chaos narratives. Similarly, Acker presents opposing 
propositions, perspectives and situations as all true, all possible, all 
existing – leaving the reader caught in their own double bind. 
In I Dreamt I Was A Nymphomaniac: Imagining, a further 
example of the way Acker disrupts narrative coherency is evident. In this 
case, philosophical mediation erupts into the dream-like and repetitive 
narrative structure. This narrative fracturing develops into a commentary 
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on the temporal instability of selfhood in Acker’s work. Temporal 
instability is a subject I return to in the next chapter, but want to note 
here for its relationship to repetition and contribution to overall sense of 
disorientation in writing psychosis, as an interpretation of this section 
using Frank’s notion of the perpetual present of the chaos narrative can 
be drawn using this literary interjection. The interjection offers a 
complex mediation on time: 
Say there’s two theories of time. Absolutist theory of time: 
the world is in time. The world, events occur in moments. 
These moments can be mapped on a time line. Relativist 
theory of time: time is in the world. Time is the temporal 
relations of events. [...] Intention: escape this horror as I 
know it and am made by it. How can I (I being a model of 
any individual) change? Assume the relativist theory of time 
accurately maps time in the world. ‘I change.’ What do I 
mean by ‘I’? (IDIN, p. 136).  
 
Either events occur sequentially, logically, or they are extant as events 
connected by (individually experienced) time. “I” is not locatable in the 
absolutist experience of time as represented in Acker’s text here, as “I” 
does not occur in a linear manner. “I” is also multiple and thus unstable 
precisely because it can only exist in a moment, for a moment. As I 
discuss in the next chapter, a secure and coherent sense of identity is 
often unachievable, expressed textually as multiple and undifferentiated 
‘I’s in Acker’s work. Watten asserts that the passages noted above, 
however, indicate that the “individuals” here are “durationless and 
merely present”, continuing: “‘I’, therefore, is either an endless series of 
such individuals or is the substance of temporality itself”.441 He 
continues, commenting specifically on the four repeated sections in the 
early part of this text – the repeated dream passage I noted above – 
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breaks off to move onto the next repetition in the middle of the sexual 
act, with no closing point before the next repetition. He suggests that “at 
the moment the event (here, a dream) becomes so multiply 
overdetermined that it precludes narration” and as such “Acker’s task in 
what follows will be to align, thus, the empty literalness of repeated 
narration with the overdetermined pressures on identity that cause it to 
break off and become reconfigured”.442 Repetition and recurrence is the 
only available response for the unstable self – it is inescapable and 
inevitable. Acker’s mediation on time and the repeated segments of I 
Dreamt I was a Nymphomaniac: Imagining might be seen as a 
literalisation of the unending present of the chaos narrative. Such 
repetitions open up the text to multiple interpretations, multiple versions 
of who the “I” is, all coexistent and thus all valid, but equally all tentative 
and uncertain. 
The reader, of this text but of much of Acker’s work more 
generally, is potentially left – like Acker’s “I’s” – suspended in a series 
of what Jameson formulated as perpetual presents of postmodern 
‘schizophrenia’, occurring when the subjects cohering sense of temporal 
logic breaks down.443 Jameson writes:  
If, indeed, the subject has lost its capacity actively to extend 
its pro-tensions and re-tensions across the temporal manifold 
and to organize its past and future into coherent experience, it 
becomes difficult enough to see how the cultural productions 
of such a subject could result in anything but ‘heaps of 
fragments’ and in a practice of the randomly heterogeneous 
and fragmentary and the aleatory.444  
 
                                                
442 Watten, p. 69.  
443 Jameson, p. 25-28.  
444 ibid. p. 25.  
191 
 
Acker’s own “cultural productions” (which seems to be a more apt 
description of her texts than ‘novels’ perhaps) are exemplars of the 
“heterogeneous and fragmentary and the aleatory” of Jameson’s version 
of postmodernity. The reader’s reading explodes into multiplicity, 
fragmented and random. The reader is imprisoned in the perpetual “and 
then and then and then” of Frank’s chaos narrative – the perpetual ‘and 
then and then and then” of literary psychosis.  
 
Inaccessible Languages  
Acker’s writing psychosis can be viewed as dream-like in many ways, 
particularly in those dream-sections that are repetitious. In some ways, 
Acker’s fragments and repetitions might be seen, in Jaspers terms, as un-
understandable, similar to some expressions of psychosis where the 
expressed message is received in a literal sense (the words are heard) but 
which may be challenging to decode and respond to (interpreting beyond 
a demarcation as ‘mad speech’). Acker had a clear interest in the way in 
which experience which either resists linguistic representation 
(particularly orgasm, but also dreams) or that exist at the limits of 
consciousness might be communicated using ‘known’ languages.445 
Parallels can be drawn between how Acker depicts inexpressible or 
inarticulable experience and how this might relate to the depiction of 
psychosis (which, as Keitel suggests, might exist at the limits of coherent 
or accessible representation in text). The challenge for the reader, which 
contributes to an overall sense of textual psychoticisation and reading 
psychosis, is thus furthered in textual terms by Acker’s use of 
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inaccessible languages – firstly, in her attempt to express the 
inexpressible, specifically the language of orgasm; secondly through the 
insertions of foreign languages and script into texts.  
Acker commented that she wrote at times from within a dream-
space. Referring to her 1993 work My Mother: Demonology, Acker notes 
her need to find an “interior space”, a “free” space.446 This space, where 
mind, body and language both meet and depart, comes from experiences 
that are inexpressible (particularly at the point of sexual departure, from 
within orgasm). This ‘space’ was found for Acker by turning “to 
dreams”.447 Acker notes that dream “was a language I accessed; I did not 
make it up. I did not compose it. I became interested in languages I could 
access, find”.448 Dream space is linked to the linguistic expression of the 
bodily experience of orgasm: Acker suggests that the language of orgasm 
“seems to be architectural: it has spaces”.449 These spaces are, perhaps, 
the “interior space that was free” which Acker wanted to write from 
within – spaces unconstrained by social language and describable 
experiences; spaces free, perhaps, of exterior repression.450 Social 
language in this way is inarticulate for expressing liminal experiences, 
such as orgasm, dream or psychosis. Acker’s dream-space expression can 
be seen as mirroring the expression of elements of psychosis – not in 
terms of the unconscious elements of psychosis, analysis of which 
belongs to psychoanalytic critique, but in terms of how the textual 
construct then offers a reading experience which is both strange and 
familiar, subliminal and sublime, unsettling and seductive. It is these 
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unsettling effects that can offer a reading of text which might provide an 
analogue to psychosis for the reader. The free space, the internal space, 
allows for exploration not only with dream language, as Acker discusses 
in ‘Paragraphs’, but from the interior of bodily and primal experience, 
with the language that emerges from intense bodily experience, be it 
athletics, bodybuilding or orgasm.451  
Acker’s attempt to develop bodily and inarticulate experiences 
into language – not describing in traditional terms of sensation or 
emotion, but in accessing and interpreting the body’s own language itself 
– has clear echoes with what Keitel describes as the challenge of 
presenting inaccessible material which “resists linguistic 
representation”.452 Examining what Acker created in her attempts to find 
the language of orgasm leads to insights into the challenge of translating 
psychosis into language and text. In interview with Jackson, Acker notes 
that, when searching for a new language outside of inherited myths 
around sexuality and gender, she felt “there’s something there that has to 
do with breath and that there’s a very close connection between breath 
and language, and rhythm”. 453 As I noted in Chapter 2, orgasm in 
Acker’s work is presented as an experience that produces loss of 
cognitive control and loss of selfhood, an unselfing where the only focus 
is on the bodily experience. She suggests that one area of interest was 
“when you go through orgasm, where you lose control, what’s the 
language that’s there”, suggesting “in that way sexual material’s been 
coming back [into her texts] because I’ve been trying to see what, or 
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listen to, what’s there”.454 In this way, the language of orgasm in Acker’s 
work might offer insights into the challenges of expressing of specific 
experiences, bodily, emotional and mental, without resorting to simple 
but inadequate descriptive process.  
The textual portrayal of liminal body experience, as 
inexpressible, contributes to Acker’s writing psychosis. Acker writes 
though orgasm in several pieces of work. In the non-fiction piece ‘Seeing 
Gender’, Acker writes, “I have become interested in languages which I 
cannot make up, which I cannot create or even create in: I have become 
interested in languages which I can only come upon (as I disappear)”.455 
Acker here notes that these are languages in which she, as an “I”, a 
cognitively orientated, active subject, disappears, leaving the “languages 
of the body”.456 She continues, further presenting the challenge of 
separating body and self, object and subject, suggesting that there are: 
[…] a plurality or more of such languages. One such is the 
language that moves through me or in me or ... for I cannot 
separate body and identity...when I am moving through 
orgasm or orgasms. I shall give you an example. Nothing has 
been made up or created.457  
 
The example she then provides is a stream of consciousness style piece, 
less thematically correlated to any socio-political motivation, as evident 
in strands of thematic concerns that cohere her earlier fragmented pieces. 
This piece instead focuses on body, nature and sensation: 
clear our forest water animals plants spout up twigs move 
twigs in lips go down under liquid comes out the animal there 
turns over 
in safe place, center of. the tendrils are moving over the 
water. going down going deep now the music begins only 
                                                
454 Acker in interview with Jackson (para. 23 of 49).  
455Kathy Acker, ‘Seeing Gender’, in Bodies of Work, pp. 158-168, (p. 166).  
456 ibid. p. 167.  
457 ibid. p. 167.  
195 
 
music is slow nothing happening in there where the trees 
grow. (there is all happening.) just goes on and on what? 
nothing, for the body has taken over consciousness, is falling 
asleep as if in a faint, all pleasant here and quiet458 
 
This fragment mirrors the kind of creations that can occur with free 
association writing. More importantly, though, when set against some of 
Acker’s fragmented and repetitious pieces that more overtly concern 
psychosis in content, the tone of this section is notably calmer, slower, 
soft and blurred rather than frantic or with jarring edges. Consciousness 
is displaced as bodily sensation overwhelms the cognitive space. The 
later section of Acker’s illustrative writing from the body rather than 
mind here breaks down into fragments and disconnects, from words to 
word:  
[…] this is so intense it can hardly be handled.  
the treasure in the  
midst of he 
churning waters gold 
dot 
churn/separate all 459 
 
The words might be recognisable, but the tone and rhythm of the piece 
overwhelms the reader’s consciousness, displacing them from the 
familiarity of narrative form and content. The content and form of 
writing from body rather than mind, like many of Acker’s pieces, 
fragments on the page to mirror linguistic expressions of thought 
disordering in psychosis.  
‘The Language of the Body’ is another short piece where Acker 
explicitly, via a ‘Masturbation Journal’, notes the relationship between 
language and orgasm and how this relates to both dream and the 
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unconscious.460 In ‘The Language of the Body’, Acker talks of orgasm 
being a “threshold” point, a crossing over – while immersed in the 
crossing, “language is forbidden; having crossed, it’s possible to have 
language”.461 Acker speaks of orgasm as related to nature, waves, rhythm 
and breath.462 The “other world” entered within and through the 
transition point where subjectivity is destabilised is one where “all is a 
kind of ease”, a “world within dream”.463 In Acker’s description of the 
‘crossing over’, there is a tipping point into the experience, but it also 
exists as a flow with ebbs and peaks rather than a specific rupture point 
with a clear ‘in’ or ‘out’ of experience. Her analysis here is interesting 
from the perspective of considering psychosis as a continuum of 
experiences, which acknowledges that there may be a point of 
consumption where psychosis takes over rationality but that, equally, 
some experiences aligned with ‘psychosis’ exist alongside more ‘usual’ 
mental processes. In this way, as Bentall has noted, psychosis might not 
be something that a person ‘becomes’ (as in ‘became psychotic’ or 
‘relapsed into psychosis’), instead represented by a range experiences 
where elements of psychosis that cause distress or disorder might be 
more or less intrusive, more or less consumptive of other parts of the 
person’s mind and life.464 This may be a more useful way of considering 
the experience of psychosis, rather than considering it as an illness that 
someone ‘has’ or ‘does not’ have, ‘is experiencing’ or is ‘in remission 
from’.  
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Yet in ‘The Language of the Body’, the ebbing and flow of the 
threshold experience occurs when Acker is alone, not when engaged in a 
sexual act with another person. She notes that “human communication” 
is unbearable.465 This may due to the struggle, in this piece, to “make sex 
live, to find the relation between language and the body rather than this 
sexuality that’s presented by society as diseased”.466 The journey is 
punctuated by space and absence, by the loss of language at the point of 
departure from the building sensation into and through the orgasm itself:  
 
1. To calm the irritation. Just calm the irritation. Where is the 
opening, the door that opens?  
 
Irritation is happy to be touched, but if it turns too expectant 
or excited without relaxing, it will become rigid.  
 
The arising is a single, growing clit;  
 
2. lose myself (beginning to lose myself) 467 
 
The journey concludes with the “going over”.468 The “I” here, the 
subject, is present initially – beginning to be lost, but present – before the 
transitional point, the “going over”, where the ‘Day 1’ section of the 
“Masturbation Journey” ends. This rhythmic sensation is mirrored in the 
spacing of the individual processes. In this respect, the experience of a 
journey experience might be considered as similar to the types of 
journeys that people who experience psychosis might experience along a 
continuum of mental processes, rather than as a binary ‘sick / well’ 
process. There may be a ‘going over’ where a person reaches a point 
where their experiences are less tolerable, more distressing or intense, but 
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this threshold exists on a continuum where the individual might move 
back or forward, towards and beyond a self-defined point of difficulty or 
distress, rather than this being medically codified in terms of ‘insight’, 
‘intensity’ or ‘relapse’.  
 What Acker finds, ultimately, is that the orgasm resists 
language; the build up can be written, but the climax is silent, 
overwhelming. At the point of climax, in orgasm, language stops. The 
‘gap’ between language and sensation, space where time moves (there is 
a logical progression to the piece) is of secondary importance to the end 
point, the ‘goal’ where self is lost. Ebbesen suggests that in the lisible 
narrative, a “gap” occurs because “the writer uses various and contrary 
components from different discourses” – thus, the “act of making 
ideology into literature (its form) creates a gap, which is the 
unconscious”.469 Ebbesen suggests that Acker “wants to make this gap 
visible”.470 When Acker writes orgasm, the gap is made visible, but not 
filled (there is often physical space on the page between written text 
segments). Language is unable to convey the physical and cognitive 
structure, or affective experience, other than in a flattened, one-
dimensional sense. The experience remains within, and can only be 
described by using, pre-existing discoursal strategies. This is the 
language of nature and the body for Acker and, in parallel, a psychiatric 
discourse for psychosis. Language, though, acts in a reductive way, 
diminishing complex experiences when applying them to particular 
schemata.  
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These types of schemata are aligned with what Keitel, drawing 
on Frank Kermode, discusses as “concord fictions”.471 Case histories and 
theoretical psychopathographies are “concord fictions” in the way a 
person’s experience is reformulated into a familiar, recognisable, 
coherent form.472 What Keitel is concerned with in her development of 
the reading effects of the psychopathographic text, however, is not the 
cohering of experience, which leaves the reader orientated and cohered 
themselves. It is the “vacuum” in which the “specific effect of 
psychopathographies can unfold” – the space created when conventional 
linguistic representation is inadequate to convey the inaccessible 
experience.473 In Acker’s work, this ‘vacuum’ is formed through the use 
of fragments and repetition; the portrayal of the inexpressible; and the 
use of language and script that might be unfamiliar to the reader, 
enacting a further alienation from the depiction. 
The insertion of sections of foreign language and script into 
narratives is apparent in some of Acker’s more structured narratives – 
Blood and Guts in High School and Empire of the Senseless, for example. 
When Sanskrit or Arabic is used in text, unless the reader is familiar with 
those forms of language, the text becomes literally ununderstandable. On 
Acker’s use of Arabic in Empire of the Senseless Pitchford suggests that 
the “meaning-disrupting speech of the Other becomes a source of 
alternative models of subjectivity (the sailor or pirate) and of narrative 
itself (a woman’s subversive storytelling as an act of survival and as a 
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rejection of sexual victimhood)”.474 There is a third possibility that 
Pitchford presents here, rather than the reader’s ‘my meaning’ or ‘no 
meaning’: that Acker opens the spaces of representation here in which 
marginalised voices can be heard.475 Pitchford suggests that this is Acker 
not seeking to “destroy the realm of language and representation” but 
instead to “expand it, to exploit its own contemporary dynamic of 
expression”.476 Furthering this argument, Acker’s literal language 
disruptions – such as in Blood and Guts in High School where Janey 
learns Persian to overcome her literal and metaphorical imprisonment – 
serve three functions. Firstly, they demonstrate the alienating power of 
‘other’ languages. Unless meaning can be made, which requires the 
reader to know the language, meaning remains at the level of mere 
notation on paper, meaningless. Secondly, such insertions leave the 
reader in a state of confusion, of absence from the text, excluded 
precisely from the meaning-making that may be occurring. Thirdly, 
Acker does provide translations for her reader – in Blood and Guts in 
High School, some of the Persian is translated, though this services only 
to demonstrate how literal translations of other languages into English 
are difficult. The reader of the translation (unless fluent in Persian) has 
no certainty as to the accuracy of Acker’s translations.  
A reversal of position is evident here, where Acker holds the 
power to completely or partially exclude the reader from the text. This 
reversal mimics the exclusion of the patient from the medical language 
used by psychiatrists and others in the creation of medicalised meaning 
                                                
474 Pitchford, p. 96.  
475 ibid. p. 96.  
476 ibid. p. 96.  
201 
 
from ‘psychotic’ speech or expression. The expressions are not seen in 
practice as standing alone as potentially meaningful in their own right; 
instead, they are codified, interpreted, re-presented in an 
‘understandable’ format, as indicative of an ‘illness’. The psychiatrist’s 
language and meaning-making has priority and higher status than the 
person’s own, and the person no longer owns their experience, its 
formulation or expression.  
Following Pitchford’s reading of the use of inaccessible foreign 
script or language, the marginalised speak in Acker’s work, and the 
reader can be, and sometimes is, excluded from understanding their 
dialogue. What potential could there be for understanding the languages 
of madness if a similar marginalising vocalisation is enacted in clinical 
practice? This question forms the basis of this concluding section – how 
Acker’s work might inform, though her disjointed textual form, both a 
reading experience that offers an analogue to the experience of 
psychosis, increasing empathetic reading process, and the development 
of novel interpretative skills from this reading, offering methods of 
communication for interacting in narrative ways with people 
experiencing psychosis. 
 
The Psychoticisation of the Text  
During another textual interruption, in Empire of the Senseless, Acker 
asks:  
What is the language of the ‘unconscious’? (If this ideal 
unconscious or freedom doesn’t exist: pretend it does, use 
fiction, for the sake of survival, all of our survival.) Its 
primary language must be taboo, all that is forbidden. Thus, 
an attack on the institutions of prison via language would 
demand the use of the language or languages which aren’t 
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acceptable, which are forbidden. Language, on one level, 
constitutes a set of codes and social and historical 
agreements. Nonsense doesn’t per se break down the code; 
speaking precisely that which the codes forbid breaks the 
codes. (ES, p. 134) 
 
Empire of the Senseless was in many respects a transitional text for 
Acker, one in which she began to move from deconstruction (and 
destruction into fragment) to construction, to the search for a “myth to 
live by”.477 It is apt, therefore, that in this novel she rejects ‘nonsense’ in 
favour of speaking the taboo itself. Two interrelated strands relating to 
Acker’s textual translation of psychosis are evident in this narrative 
interlude. Firstly, that the unconscious is formed of that which is taboo, 
unspoken – Acker writes these taboos, enacting the textual codes 
required to deconstruct, and destruct, the societal, institutionalised and 
codified psychological walls enclosing that which is unspoken, unable to 
be spoken, precisely because it is defined as taboo. If psychosis remains 
an experience that is deemed ‘ununderstandable’ then it remains taboo, 
codified only in medicalised terms as Other to ‘rational’ or 
understandable experience. Acker’s second point here is that ‘nonsense’ 
will not suffice for breaking down linguistic code or societal taboo. Sense 
might not be immediately evident in Acker’s fragmented texts, but 
readings of the apparently random elements can and does offer 
potentially useful readings of taboo. There are lessons to be taken from 
both the reading experience and the processes of interpretation necessary 
for understanding Acker’s ‘non-sense’. In my argument, the reading 
experience and possibilities for interpretative reflection lie in the 
                                                
477 Acker in interview with Friedman, (para. 46 of 115).  
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correspondence between Acker’s textual portrayals and the expression of 
psychosis. 
Acker, through the narrative devices of fragmentation, repetition 
and inaccessible language, can be situated somewhere between Keitel’s 
literary and imitative psychopathography, not easily affiliated with either 
category but offering for the reader effects of both. Ebbesen, in a further 
categorisation, identifies that Acker does not write lisible (in Barthes’ 
terms – ‘readerly’) narratives – instead, she undermines the lisible 
narrative via a collection of elements, which I suggest include 
fragmentation of narrative linearity or coherence, repetition, and the 
reproduction of inaccessible languages to demonstrate the 
inexpressible.478 In employing such textual elements Ebbesen suggests 
that Acker “wants to attack the acculturation process by destroying – or 
at least disrupting – the lisible text’s role within the acculturing 
institution of literature”.479 Specifically, for Ebbesen, Acker’s repetitive 
narratives, the destruction of a stable narrative voice, and the replacing of 
“descriptive residue” with “moments of iteration which disrupt the 
narrative rhythm and, as a consequence, interfere with realistic 
presentation of the world” are key elements of her uncovering that which 
is repressed or silenced.480 Indeed, the “iterative” moments – both the 
fragments that Acker peppers her narratives with which disrupt (and on 
occasion destroy) a sense of narrative coherency and her literal 
repetitions – are closely interlinked with Acker’s “assault on reason and 
                                                
478 Ebbesen, p. 72.  
479 ibid. p. 74.  
480 ibid. p. 96. Emphasis in the original.  
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logic” according to Ebbesen.481 This argument can be expanded. 
Notwithstanding that Acker’s purpose may have been to disrupt generic 
convention, as Ebbesen suggests, the effect of her textual disruptions on 
the reader actively demonstrates an attack on notions of understandability 
that prioritise rationalism and coherence as more valuable that those 
expressed by people who experience, and speak from, a position of 
marginalisation. This active nature of this demonstrable writing 
psychosis, then, offers something that a traditional lisible or ‘readerly’ 
narrative cannot. 
The language used to convey psychosis, particularly when 
spoken by the individual experiencing psychosis, may or may not be 
understandable in its most literal form. Sections of Acker’s work are 
clearly interpretable, but others are not, as in psychosis where 
experiences of paranoia or hallucination might be clearly describable but 
experiences like thought disorder might emerge as more challenging to 
hear and respond to. In the latter, unpacking threads of importance 
amidst elements of intrusion or confusion might be challenging. The 
content of expression and the form through which it is presented might 
be alien to more common experience. This again opens a further space, a 
space between literal ability to read words on a page and a broader 
understanding of the text itself. This space mirrors the lacuna Jaspers’ 
identifies between the understandable experience (neurosis) and the 
ununderstandability of psychosis. Acker often leaves her readers 
suspended in the ‘space between’ the understandable and the un-
understandable, with both plural and plastic interpretations available. 
                                                
481 Ebbesen, p. 97.  
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Acker’s texts open out, rather than closing down, interpretation. A 
biomedical binary framework of madness ‘v’ sanity risks closing down, 
through the demarcation of ‘mad’ or ‘sane’ expression and experience. 
Confusing or muddled expression can be dismissed as indicative of 
‘sickness’ or focused on as meaningful at that moment for an individual. 
Scholars often comment upon the reader of Acker’s work. Carla 
Harryman, for example, suggests that the reader of Acker’s text: 
[…] suspends her own interpretative coherence; self-identity 
in reading multiplies, expands, pixelates, contracts, is 
undone: the reader becomes to herself a multisensory / 
sensibility of the text, a further anarchic layer of the text and / 
or obstruction. Reading further crowds the text. ‘I’ am 
interference.482 
 
Similarly, Dick suggests that, like a “recalcitrant child”, Acker: 
[...] sets to work to break every writerly rule: the first and 
most fundamental rule of originality is exploded in a 
relentless practice of plagiarism; the idea of continuity – or 
authorial voice, of character, of narrative progression – is 
shattered. Most particularly, any kind of gender continuity is 
continually called into question, while genres thrown are 
thrown together to disrupt and disturb and disorientate any 
reading that settles into a comfortable pattern for a moment 
or two.483 
 
Both Harryman and Dick note here that the reader is not afforded any 
continuity in the reading process, either through the text or as external to 
the text. In contrast, focusing on Acker’s narrators-as-(re)readers, 
Pitchford notes that Acker rewrites “classics and pulp texts alike in a flat, 
deaestheticized style that becomes, in a sense, the common thread among 
the texts”, suggesting that “this deaestheticization marks an interruption 
of the irrational, challenging the normal rules of reading”.484 Thus, 
                                                
482 Carla Harryman, ‘Acker Un-Formed’, in Lust for Life: On the Writings of Kathy 
Acker, pp. 35-44, (p. 36) 
483 Dick, p. 115.  
484 Pitchford, p. 78.  
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Acker’s “strategically stupid style refuses attempts to compartmentalize 
(rationalize) thought and speech into monologic units”.485 These three 
differing perspectives on Acker’s readers demonstrate the challenge of 
offering a clear or definite reading of Acker’s texts, the challenge 
inherent in stating that Acker’s texts can offer something fixable for the 
reader. Such a challenge is not limited to radically fragmented or 
alienating texts, but my proposals as to what might be experienced or 
taken from the text by the reader are necessarily tentative and 
propositional. 
I have referred to Acker’s writing as a writing psychosis 
throughout this chapter, an interpretation which takes Keitel’s 
interpretation of the psychopathographical text beyond her initial 
theorisation. The effects on the reader of Acker’s destruction of linear 
narrative into fragments, her use of repetition within narratives, and her 
disclosure of the space in which experience resists conventional 
linguistic representation, is nonetheless closely aligned to Keitel’s 
analysis. The effect on the reader of reading psychopathographic 
narratives is clear for Keitel: “Reading about psychosis becomes a 
reading psychosis”.486 Acker, as I have argued, does not write about 
psychosis. Instead, she provides a literary analogue of psychosis – she 
writes psychosis.  
The reader does not recall Acker’s ‘stories’, but the fragments 
contained within them. De-familiarisation with narrative coherence or, to 
paraphrase Keitel’s words, the absence of the stabilising mediating text, 
                                                
485 Pitchford, p. 79.  
486 Keitel, p. 118 – see also Baker and others, Madness in Post-1945 British and 
American Fiction, pp. 24-26.  
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might leave the reader somehow lost, excluded from content that is 
stable, knowable and known, and simultaneously included into the 
disoriented experience of psychosis. Wheeler suggests that Acker 
“sought to reveal the fact that familiar order and logic are much less 
native to our experience or the apparent order of nature and the ‘external’ 
world”, suggesting that sanity is “arguably, merely the most familiar 
form of irrationality”.487 Acker textually creates irrationality in her 
‘irrational’ texts. This might, then, offer readers with a sense of what 
confusion, insecurity, dissociation from everyday experience or 
communication, fragmentation, fear, anxiety, joy, elation and liminal 
experiences might then feel like. When such experiences are aligned, as I 
have, with psychosis, this insight may be then further applied to clinical 
practice in terms of reflection on how such experiences might feel.  
Acker destructs texts and narratives; she destabilises, 
disorientates and disrupts the reading process. In this way, reading her 
work might require the development of novel interpretative and reading 
skills. In 1993, Acker wrote on nonfiction piece about the processes she 
went through in her experience of bodybuilding and the struggle she had 
in writing about bodybuilding.488 Finally, she notes that she decided to 
write after each workout, yet she constantly forgets to write: “I...some 
part of me ... the part of the ‘I’ who bodybuilds... was rejecting language, 
any verbal description of the processes of bodybuilding”.489 Hence, the 
only way she can begin to write about bodybuilding is to begin by 
analysing the rejection of verbal language involved in such an intense 
                                                
487 Wheeler (para. 8 of 14).  
488 See also Colby, ‘The Reappropriation of Mythology to Represent Pain’ on this piece 
for a broadly similar reading.  
489 Kathy Acker, ‘Against Ordinary Language: The Language of the Body’ (1993), in 
Bodies of Work, pp. 143-151, (p. 143).  
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physical activity. The physical act of entering the gym involves a 
“crossing of the threshold from the world defined by verbal language into 
the gym” – a parallel can be drawn here with her work on the crossing of 
the threshold into orgasm.490 She writes: “What happens during these 
minutes is that I forget. Masses of swirling thought, verbalized insofar as 
I am conscious of them, disappear as mind or thought begin to focus”.491 
There is a loss of conventional, external, cognisant self upon entering a 
space of physicality, through bodybuilding here but also through orgasm 
elsewhere or any kind of intense physical activity. The mind focuses 
exclusively on the physical action and sensation. Acker describes in 
detail the process involved in bodybuilding, whereby muscle groups are 
broken down in order to be re-grown, stronger than before – muscle 
groups are worked to the point of, and through, “failure”.492 To grow, 
muscles must first be destroyed. She asks, “Is this equation between 
destruction and growth also a formula for art?”.493  
Colby suggests that in Acker’s work “this destruction-growth 
formula becomes immediately apparent in both her feminist revisions of 
male texts and in her use of repetition within those texts”.494 This 
‘formula’ seems to be an apt metaphor for Acker’s writing processes. In 
her writing she destructs narrative coherence, linguistic structure, rhythm 
and form, in order to germinate and create meaning. This does not occur 
in a conventional manner, where story is created through development of 
linear narrative, but instead through the destruction and erasure of 
traditional, recognisable form via fragments, repetition and inaccessible 
                                                
490 Acker, ‘Against Ordinary Language: The Language of the Body’, p. 145.  
491 ibid. p. 145.  
492 ibid. p. 145-146.  
493 ibid. p. 146 
494 Colby, “The Reappropriation of Mythology to Represent Pain’, p. 10.  
209 
 
language, as well as through elements such as plagiarism and 
appropriation which I discuss in the following chapter. As I suggested 
when discussing Keitel, Acker’s narrative fragments rely on the 
unfamiliar and the strange because the distance created between the 
effect of reading Acker’s texts and ‘known’ textual strategies serves to 
prompt reflection on diverse communicative strategies. This induces the 
disruption in the reader; the medium may be actively de-familiarising, 
almost repelling the reader from the content. A new type of reading is 
required when encountering Acker’s textual psychosis. I argue that this is 
analogous to the process a listener might go through when encountering a 
person experiencing psychosis. The content and the form in which 
psychosis is told might be, in Jasper’s terms, ununderstandable. It might 
be outside the realm of everyday experience. New strategies are required 
to reach an understanding of the ununderstandable; narrative-based 
psychiatric practice might offer one such strategy, as I return to in 
Chapter 5. In this way, the processes involved in reading Acker’s texts – 
considering salient language and expression through metaphor, trope, 
structure; cohering meaning by reading Acker’s non fiction pieces 
alongside her fictions; familiarity with contextual theory that might 
inform readings of the text; noting the emotional and cognitive effects of 
textual tone and form; considering what can be taken away not only from 
the form of writing psychosis here, but the content of experience – might 
be new and worthy of reflection. Narrative skills such as these might then 
prompt supportive interpretation, reformulation and acting as an aid to 
personal meaning-making of the emotional and cognitive features of the 
experience of ‘psychosis’, which is the focus of Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: ‘Psychosis’, Experience and Content in Acker 
Reason which always homogenizes and reduces, represses 
and unifies phenomena or actuality into what can be 
perceived and so controlled. The subjects, us, are now stable 
and socializable. Reason is always in the service of the 
political and economic masters. (ES, p. 12) 
 
I have explored the medical and the socio-political context of madness in 
Chapters 1 and 2 respectively, and examined in Chapter 3 Acker’s textual 
form and how reading her work might offer the analogous experience of 
psychosis and development of novel reading strategies for clinical 
practice. In this chapter I consider Acker’s representation of the 
individual experience of ‘psychosis’, the content of her ‘literary 
psychosis’. I argue that Acker’s version of the phenomenology of 
madness offers a vision of the challenges of coherent and securely 
identified self-story telling and meaning-making in psychosis that may 
then offer something beneficial for clinicians to consider when 
contemplating how to support people in narratively oriented ways. Given 
that Acker’s vision of ‘psychosis’ is not one particularly aligned with a 
diagnostic or medical vision of psychopathological phenomenology, my 
intention is not to ‘symptom spot’ or to ‘diagnose’ her characters. Instead 
I examine three broad elements. Firstly, I focus on Acker and self-
storying, particularly Acker’s reflection on the interrelationship of 
‘schizophrenia’ and identity, lack of stable first-person narrative ‘I’, and 
her manipulation of fiction and autobiography. Secondly, I examine 
conceptions of memory and time in Acker as important to cohering 
personal experience in temporal ways. Finally, I explore the how Acker 
presents paranoia, fear of controlling agencies and lobotomy, a frequent 
trope in Acker’s work, that could be aligned with a framework of 
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descriptive psychopathology, but which I explore in terms of experience 
rather than their familiarity (or not) with the symptomatological approach 
to formulating ‘psychosis’. What psychosis means in Acker’s work, 
rather than what it ‘is’ or what it ‘looks like’, is a central concern of this 
chapter. Given this principal focus, in the concluding section of this 
chapter I note the ‘form-content’ divide in psychiatry, arguing that 
attention to the content offers a way of working in clinical practice that is 
both potentially beneficial and more aligned with an individualised 
perspective.  
The quote that opens this chapter, from one of Acker’s more 
coherent novels Empire of the Senseless, is similar in message to some of 
the contemporary works that attempt to formulate what ‘psychosis’ may 
be. Leader points out that we “live in a society that has less and less 
space for the detail and value of individual lives […] people today are 
coerced more that ever to think in uniform ways, from the nursery to the 
corridors of professional life”.495 In this way, clinical students and staff 
are indoctrinated into discourses of knowledge about what ‘psychosis’ is 
which might not align with people’s own experiences, and indeed might 
actively be against people’s own formulation of cause, effect, impact and 
recovery.496 Immediately after this comment, Leader notes: 
We see this reflected in the mental health world, where 
treatment is often considered as an almost mechanized 
technique to be applied to a passive patient, rather than as a 
joint collaborative work, where each party has 
responsibilities. […] The psychotic subject has become less a 
person to be listened to than an object to be treated. The 
                                                
495 Leader, p. 3-4.  
496 Multiple first-person accounts of encounters with mental health services and 
professionals have explored the way in which psychiatric discourse might sometimes 
misrepresent people’s experience or beliefs about aetiology, meaning, sense making and 
recovery – see for example Read and Reynolds; Grant, Biley and Walker; Grant, Haire, 
Biley and Stone; and Baker, Shaw and Biley.  
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patient’s specifity and life story are often just airbrushed 
away. […] Despite the warnings of progressive psychiatrists 
over the years and the antipsychiatry movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s, psychosis is still too often equated with the ways 
in which some people fail to fit the norms of society.497 
 
Leader focuses much of his study on the ‘everyday madness’ that people 
outside of the psychiatric system might experience, his objective being 
that if we can understand “what has allowed someone to remain stable 
and avoid the most shattering and painful symptoms of psychosis” we 
may be better able to understand the experiences of people who have 
attracted the attention of psychiatric services, either through their own 
volition (as their distress or fear is great) or through their externally 
observed behaviour (often focused around discourses of ‘risk’ to self and 
other).498 
Leader is critical of psychiatric systems that ignore or deny 
subjective meaning and sense making as important, those systems that 
prioritise symptomatological form over content, privileging the surface 
appearance and expression rather than the inner world.499 Acker, over 20 
years earlier, suggested that not only did a singular notion of what reason 
‘is’ reduce and repress people, but that literature had the potential to 
address this state of affairs, as seen in the text following the quotation 
which opens this chapter: “It is here that literature strikes, at this base, 
where the concepts and actings of order impose themselves. Literature is 
that which denounces and slashes apart the repressing machine at the 
level of the signified” (ES, p. 12). Literature can upend, subvert 
dominating or marginalising discourse. This chapter aims to examine 
                                                
497 Leader, p. 4 
498 ibid. p. 10.  
499 ibid. p. 32.  
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how Acker’s phenomenological portrayal of different elements of 
‘psychosis’ might upend a traditional discourse which might risk 
privileging symptomatological form over personally important content, 
demonstrating how attention to the content might offer beneficial ways of 
working with people outside of an illness framework, in terms of storying 
or re-storying narratively-constructed authentic identity.500 
 
Narrative and Authorial ‘I’: Identity and ‘Schizophrenia’ 
Acker was fascinated with notions of identity, a theme that appears time 
and again in both interviews and critical work. The sense of challenge in 
developing a coherent or coalesced centralised identity materialises as a 
regular issue through her narrative voices, often via interior monologue. 
As Watten notes, the “centre of Acker’s strategies, then, is a dissociation 
of personal identity that generates the form of the novel”.501 Ebbesen 
further suggests that Acker’s “shifting proper names and pronouns” 
serves “to problematize the ideological notion of ‘I’, whose construction 
takes place at the moment one enters phallogocentric language”.502 
Dissociated identities are written into the construction of Acker’s texts; 
their expressions of experience are always bound up in notions of 
anxiety, fear, mistrust, ontological and existential insecurity and the 
inherent instability of the language available to them to construct their 
‘selves’. As Hume suggests, the “varied range of subjects in her narrative 
subunits at first supports the sense of there being no unified centre of 
consciousness”, yet there is, as Hume elaborates, a consistent voice 
                                                
500 See also A. Grant, H. Leigh-Phippard and N. P. Short, ‘Re-storying narrative 
identity: a dialogical study of mental health recovery and survival’, Journal of 
Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 22. 4 (2015), 278-286.  
501 Watten, p. 64.  
502 Ebbesen, p. 9.  
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through Acker’s work, one concerned with the experience of control 
from others (among other themes) and which resists a simple reading that 
positions Acker as emblematic perhaps of ‘postmodern fragmentation’.503 
In this section I explore how Acker portrays the first person voice in her 
fiction and how this might relate to experiences aligned with ‘psychosis’, 
and how this troubling of narrative voice is related to the blurring of 
autobiography and fiction, before considering how challenges around 
who is cohering a self-story might offer insights into narrative-based 
work in psychiatric practice.  
Acker was critical of the notion of what she has referred to as a 
“specific, controlling, imprisoning ‘I’ ”.504 Elsewhere, she noted the 
radical disjunction that exists between the individual’s view of reality 
and the world itself is “insanity” incarnate: “Pretend that there is a 
distinct entity named self and a different entirety named world or other. 
Define insanity as the situation between the self’s version of the world 
and the world. According to this definition, American culture is now 
insane”.505 Furthermore, the expression of this personally experienced 
and culturally demonstrated “insanity” cannot be adequately 
demonstrated, for Acker, through “[w]ell-measured language, novels 
which structurally depend on Aristotelian continuities, on any formal 
continuities”; such works “cannot describe, much less criticise, this 
culture”.506 This disparity, then, between the desired aim of a centralised 
identity and knowable real versus the reality of a fragmented sense of self 
and lack of ontological or existential certainty is best expressed, for 
                                                
503 Hume, p. 489.  
504 R. U. Sirius, ‘Kathy Acker: Where does she get off? Interview by R. U. Sirius’, Alt X 
(online journal) <http://www.altx.com/io/acker.html> [accessed 2nd December 2005].  
505 Acker, ‘William Burroughs’s Realism’, p. 2.  
506 ibid. p. 2.  
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Acker, through discordant narrative voices who have a limited sense of ‘I 
am’, ‘I want’ or ‘I believe’.  
The previous chapter spoke at length about reader responses to 
Acker in terms of her dissolution of structural formality. Glück suggests 
that, as a reader of Acker’s work and finding her disorientating, he felt 
“anguish exactly because I was deprived of the one identity-making 
machine of identification and recognition”.507 This disorientation is not 
only indicative of the reader response to Acker’s work, but is 
disorientation experienced by many of her characters and narrative 
voices within her texts. Acker’s characters are fragmented, unsure, 
insecure, paranoid, experiencing a fracturing between their perceptions 
and the perceptions of others. First person narration sometimes involves 
multiple voices, a babbling of identities or elements of selfhood. What 
this babble of ‘I’s’ reminds the reader of is the common misconception 
that psychosis, and specifically ‘schizophrenia’, involves a splitting of 
identity. This notion is not true – instead this kind of personality division 
is codified in the formal (but controversial) diagnosis of ‘Dissociative 
Identity Disorder’, where, usually in response to acute trauma, the core 
personality ‘splits’ into one or more ‘alters’.508 Far from being caught up 
with diagnostic nosology, Acker instead presents this plurality of identity 
alongside issues of plagiarism and blurring of autobiography, fiction and 
critical writing in a complex fusion.  
Acker attributed this fusion as being born from her interest in 
‘schizophrenia’. In interview with Friedman, she states “I came to 
                                                
507 Glück, p. 47.  
508 See Stickley and Nickeas for a detailed perspective on living with Dissociative 
Identity Disorder. . 
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plagiarism from a different point of view, from exploring schizophrenia 
and identity”.509 Again, in interview with Lotringer, she reiterates this 
view, stating, “I became very interested in the model of schizophrenia. I 
wanted to explore the use of the word I”.510 The most viable identity in 
the contemporary world, Acker states, is formed of a splitting, a 
hyperreal merging of false/true, constructed and reproduced: in writing 
The Childlike Life of the Black Tarantula by The Black Tarantula, Acker 
wrote that she wanted to explore:  
The idea that you don’t need to have a central identity, that a 
split identity was a more viable way in the world. I was 
splitting the I into false and true I’s and I just wanted to see if 
this false I was more or less real than the true I; what are the 
reality levels between false and true and how it worked.511 
 
The most striking element of Acker’s re-presentation a ‘split’ identity 
occurs through her decentring of a stable and secure narrative I in her 
fragments and texts – as Schlichter notes (with reference to Don 
Quixote), “the destabilization of the point of view produces a variety of 
many small, local narrations that replace the master narrative”.512 Such a 
destabilisation exposes the way identity fragmentation relates to issues of 
coherent self-narrative but offers a narrative decentralisation of the 
‘master narrative’ of rationality as a masculine objective.  
I want to return here to the fragment from The Burning Bombing 
of America that I used earlier, to illustrate my point related to how the 
narrative I functions in Acker’s work as a dissociate, insecure expression 
of identity: 
                                                
509 Acker in interview with Friedman, (para. 8 of 115).  
510 Acker in interview with Lotringer, p. 7.  
511 Acker in interview with Lotringer, p. 7.  
512 Schlichter, p. 321.  
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I’ll just talk  forget it  inspiration gone  energy high  general 
feeling in the consciousness: can’t get myself together  what 
are you doing  I’m flying into outer apace  I’m going insane  
25mg. Valium one seconal. 50mg. Benzedrine unknown 
chemicals in the food  personality changes result. hospitals 
are for getting well. don’t believe it  don’t believe anything 
you hear. Be as paranoid  schizophrenic  as possible. all 
sentences suspect. Stupid Man says the universities are in 
league with the evil magicians  the so-called Death Wards  
Columbia deals arsenic-napalm  DD3 welfare means 
lobotomy  nurses are robotants. Allow people to do whatever 
they want allow the streets to be covered with silk  people 
will dance wildly in the streets 513 
 
This segment is overtly concerned thematically with psychosis and the 
experience of paranoia and fear, presenting a sense of madness as 
inescapable and as an escape strategy. The elements of what has been 
termed post-war cultural paranoia are clear from the middle and towards 
the end of this fragment, and this theme in post-war fiction has been 
amply discussed elsewhere – I return to this experience shortly.514 From 
the perspective of exploring Acker’s presentation of narrative identity, 
the textual presence of a possibly omniscient voice (it could equally be 
argued that this is an internal questioning ’I’ rather than a dislocated one) 
is evident here. It is subtly placed – as subtle as an auditory hallucination 
may be experienced, for example. The I in the text first indicates a sense 
of unease, of “general feeling in the consciousness: can’t get myself 
together”, and immediately after this a voice asks, “what are you doing”. 
The “I” replies, “I’m flying into outer space   I’m going insane”, a note 
of insight before the paradoxical descent into paranoia about insanity, 
and a simultaneous call towards “being” mad.  
                                                
513 Kathy Acker, The Burning Bombing of America, p. 158.  
514 See Patrick O’Donnell, Latent Destinies: Cultural Paranoia and Contemporary U. S. 
Narrative (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000); Timothy Melley, 
Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2000).  
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The curious use of “I” and “You” (and later, “We”) in this piece 
distances both authorial I and I-as-first-person narrator because the I (or 
I’s) are inherently unstable. There is no coherent character identity 
created because of the littered fragments of text that form the piece as a 
whole. References to various friends and others at different points in the 
text are only initialised, producing a further distance than would be 
achieved by naming people. The use of “You” draws the reader directly 
into the text, appealing to them but simultaneously dissociating them 
from their expectations as a reader, for example: 
SWISH freaks maniacs Your schizophrenia SWISH Your 
giant hand covers our eyes pulls our fingers into long strands 
of light Your fingernails scrape the skin off our senses Your 
realm is not discussed there is no language for You [...] You 
never rest You talk to me in the presence of other people I am 
alone I sit by myself I cry.515 
 
This section is accusatory in tone (“Your schizophrenia” / “your 
fingernails scrape the skin off our senses”), yet collective (“our”). In 
many respects, “I” is every and any “I”; “you” is every and any “Other”. 
The overt distancing, almost repelling, of the reader (both through the 
accusing of the narrative voice, and the literal fragments of text posing a 
challenge to coherent reading and sense-making) leaves a reader who is 
trying to navigate their way through the scattered fragments of a text that, 
concomitantly, depicts the scattered fragments of a desecrated America. 
There is, again, no mediating text here, or even the structure of a 
mediating text to orientate the reader. The text may be thematically 
dystopian, but it does not follow the conventions of a dystopian narrative. 
Both the external real (cityscape) and the internal self (the I) are fractured 
and ruptured. 
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Acker’s narratives are often interrupted by different voices 
(including those of the author) making identification of a discrete ‘I’ 
challenging. In a 1990 piece, published initially in the journal 
Postmodern Culture as “Dead Doll Humility” and reproduced in 1993 as 
“Dead Doll Prophecy”, Acker demonstrates these interruptive voices.516 
This is a creative piece about the process of becoming a writer, creatively 
retelling the legal wrangling Acker experienced over plagiarism, and her 
feelings on the issue of plagiarism more generally. This fusion of creative 
and autobiographical is told in the third and first person (via Capitol’s 
thoughts) but also signals concerns and influences that Acker discussed 
in interviews, for example the Black Mountain Poets.517 The text is often 
missing the subject pronoun ‘she’ or ‘her’ giving a curiously distant 
impression. Other capitalised sections put Capitol’s thoughts into 
quotation marks, offering a further distance from the impression of 
Capitol speaking Acker’s thoughts, ultimately leading to a doubling of 
Acker’s voice – two voices, possibly three (1st person, 3rd person and 
‘....’). This is a powerful, if confusing, linguistic strategy. The different 
voices culminate and agree with one another. This is a feature throughout 
much of Acker’s work, whereby I becomes unstable through a 
multiplicity of narrators all speaking in the first person. As in ‘Dead Doll 
Prophecy’, Acker interjects explicitly autobiographical material, political 
commentary, seemingly irrelevant sub-plots that fail to become plots, and 
philosophical musings into many of her texts. This again proves 
                                                
516 Kathy Acker, ‘Dead Doll Prophecy’, (1993) in The Subversive Imagination: Artists, 
Society, and Social Responsibility ed. by Carol Becker. New York: Routledge, 1994: 
20-35.  
517 ibid. p. 21.  
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disorientating for the reader, and fragments Acker’s more stable or 
coherent narratives in the same ways as her short pieces fragment.  
As Kathryn Hume suggests, though, writing on the destabilising 
and deconstructing voices in Acker, there is a consistent voice 
throughout Acker’s work, one which “projects itself through lyric 
lamentation, cries, the vocabularies of sex, pain and oppression”.518 She 
continues, suggesting that the values of this voice are “traditional and 
humanist, and include fair treatment, decent living conditions, the inner 
self’s authenticity, and its right not to conform to social norms”.519 
Alongside the ‘I’ that speaks consistently of Acker’s core concerns, in 
other ways the narrative ‘I’ in Acker’s work is destabilised, 
autoscopically displaced and external to the self.  
The multiple points of view struggling for space within The 
Childlike Life of the Black Tarantula by the Black Tarantula, for 
example, are presented as a babble of hallucinatory voices. Within this 
text, there is no stable I offering a discrete charactorial identity – the first 
person voices are multiple and undifferentiated by Acker: “My name is 
Laura Lane. I’m born in Holly Springs, Mississippi, in 1837. My name is 
Adelaide Blanche de la Tremouille. I, K A, fall in love with D; D burns 
me” (CLBT, p. 17). The narrative here switches between an authorial 
voice narrating contemporary events in a diary or self-analytical manner 
alongside the stories of female murderesses in the first and second 
chapters. The framing breaks down when Acker asserts that she is 
copying pornographic books, yet elements that Acker draws on 
(potentially) autobiographically (“I, K A” in the quote above; references 
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to L and B in the quote below) interject the ‘pornographic’ tale of a 
relationship between two girls at a school: 
In my head I’m telling someone about me the two voices 
become voices outside my head I almost hear, not quite, I 
feel I’m closest to people in loony bins I see myself acting 
superior I’m going to get a job emptying toilets in a loony bin 
because I subconsciously know that I’m crazy. This is how 
I’m sneakily helping myself: I ask L about B’s work say I 
think B’s work is important because I’m still secretly and 
madly in love with B; secret sexual intentions determine my 
actions. […] A semicircle of people stand around Jean’s 
cubicle, stare at our forms through the thin white curtains. 
Everyone knows about me. I love you. (CLBT, p. 33-34). 
 
The L and B sections occur at different points and seem to be mediations 
of Acker, working through her personal relationships, interrupted by the 
‘story’ of Jean and the I voice. Allusion to the experience of voice 
hearing is also evident in this quote. Where there is a babbling of ‘I’s’ 
speaking, the effect replicates the potential experience of auditory 
‘hallucination’ for the reader, where thought is interrupted by more 
ethereal voices.  
Acker seems to directly appear in this text: “Kathy also writes 
about this and her memory of it is the same as mine” (CLBT, p. 70). 
Acker explicitly links ‘schizophrenia’, identity and the blurring of 
autobiography and fiction in discussion about the process of writing this 
text. In interview with Lotringer she asserted that she was, in The 
Childlike Life of the Black Tarantula by the Black Tarantula, “splitting 
the I into false and true I’s and I just wanted to see if this false I was 
more or less real than the true I”, noting that by the end of the text “I 
can’t tell what’s true or false, except for actual dates. If I say I was born 
in 1748, I know that’s false”.520 She also commented on the 
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interrelatedness, for her, of autobiography and fiction, truth and falsity, 
and ‘schizophrenia’ in interview with Friedman: 
The thing about schizophrenia: I used a lot of 
autobiographical material in Black Tarantula. I put 
autobiographical material next to material that couldn’t be 
autobiographical. The major theme was identity […] 
It’s a very simple experiment in Tarantula. When one first 
encounters the ‘I’ in Tarantula, it’s the autobiographical ‘I’. 
Then the ‘I’ takes on other, non-autobiographical qualities 
and gradually the inevitable parentheses around ‘I’ dissolve 
and the experiment in identity proceeds from that.521 
 
This further, then, implants the author into the narrative, further 
displacing authorial and charactorial identities, closing the gap between 
author and text. Authorial identity is pluralised, like the ‘schizophrenic’ 
identities that Acker conveys in The Childlike Life of the Black Tarantula 
by the Black Tarantula.522 
Through the blurring of authorial control over the text and the 
production of fictional or narrative voice, Acker in many ways constructs 
herself through writing. This offers a presentation of a public identity, 
which is unstable and slippery; the ‘facts’ about Acker’s life cannot be 
grasped from her narratives, as much as they ever can from even the most 
directly autobiographical texts. The presentation of a fictionalised or 
semi-fictionalised autobiography offers an interesting perspective when 
considering how to support people experiencing ‘psychosis’ and related 
experiences to construct their self-narratives in coherent ways, as a 
common criticism of narrative-based research (and potentially narrative-
                                                
521 Acker in interview with Friedman, (para. 28 and 32).  
522 See also Hardin, ‘Between Theory and Autobiography’, for an interesting reading of 
the insertion of autobiography into Acker’s fictions, tracking through her oeuvre – 
Hardin notes that “we should not be so quick to dismiss the autobiographic because 
there is an honesty and purpose behind it” (p. 140).  
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based practice) lies in issues of authorial truth.523 As Bracken and 
Thomas point out, attention to who is speaking at a given moment is 
important in considering how we might construct Otherness and 
Sameness, difference and familiarity, and, importantly, communication 
and dialogue.524 They suggest that a static notion of ‘character’ in text 
(and I argue that Acker’s narrative voices, rather than characters, are not 
‘static’ in this sense as they do not appear long enough to develop any 
secure or continuous identities) might be seen as “monological, fixed, 
unvarying”, whereas a person is “truly dialogical, an ever unfolding set 
of infinite possibilities”.525 The blurring of Acker’s authorial authority 
over the text makes her in many ways dialogic with (as would be 
expected through textual creation) and within her texts themselves. 
Ebbesen notes that Acker’s expression of narrator voice “marks the break 
between the speaker who speaks and the speaker who is spoken of”.526 In 
this way, then, she troubles how (clinically) we might define the ‘truth’ 
of an author or narrator’s story. However, the truth-value of a story 
becomes of secondary concern when establishing meaning is prioritised 
in the reading process. Most importantly, though, Acker’s unstable I’s 
serve to offer consideration, as Ebbesen notes, of who speaks and when, 
who constructs a story, who tells us what is occurring. Instead of 
reducing people’s complex experiences to biomedicalised formulae, 
people experiencing ‘psychosis’ might be better served by being placed 
                                                
523 See Immy Holloway and Dawn Freshwater, Narrative Research in Nursing (Oxford: 
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in the role of active speaking subject rather than passive recipient of 
discourse. 
Acker noted that her distortion of author and character related to 
her appropriation and plagiarism of sources, which distorts the boundary 
between experience, adoption of another’s experience, and re-presenting 
both as potentially, but not actually, true or false:  
I don’t work in any way that is pure. Either, as a writer, you 
take a stance that one is only going to talk about oneself […] 
or you engage in practices that are impure […] What I do is 
obviously very impure. I don’t re-enact other texts, I directly 
appropriate: I directly and bluntly use these other experiences 
which aren’t ‘mine’. Only they’re mine because I’ve read 
them. Or heard them, etc.527 
 
This, then, adds a further layer of interpretative tentativeness – all that is 
offered is a narrative that is simultaneously true and false, simultaneously 
real and unreal. Acker further presents her own experiences in 
fictionalised form, evident in comparing ‘The Gift of Disease’ and the 
short piece ‘Eurydice in the Underworld’.528 Acker’s insertion of herself 
into texts is further complexified through how she describes her creation 
of characters. She suggested in interview with Lotringer: “I become the 
characters in the novel, but the characters in the novel aren’t me. People 
always think they’re me, and it’s a drag”.529 Acker further noted, on the 
writing process in her early works, she was looking for her both her 
writing voice and a sense of true ‘I’: “I placed ‘true’ autobiography next 
to ‘false’ autobiography […] in fiction, there is no ‘true’ or ‘false’ in 
social-realist terms. […] All is real. When I placed ‘true’ autobiography 
                                                
527 Acker, ‘Paragraphs’, p. 89.  
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225 
 
next to ‘false’ autobiography, everything was real”.530 Drawing on 
Acker’s views on the construction of personal identity through text, and 
to answer critique posed around the validity and trustworthiness of 
narrative-based approaches – all stories are real and personally true, all 
perceptions of events valid. The task of the clinician, then, in narrative-
based psychiatry is not to assert that a version of events is true or false, 
but the explore the psychosocial effect of the described situation or 
scenario, explore interpersonal reactions to it, to offer alternative 
readings of what is described, and perhaps to counter dominant narratives 
of a centralised identity as a desirable goal with a version of selfhood that 
accepts a plurality of identities that everyone inhabit at different times. 
The final layer of narrative identity pluralisation that contributes 
to Acker’s overarching fragmentation of selfhood in texts is the way she 
appropriates and plagiarises texts as well as re-appropriating her own 
writing. This again offers a destabilising of authorial identity via the text. 
The early work ‘Politics’ demonstrates Acker’s interest in weaving 
autobiography (specifically diary material) and fiction as a presentation 
of pluralised authorial identity. Acker was working in a sex show when 
she wrote the piece, and notes in interview with Lotringer that “in the 
diary section I wasn’t dealing with a fake I, with fake autobiography 
yet”.531 She discussed in this interview the construction of this text, 
noting: “I placed very direct autobiographical, just diary material, right 
next to fake diary material. I tried to figure out who I wasn’t”.532 This 
piece of Acker’s early writing directly links a personal working through 
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of a fragmented identity, where the only way to construct personalised 
identity might be by discarding different elements of identity that do not 
quite ‘fit’. Acker suggests she wrote, initially, to find out who she was 
not. Writing is not the act of self-creation or self-awareness, instead 
reliant on acceptance of the plural nature of identity, with story making 
functioning as an erasure of who the author is not, starting from the point 
of ‘I am’ as a fluid and multiple position. 
Through the distortion of narrative I and the blurring of 
autobiographical and fictional material in her work, Acker calls into 
question how far a stable identity can be constructed, through or within 
narrative. If this process is impossible, this might then offer an insight 
into the ways in which people experiencing the continuum of experiences 
that are biomedically formulated as ‘psychosis’ might struggle to create 
their own storied identity. In Acker’s work, the disturbance of coherent 
or confident (and autonomous) subjectivity is linked to plagiarism: “You 
create identity, you’re not given identity per se. What became more 
interesting to me wasn’t the I, it was text because it’s text that creates 
identity. That’s how I got interested in plagiarism”.533 Plagiarism in this 
way might be seen not only as taking a pre-existing text and re-inscribing 
its methods, tropes, content, meaning and themes, but in also adopting 
another person’s identity. As Pitchford notes: 
This widespread plagiarism [in My Death My Life by Pier 
Paolo Pasolini, but also in Acker’s other texts] is a way to 
trouble the authority of writer, meaning, and reader. [...] 
Authorial ownership normally functions as a form of rational 
causality, determining meaning and thereby legislating a 
certain sense of how reality works. It is by now 
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commonplace to point out that this sense of reality has tended 
to be male and otherwise hegemonic.534 
 
Acker noted the relationship, as she saw it, between plagiarism, identity 
and ‘schizophrenia’. In this way, as Pitchford notes, her writing troubles 
(male and hegemonic) discourses that allege the desirability of one 
stable, fixed reality and the possibility, therefore, of a fixed identity 
responding to and existent in that real. This troubling, as asserted by 
Avital Ronell, did not lie in a wilful ignorance of the masculine and 
hegemonic tradition: 
Acker undermined the staple myths of originality, of literary 
ownership and reliable reference. She rearranged the logic of 
framing [...] she didn’t turn her back on a very determined 
history of thought or on the literary tradition; she just turned 
them on their backs, that is, by reinscribing, regendering, 
profaning, desecrating, shattering the source and adjusting 
the reference in a constant, loyal, determined way.535  
 
Instead, Acker – in my reading – subverts the discourse that asserts that 
one reality is ‘real’ and that beliefs or experiences that lie outside of that 
commonly held ‘real’ thus are indicative of pathology, of sickness, of 
‘psychosis’. Her work calls into question to the ways in which human 
experiences are experienced intrapersonally, interpersonally and extra-
personally and the way such experiences are viewed and codified by 
external powers. 
It is possible, through Acker’s presentation of plural identity, to 
consider how people may hold different identities at different times, 
rather than only being identified with a pathological identity. The effect 
of being attributed a ‘sick’ (central) identity have been widely formulated 
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and commented on in the Medical Humanities.536 Deborah Bowman, for 
example, comments on how the “confining effects of identity” are 
experienced by “those who become patients”: 
[…] from the mundane, but significant, dehumanisation that 
occurs when a person is distilled into a hospital number, test 
results, systemic pathologies or bed location to the existential 
crises to which illness and suffering give rise. Diseases too 
are telescoped into singular identities in which a particular 
narrative, often predicated on a reductive or mechanistic 
account, dominates discourse […].537  
 
The denotation of a person with diverse experiences as only ‘sick’, 
‘telescoping’ a life into a singular identity, is particularly evident in 
mental health care. The labels applied – ‘schizophrenic’, ‘bipolar’, ‘P. 
D.’ – carry with them sets of (sometimes pejorative) assumptions, 
prejudices and indications of what, rather than who a person may be. 
Instead of being ‘a person experiencing psychosis’ or ‘a person 
responding to acute childhood trauma’, patients might be reductively 
noted in clinical shorthand as ‘psychotics’ or ‘Borderlines’.538 As I 
argued in Chapter 2, the way we formulate experiences, reactions, 
emotions and personality characteristics into pathology risks over-
pathologising and over-diagnosing people into a particular discourse that 
risks further dominating declarations around subjective experience that 
does or does not ‘fit’ this framework. A person with a label of ‘borderline 
personality disorder’, for example, might experience a distressing life 
event and express a quite reasonable level of upset: in a person without 
                                                
536 See for example Erivng Goffman’s classic Stigma: Notes on the Management of 
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this label, the distress might be considered ‘reasonable’. In a person with 
this label, upset risks being re-formulated into ‘over-emotionality’, 
‘attention-seeking’, ‘acting out’ or indicating a person ‘in a crisis’. 
Acker subverts identity-containing or constraining frameworks, 
further disrupting binaries of rationality, normativity and 
‘appropriateness’. Her work, in this way, might offer a way of rethinking 
how people experience different elements of mental health challenges as 
flexible elements of a whole person, rather than these being the whole 
person. Such experiences are not only common but also part of being 
human, rather than isolated biomedical pathologies.539 At the very least, 
her exploration of the plural nature of identity prompts consideration of 
the array of available identities that people adopt in different ways at 
different times or in different circumstances, and, importantly, the way 
that what Bowman refers to as the “privileging of particular ways of 
describing illness or disease” holds “significant implications for how we 
identify and respond to illness”.540 There is a pressing need to consider 
how labels are used in psychiatry to describe a person’s identity, 
particularly those labels that carry negative connotations that might serve 
to exclude people from accessing help, despite policy-level documents to 
the contrary.541 The privileging of one view over another that Bowman 
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notes “represents a clash of identities: the collision of personal, 
professional, individual, systemic and epistemological identities in which 
multiplicity of meaning may be unseen, disregarded, misunderstood or 
diminished”.542 Noting the importance of acknowledging the multiple 
meanings of experience that might be held by people experiencing health 
and illness, and continuing the recognition of plurality and plasticity of 
both identity and interpretation, in the next section I discuss how memory 
and temporality function in Acker’s development of plural identities, and 
the importance of temporality in the development of coherent self-
storying.  
 
History, Temporality and the Construction of Self-Stories 
One vital but sometimes overlooked element in contemporary psychiatric 
practice, when considering how personal identity is both constructed, 
experienced and malleable, is the experience of personal temporality and 
the relevance of personal history. When a clinical history is taken as part 
of an assessment framework, a core element of the dialogue usually asks 
about childhood, education, family structure, family history of mental 
illness and personal history. The initial assessment might not be the right 
place to ask for details of any elements of past history that might be 
traumatic (given the limited nature of this contact) – yet it sets the tone 
for future interactions. When elements that are considered important to 
the person are closed down as not relevant to assessing mental health at 
that point, a sense may be left of mental health challenges existing only 
                                                                                                                                                            
personality disorder’, Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 22. 7 
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presently (what is happening now), rather than as affected by past 
experience. Recent developments in clinical practice such as Trauma 
Informed Care and reducing rates of physical restraint in care settings 
note the importance of personal history of trauma on current experience, 
in mental health generally and in psychosis.543 Hence, a personal 
experience of temporality, the impact of personal history, and the 
experience of the current are important elements for working with people 
in contemporary mental health care. As Acker notes, if we “throw history 
away, if we do not accept historical thinking, what kind of civilization 
are we negotiating? What kind of culture? If we throw history away, we 
are depriving ourselves of potentialities, potentialities for actions”.544 
This has not been (and is not) always the case, however. A 
singular focus on the present is common in mental health care, as 
Bracken and Thomas comment, noting paradoxically that it “is only from 
outside the series of nows that what is past, present and future can be 
established”.545 Drawing on Heideggerian notions of being-in-time, they 
suggest: “the present is not and cannot be something that is fixed and 
separate from the past and the future. The three are involved inextricably 
with one another”.546 The effects of this are most evident if “we attempt 
to imagine a person existing in the present tense alone, without access to 
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a past or future”.547 The significance of this insight is crucial to 
understanding the ways in which contemporary phenomenological 
descriptive psychiatry risks failing to consider content, context and 
subjective experience. Bracken and Thomas’ point is simple: our selves 
are constructed through our pasts, our contemporary experiences, and our 
perceived (or not) future. Disruptions to this process might then initiate 
extreme psychological responses that result in subjective confusion, 
distortions of perception, and emotional labour involved in moving 
beyond past trauma. 
A disrupted sense of personal temporality and history 
contributes to the overall challenge in securing a stable identity or set of 
identities in Acker’s work. Acker’s ‘I’s often only exist at that moment in 
the text, without a sense of story for the reader. The use of inner 
monologue perhaps presents the most acute example of the present-ness 
of experience as represented in Acker’s fragments. A multi-layered and 
complex experience of past, present and future, the way the present is 
relentlessly experienced and the person’s own version of their history, 
forms versions of what Frank theorises as chaos narratives. It is the chaos 
narrative that the clinician can most easily “dismiss” in favour of his or 
her own reductive medicalised version.548 In chaos narratives, Frank 
argues, the person’s own story is not a coherent, temporally logical or 
sequential narrative.549 The same is true for the ontological and 
existential instability that character’s experience in Acker’s work, and for 
Acker’s narratives more generally. Time – as a sense of secure history 
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and identifiable past-present-future sequence, and the experience of 
temporality – is both disrupted and disruptive in Acker’s chaos-like 
narratives.550 The relentless ‘now’ inherent in Acker’s work may involve 
different events or emotions, but it forms a sense of imprisonment, of 
relentless staticity, immobility, whereby the individual only experiences 
a perpetual series of presents. As Abhor experiences, for example, “I no 
longer remembered. Without my memory I realised reality was gone” 
(ES, p. 113). In the absence of memory – personal past – she is “the only 
end which could be present”, whereby in the future (not only hers) there 
“will be no end to human tears” (ES, p. 113). The disrupted sense of 
personal history enacts a trauma in and of itself, leaving no positive 
future: “Since I saw no temporal possibility to other than the present, I 
saw no possibilities” (ES, p. 113). No sense of coherent past, or of 
possible future, is envisaged.  
Personal history, as I note, is not entirely ignored in psychiatric 
assessment processes. Yet as Frank suggests, there are often significant 
differences between a person’s telling of their own history, their 
ownership of it, and which features or memories are significant, and the 
practice of a clinical history taking.551 When clinicians have, by virtue of 
the person’s condition, potentially pre-doubted the person’s account of 
their narrative depending on their experiences, labels or different 
versions of events involving the person, there results a multi-layered 
history comprised of multiple sources, in which the salient features of the 
clinical discourse may vary wildly from the salient features of the 
person’s own experience.  
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In Acker’s work a disruption in temporal coherency is further 
developed through her misuse of historical fragments and events, which 
contribute to the overall sense of temporal disruption in her work. While 
in much of Acker’s work there are historical referencing points, such as 
the Vietnam War in The Burning Bombing of America, in other pieces 
Acker destroys the temporal (and, sometimes, spatial-geographical) 
structuring the reader has come to expect. In Acker’s The Childlike Life 
of the Black Tarantula, she blurs pieces set in history and taken from 
various textual records of, for example, female murderesses, and what 
appear to be contemporary (auto)biographical sections. This effects a 
textual temporal dislocation, with modern day elements such as 
American 7-11 convenience stores placed alongside historical features 
London’s Newgate prison, with only brackets to demarcate between the 
time shifts (CLBT, p. 26-27). Acker often takes historical events and 
rewrites them (such as the death of Pier Pasolini in My Death My Life by 
Pier Paolo Pasolini), plunders autobiographies (such as the Rimbaud 
section of In Memoriam to Identity) and inserts historical figures into 
otherwise seemingly fictional texts (such as the appearance of Jean Genet 
in Blood and Guts in High School). This further temporally disorients the 
reader, mirroring the charactorial dislocation experienced.  
Ebbesen suggests that the inclusion (or at times, interruption) of 
historical moment or event in Acker’s work provides a “critique of 
history not unlike Foucault’s” which “sees history and historical 
narrative as constructed from disparate and different phenomena, none of 
which can be unified into a true history”.552 This is a problematic feature 
                                                
552 Ebbesen, p. 111-112.  
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of Acker’s work for Ebbesen. He suggests that Acker’s purpose with her 
historical inclusions is to “ethically driven: she desires to overturn 
patriarchy and capitalism as they have been historically inherited”, yet at 
the same time “she seems to hold a vision of history as itself made 
historical by the narratives in which it is recounted”.553 Similarly, 
Pitchford comments on the function of the rewriting of history in 
postmodern writings, suggesting that in Acker, and in postmodernism 
more generally, the subject can “only ever repeat the language and the 
stories that have served to perpetuate oppression”.554 Texts have different 
readings in different contexts, however, and in exposing this both Acker 
and her characters “exploit this potential for contradiction among the 
utterances of authority”.555 Such a reading might offer a timely reminder 
about who owns a person’s history, and how far clinicians should and 
should not enact a rewriting of that history, given the medical authority 
given to clinical staff to resituate people as and into diagnoses and 
formulations. 
Acker’s “irrational pastiche” acts, for Pitchford, “primarily to 
challenge rationalism”.556 This textual strategy is a potentially 
revolutionary one: 
Recognizing, on the one hand, that history is composed only 
of texts and, on the other, that texts are always mired in 
history (and thus, material in their impact) produces a 
practice of reading that moves beyond either mere relativism 
or binary opposition to create an identity patched together 
from local, tactical acts of reuse.557 
 
                                                
553 Ebbesen, p. 112.  
554 Pitchford, p. 17.  
555 ibid. p. 17.  
556 ibid. p. 17.  
557 ibid. p. 60.  
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I commented upon Acker’s use of ‘tactics’ in Chapter 2 with reference to 
Pitchford’s analysis and I reiterate here, in some senses concurring with 
Pitchford, that Acker’s disjunctive use of historical fragments serves two 
functions, both of which rely on tension for their effect. Firstly, by 
rewriting history, Acker exposes the constructed nature of historical 
narrative – a person’s version of their history may materially differ from 
an external observer’s viewpoint, but their version is no more or less 
valid. Secondly, Acker identifies and exploits the constructed nature of 
History as evidence for the false and arbitrary nature of what, instead of 
historical fact, might just as equally be referred to as the myths and 
legends that have contributed to the contemporary situation, for example, 
regarding the position of women as embodying madness. 
Acknowledgment of these two points emphasises the need to 
consider how a person experienced their past, how it intrudes into their 
present, how they see their present experiences as relating to their past 
history and, vitally, how they envision their future. Temporality is a vital 
element in working narratively with people experiencing disruptions to 
their sense of selfhood in the both present and the past, whether this be in 
working through trauma that might be intruding into the present or 
considering how past experiences of treatment for ‘psychosis’ affect their 
beliefs about their potential (or desire) to feel differently in the future. 
This is particularly evident in the ways people might have experienced 
psychiatric treatment as coercive, controlling or otherwise as dismissive 
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or insensitive to their sense of self and their experiences as genuine, not 
only indicative of pathology.558 
 
Paranoia and Lobotomy  
Experiences of controlling agencies or figures (often an eponymous 
‘they’) and a resultant paranoia, both generalised and specific to the 
threat of ‘lobotomy’, are commonly depicted experiences in Acker’s 
work. As Hume notes, the “central core found in all Acker’s personae is 
threatened […] and the emblematic experience of that threat is 
lobotomy”.559 My aim in this section is not to directly offer a clinically 
informed reading, but to note how subjective experience is richly 
depicted in Acker’s work, compared to how it might be reductively 
formulated in psychiatric assessment as merely ‘paranoia’ or ‘delusions 
of passivity’. In this way, rather than ‘symptom spotting’, I aim to 
consider the content and experience of psychological phenomena in 
Acker’s work in terms of the relevance and importance character’s place 
on their experiences. Paranoia has been theorised as endemic in 
postmodern fiction.560 Patrick O’Donnell suggests that: 
Paranoia as manifested in contemporary narrative can be 
further considered as the multifarious contradiction of a 
postmodern condition in which the libidinal investment in 
mutability, in being utterly other, contests with an equally 
intense investment in the commodification of discrete 
identities: this contradiction pertains both to the formation of 
individual subjects and to the national and political bodies 
into which they are interpellated as collective subjects.561 
 
                                                
558 See Duxbury for discussion of one of the worst coercive aspects of psychiatric 
practice, physical restraint.  
559 Hume, p. 500.  
560 See O’Donnell; see also Melley.  
561 O’Donnell, p. 14.  
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The result of the tension between individual identity and the pressures of 
a collective consciousness is that paranoia is no longer “the classic, 
universalized symptoms of an individual pathological condition” but 
instead “can be seen as symptomatic of a collective identity”.562 In this 
section, I consider how Acker presents the effect of controlling agencies 
on the construction of selfhood, feelings of ‘paranoia’ and the related fear 
of lobotomy, in both Empire of the Senseless and, more briefly, The 
Childlike Life of the Black Tarantula by the Black Tarantula. These two 
texts demonstrate in an emblematic way the worst potential of controlling 
agencies, as both a radically individual and more universal experience. 
In Empire of the Senseless, Abhor has to constantly question 
both her sense of who she is and how her experiences might be real or 
unreal. The loose thread of the novel is Abhor and Thivai’s search for a 
live-saving drug made by Dr Schreber. In the dystopian world that the 
narrative is set in, this journey is perilous. This key passage by Abhor, on 
difficulty of finding any stable and knowable ‘I’ and thus identity, 
summarises the identity fragmentation that she suffers as an individual:  
I was not possible. I, in fact, was more than diseased. [….] 
When all that’s known is sick, the unknown has to look 
better. I, whoever I was, had no choice but to go along with 
Schreber. I, whoever I was, was going to be a construct. (ES, 
p. 33) 
 
In this landscape, not only is Abhor’s identity constructed rather than 
self-definable, but also there is no escape, no sense of reliable exterior 
real: 
There was no such thing as rescue. There could have been no 
reality. I had only myself to save myself. I couldn’t save 
myself. My wings were more torn than dishrags, they were 
sick, and the tongue was so torn it couldn’t speak. I could 
                                                
562 O’Donnell, Latent Destinies, p. 14.  
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neither fly nor cry. Nor could I stay alive […] Inside my 
mind I scream aloud: inside my mind, the world, I scream 
aloud. (ES, p. 13-14) 
 
Only by turning towards her interior can Abhor have a voice, as Ward 
notes: “The overwhelming physical and emotional control which Abhor’s 
father exerts over her creates a situation in which she cannot change the 
conditions of her existence, leaving her to instead turn inward and assert 
control over her desires”.563 Later in the novel, when Abhor clings to the 
broken, tortured body of her raping father who, like Janey in Blood and 
Guts in High School, she loves sexually as a lover, she states: “I was 
crying. In the nightmare of my mind, I desperately clung to that body as 
if it was alive. Like a shipwrecked sailor, I desperately clung to life.” 
(ES, p. 86). In response to this trauma, Abhor describes reality as 
“something else”, as “enough to make you crazy” (ES, p. 86). 
Confronted with further trauma, Abhor’s ‘real’ is enough to drive her 
towards psychosis. The existent external real is controlling, violent, 
decaying in Empire of the Senseless, and Thivai also experiences 
disruptions to his sense of who is through the existence of controlling 
external agencies. Only when Thivai has experienced isolation and acute 
panic (in which only “an act of will kept the fiction of ‘me’ going”) and 
mistreatment from the CIA, can he see the superficiality (and fiction) of 
the social real (ES, p. 147). Again, Acker here displaces stable identity, 
replacing with fictional, constructed ‘me’, only sustainable by an act of 
will and threatened by absence of any sense of interconnection with 
others. Acker’s message here might be that a stable, self-defined and 
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authentic sense of self, and the desired happiness and freedom concurrent 
with the discovery of this true self, is not possible in society that controls. 
The theme of control is taken to a very literal extreme in Empire 
of the Senseless. Post-war Paris, taken over by Algerians, forms the scene 
of the CIA’s Operation Midnight Climax, whereby the testing of “mind 
chemicals or drugs” are conducted through the programme designed “to 
find safe ways to cause total human amnesia” (ES, p. 142-143). The core 
agency of control in Empire of the Senseless is the CIA, related to 
experiments in the 1960s with LSD. The tone hear appears paranoid, but 
the paranoia (given the historical context of the events depicted) is 
reasonable rather than pathological:  
By this time, since the CIA had tested chemicals on 
themselves to such an extent that they were now either 
lobotomy cases or insane, they needed new experimentees. 
Since the experimentees could know that they were such – 
victims – they had to be part of socially despised closed 
groups: prisoners, homosexuals, etc. The CIA needed socially 
despised closed groups. (ES, p. 143) 
 
Set against the reasonable fear of lobotomy (with lobotomy both actual 
and symbolic of other forms of mind-control) is an overarching sense 
that the general public is somehow sleepwalking towards increasing 
sense of control:  
There were now those humans who had things and those 
humans who didn’t. Those who didn’t have things knew 
nothing of education, lived in the streets, concrete lumps of 
the lumpenproletariat, and ate shit for food. They were just 
too low to be drug test-worthy. Lobotomies can’s be given 
lobotomies. (ES, p. 143-144)  
 
Those who comply, who remain silent, who do not question or rebel, are 
not under threat because they lack any vision of the controlling nature of 
historical and contemporary existence. Acker noted that the CIA in this 
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novel, despite depicting now-accepted ‘real’ events, was symbolic of the 
fact that “you can’t isolate yourself from the world”:  
That’s what I mean by the CIA being symbolic. It could have 
been anybody […] you can’t get to a place, to a society, that 
isn’t constructed according to the phallus. You’re stuck with 
a lot of loneliness, so how do you deal with that isolation and 
loneliness? The third part concerns that issue. Also I’m 
looking for a myth. I’m looking for it where no one else is 
looking.564 
 
In this way, Acker’s portrayal of acute anxiety, isolation, fear and 
perpetual threat demonstrates both the notion of paranoia as a reasonable 
and endemic experience, as O’Donnell suggests, and that it is inevitable 
in the contemporary patriarchal constructed and controlling social realm. 
Lobotomy forms a significatory chain throughout Acker’s work. 
Thivai watches as the CIA lobotomise a young man drugged on “super 
acid” and develops sudden insight into the nature of control: “That 
lobotomy was both a lobotomy and a sign: my pleasure (my imagination, 
dreaming, desiring) was being cut off from actual life” in a society which 
(literally) exerts forms of mind control (ES, p. 146). The “Sultan of 
Reality” is no longer the individual mind, capable of imagination and 
desire, in the existent senseless empire, but is the person “who gives the 
orders” (ES, p. 145); including the lobotomising, scalpel-wielding doctor. 
The novel in some ways then functions as a call to arms: “The people 
whom the CIA force to live in prison are evil because they’re insane. 
They live in dreams. Let our madness turn from insanity into anger” (ES, 
p. 169) is Acker’s rousing message.  
The theme of escapism is apparent in Empire of the Senseless 
through two areas: sailing and sexual desire (which is linked to drug-
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taking, both enacting a de-selfing). The escapist potential of sailing is 
noted in the Sinbad the Sailor section, and there are several references to 
piracy and sailing as ways to obtain a true or unconstrained desiring 
identity. The quest, though, to escape as a sailor is blighted by 
nightmarish hallucinatory experiences. Commenting on the hypocrisy of 
the religion, for example, Acker includes a scene in which a “serpent” 
(representing a priest) rapes a pregnant woman after sliding from under 
the confessional door in a church – amid piles of “shit” he, “writhing 
around in her intestines”, “injected his venom” into the foetus (ES, p. 
161). The scene is disturbing, offering a vision of both trauma and fear 
that mirror some of the distressing elements of psychosis.  
Set against such nightmarish elements is the desired sensation of 
orgasm, as I explored in both Chapters 2 and 3, which is linked to the 
unselfing sensation of taking drugs in Empire of the Senseless. Thivai 
states, “I existed when I shot up. The sperm or me was evanescent, 
floating. Sparks of stars exploded in the black sky” (ES, p. 141). The 
metaphoric ecstasy here forms a doubling of the notion of “shot up”, 
which is a euphemism for injecting drugs as well as orgasm. Thivai 
states, “I would, and I would have, run away, but there’s no place to 
which to run, so the only safety is psychosis and drugs” (ES, p. 27) – 
both psychosis and drugs represent escape from the ‘real’ experience of 
paranoia, fear and control. 
A similar balancing of paranoia and fear of lobotomy versus the 
pleasure of sexual desire occurs in The Childlike Life of the Black 
Tarantula by the Black Tarantula, where drugs and the experience of 
desire are equally addictive: “I find my being dependant on love [...] 
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Drugged, I can completely control myself […] The drug aids my 
passivity and thus my strength. Living has become pure pleasure. I can 
hardly tell the difference between my coming and not coming” (CLBT, 
p. 59). Balanced against this pleasure-existence is the fear of being 
lobotomised by the social real and those who control it: “I think I would 
rather die than submit become a robot let them lobotomise me” (CLBT, 
p. 61). In one of the diary-like sections, where Acker’s authorial voice 
emerges, lobotomy and the idea of being “robotized” by controlling 
powers who define ‘correct’ behaviour is again highlighted: “I’m sick of 
this society. ‘Earn a living’ as if I’m not yet living; lobotomized and 
robotized from birth, they tell me I can’t do anything I want to do in the 
subtlest and sneakiest ways possible” (CLBT, p. 58). Lobotomy, the 
literal killing of the individualised self by those with medical power, is 
one metaphoric way in which Acker demonstrates how female desire is 
controlled, and how mind control is experienced in the way people are 
constrained and dictated to.  
Ultimately, the descent into insanity – even if descent is 
conducted in defiance to lobotomising reality or is enacted because of all 
consuming paranoia – is nihilistic and will prove unsuccessful in Acker’s 
eyes. Paris becomes, for Thivai, not the city of carnal pleasure he initially 
inhabited but “a city completely empty” (ES, p. 146) in which “I was 
lost. My total being could have been a total scream” (ES, p. 147). Within 
this apocalypse, the only voice capable is a scream (which both Thivai 
and Abhor perform). Abhor speaks brutally but honestly about her desire 
to escape: “I want to be mad, not senseless, but angry beyond memories 
and reason. I want to be mad” (ES, p. 51). The literal end point of such 
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an experience, though, might be one that involves not the fulfilment of 
desire or the coherence of stable subjectivity, but the literal killing of the 
self through suicide. Suicide is one of the strongest fears of clinical staff 
in psychiatry; suicide is often alluded to in Acker’s work. Both a 
personal sense of helplessness and hopelessness are strongly correlated 
with suicide and suicidality.565 The ultimate end point for Acker’s 
characters amidst their fragmenting subjectivity, their inability to cohere 
a stable sense of past, present and future, their experiences of fear and 
control, is to express thoughts of suicide. This representation might offer 
insights into ways in which suicidality is experienced.  
Thivai notes that he is “physically and mentally damaged 
because my only desire is to suicide”, yes his damage is directly related 
to both desire and paranoia, as his “current fuck” is “always telling me 
that I ought to kill myself but, more significantly, that everyone wants to 
kill me” (ES, p. 27). The desire here might, then, be related to 
helplessness associated with paranoia and a sense of passivity – a way of 
regaining an element of control against the amorphous threat of murder. 
In comparison, and more richly, Abhor expresses:  
There are different forms of suicide […] It seemed to me that 
any form of human suicide was neither a necessary nor an 
unnecessary act, but an act of unbearable anger, an act of 
murder in which the murderer self-destroys his desires to 
destroy the whole world. (ES, p. 72).  
 
Here suicide is portrayed as an act of anger, a way of turning destructive 
desires inward. Yet Abhor afterwards notes that suicide might offer the 
only available choice over individual destiny, and given the notions of 
control and fear inherent in Empire of the Senseless, this later elaborate 
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245 
 
theorisation offers a vision of suicide as escape. Two strategies are 
available in “the face of suicide, in the face of those living corpses who 
are trying to drag us into their own suicides, in the faces of those old 
men”:  
One is a pure act of will. To bang one’s head against a wall, 
preferably a red brick wall, until either the red brick wall or 
the world, which seems unbearable and inescapable, breaks 
open. […] 
The second strategy wasn’t exactly one of will. The heads, 
being broken, gave up. Gave up in the face of the 
unopposable suicide of the owning class [...] Because in 
almost every nation political torture was a common practice 
so there was nowhere to which to run. (ES, p. 73)  
 
Suicide might, for many people, represent a reasonable response to 
unbearable psychological, physical and emotional pain, particularly when 
confronted with a seemingly inescapable or oppressive scenario. Acker’s 
emphasis here serves, perhaps more than at any other point, to remind 
readers to the need to explore personal meaning and rationale for suicidal 
emotions, the content of intention and personal history to reach that 
point. There is no universal motive for suicide; each person’s story is 
unique, and reducing such a complex set of experiences into either a 
symptom (‘suicidality’) or a result of ‘symptoms’ (‘considering suicide 
in response to X’) without detailed narratively informed investigation is 
unhelpful.566 
 
Narrative Identity: The Importance of Content  
Through this chapter, I have argued that Acker deconstructs pathological 
interpretations of experiences potentially aligned with ‘psychosis’ (such 
                                                
566 See Grant, Haire, Biley and Stone for details of the interpersonal experience of 
suicide, from those who have experienced the desire to die and from those who have 
lost people to suicide.  
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as struggles in the coherent sense of ‘I am’, ‘I think’ or ‘I believe’, and 
experiences of fear, control and paranoia), while troubling the 
relationship between narrative and author as distinct from one another. 
She also offers a view on the importance of temporality and history in 
constructing secure self-stories. Identity, experience and notions of what 
is or is not ‘reasonable’ or ‘understandable’ are fluid and malleable 
concepts in Acker’s work, set against notions of a definitive predication 
of who is or is not ‘pathological’ or ‘healthy’. Acker’s focus on the 
content of experience, rather than on symptomatological form and 
depiction, offers a reconsideration of how content is subordinate to form 
in psychiatric practice. 
For Ebbesen, Acker’s work “parodies genres in order to unmask 
– at the levels of form and content – what she feels these constructions 
attempt to conceal or repress, namely, destructive social relations under 
patriarchy and capitalism”.567 He continues by suggesting that, for Acker, 
“this state of affairs has much to do with reason, notions of static and 
autonomous subjectivity, as well as reified social relations”.568 Within 
the ever-shifting levels of narration in Acker, it is rare to find an 
identifiable symptom which matches the symptomatological form 
described in diagnostic textbooks. Ebbesen suggests that Acker may hold 
“form partially accountable for gender oppression and oppression of the 
poor”, as in form “she sees a fundamental thought process which 
structures all of life”.569 The content rather than the form – in terms of 
textual framing and the content of that text – offers a more insightful and 
                                                
567 Ebbesen, p. 67.  
568 ibid. p. 67.  
569 ibid. p. 7.  
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useful depiction in Acker’s writing than a linearly constructed formal 
‘story’. Similarly, Wollen notes:  
The fantastic elements of [Acker’s] writing are generated 
textually, rather than by acts of creation – the author is 
divested of her authority, mediumistic in her relationship of a 
text generated through interpersonal methodologies. The 
narrator, the “I”, her/himself, becomes a construct of that 
text, rather than the other way round.570 
 
A parallel can be drawn between Wollen’s assertions on Acker’s writing 
practice and construction of narrative identity in clinical practice. In 
psychiatry, the people who are cared for by clinical staff risk becoming 
constructs of psychiatry rather than autonomous subjects who can opt to 
take different elements from the multitude of available theories that best 
suit their beliefs, experiences and sense of personal history, present and 
future. The dominance of pathology and biomedical technocracy 
currently risks creating the person, the ‘I’ her or himself, into a construct 
of psychiatry: as a patient at best, or reduced to a label at worst, rather 
than as a person seeking or in need of care and support to reconstruct 
their experiences in a way they find both meaningful and acceptable.  
One issue that maintains the reductive practice of people 
becoming seen through only their illness or label concerns the way that 
form and content are considered in psychiatry. Contemporary psychiatric 
practice starts from the point of symptom, not experience. As Sims states, 
it is “important to try and reach the patient’s subjective meaning and not 
just be satisfied that the response is abnormal”, yet at the same time, 
citing Jasper’s distinction between that which is understandable and that 
which is un-understandable, he suggests that ununderstandability is “the 
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essence of the psychotic experience”.571 A challenge can be noted in how 
clinicians might reach a shared understanding of a subjective experience 
that is essentially ununderstandable to their experience. One of the 
potentially alienating elements in this challenge is that the form of 
symptoms is more important to the psychiatrist’s assessment whereas the 
content is the crucial element to the patient, as Sims notes: 
The form of a psychic experience is the description of its 
structure in phenomenological terms, for example a delusion. 
Viewed in this way, content is the colouring of the 
experience […] The patient is only concerned with the 
content […] The Doctor is concerned with both the form and 
content, but as a phenomenologist only with form.572 
 
Sims gives two further examples of the form/content dilemma, following 
with a crucial statement: “the nature of the content of these two examples 
is irrelevant in coming to a diagnosis”.573 Essentially, in descriptive 
psychopathology – the discourse commonly used by psychiatrists during 
assessment – the experience (content) is irrelevant when compared to the 
symptom (form) in making a diagnosis. 
I am not alone in identifying issues with the form/content divide 
in psychiatry, and it is oft highlighted as a concern in texts that take a 
critical look at psychiatric practice. Some critical views suggest that form 
and content need to be viewed as equally important, as Parker and 
colleagues note: “One cannot privilege content alone since it is always 
mediated in some form and it is not simply reification which is the 
problem”.574 Bracken and Thomas, however, offer a more critical 
perspective, noting how the form/content divide first came to be through 
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Jasper’s essential distinction.575 After noting the way in which 
psychopathology, if it is ever to be considered a ‘scientific’ discipline, 
necessarily reduces experience to form as “without this we are ‘limited’ 
to a level of interpretation that is based only on personally narrative and 
locally defined meanings”, Bracken and Thomas point out: 
[…] the experiences bought to psychiatry are rarely, if ever, 
singular isolated events. They are most often varied and 
muddled. Forcefully present at one moment, less intense at a 
later time, and absent altogether in a different social setting. 
They emerge from within the tapestry that is the person’s 
life.576  
 
Bracken and Thomas note, like Parker and colleagues, that the clinician 
might well be interested in the content in terms of building a therapeutic 
relationship, but that in terms of assessment, diagnosis and treatment, 
phenomenological form is prioritised. In contrast, a postpsychiatric 
perspective considers “context” and “hermeneutic exploration” firstly 
and secondly, with diagnosis (if warranted at all) developing through a 
dialogic process of shared exploration, which values both medical and 
personal knowledge and beliefs.577  
In Acker, a sense of stable self and certainty of internal and 
external real, is challenging – her character’s quests for a secure self 
(particularly in more coherent and developed characters such as Abhor in 
Empire of the Senseless) often involves the concomitant acceptance of 
the uncertainty of reality and their desire for a certainty. This acceptance, 
for Acker, defines the “history of the century” which “can be seen as 
defined by the struggle between a model of or desire for an absolute 
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reality and a model or recognition of reality as indeterminate”.578 Leader, 
reflecting on notions of paranoia, suggests: 
The frozen condensation of meaning found in paranoia is 
very different from the polysemy of, the wealth of meaning, 
found in schizophrenias […] the person is left at the mercy of 
too many meanings: this can at times result in literary and 
poetic dexterity, but often the person feels overwhelmed and 
invaded by meaning.579  
 
Acker’s work demonstrates the overwhelming sense of a polysemy of 
personal meaning possible for cohering self stories, not as indicative 
necessarily of pathology but as the more common experience of what she 
described as “the struggle between a model of or desire for an absolute 
reality and a model or recognition of reality as indeterminate”.580 This 
experience does not result in any sense of narrative or poetic dexterity; it 
is the challenge of coherent self-awareness and self-expression which 
enables no clear reading of the ways in which her characters experience 
‘psychosis’. Focus on the form only dismisses the polysemy of meaning, 
plurality of experience and the radical individualism that characterises 
much of Acker’s work. It is these factors that offer clinical insights into 
the experience of fragmentation of self, disruptions in temporality and 
experiences of fear or anxiety that might be experienced by people in 
clinical settings. In this chapter, I have argued that in Acker, it is not the 
form of a symptom but the content of experience that is crucial to 
understanding the individual subjective experience of psychosis. Whilst 
diagnostic criteria and categorisation can function as a denial of 
individual experience, reducing the complexities of mental life to a series 
of tick boxes, Acker presents the cognitive and emotional content of 
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experience against a background of destructive and destructing society. A 
diagnostic reading of the texts of Acker continues to work within a 
flawed discourse that, in the contemporary age, has begun to be 
deconstructed. In the concluding chapter, I turn to the clinical utility of 
Acker’s work. 
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Chapter 5: New Perspectives  
But reality is something else. Reality is enough to make you 
crazy.581  
 
In the preceding chapters, I have explored notions of gender, sex, 
sexuality and trauma in Acker’s visionary texts, aiming to demonstrate 
how women’s madness in her work is reasonable rather than 
unreasonable. I have explored the ‘tactics’ (in Pitchford’s terms) that 
may be found in Acker’s work for identification and deconstruction of 
these issues both within and beyond a simple feminist framework. I have 
examined how Acker’s texts may be seen as analogous in themselves to 
the formal expression of psychosis, offering an introduction and 
development new ways of reading, listening to and interpreting 
psychosis. By exploring, in Chapter 4, how Acker’s work details content 
and subjective experience, I have offered one interpretation (and there 
are multiple interpretations of Acker’s work – each is tentative and 
tenuous) around the way she offers a pluralised vision of elements of 
experience that might otherwise be more reductively formulated as 
‘psychosis’. This radically individualised creative portrayal is not 
available through the homogenising diagnostic frameworks that dominate 
areas of contemporary psychiatric practice. I hope that, through a close 
reading which appreciates the symbiosis of mental state and textual 
construct in Acker’s work, my reading might offer insights into how 
clinical staff might: reflect on novel interpretative skills that can be 
gleaned from reading practices; reflect on paying attention to the 
fragment and to personal interpretation and meaning of experiences; 
reflect on the importance of acknowledging the external context of 
                                                
581 Acker, Empire of the Senseless, p. 86.  
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madness (in particular, issues of power and gender). In this way, Acker 
offers a version of elements of psychosis in the contemporary age that are 
understandable. In this summary chapter I want to explore how my 
analysis of Acker’s literary extreme of psychosis, as an example of a 
specific reading practice, might have implications in encountering the 
‘real life’ experience of psychosis in clinical practice. Firstly, I offer 
some final considerations of the implications of my reading of Acker’s 
version of psychosis; secondly, I consider the clinical implications of 
using literature and narrative-based working in healthcare education and 
practice; finally I consider some of the clinical innovations that are 
aligned with my reading of Acker in order to demonstrate ways in which 
changes in how we view and respond to people experiencing ‘psychosis’ 
is changing.  
I stated in Chapter 1 that I am not suggesting that Acker’s work 
mirrors a clinically diagnosable psychosis – this does not, however, mean 
that readings of her work do not provide a potentially valuable 
contribution to understanding psychosis differently, in a manner that has 
parallels with the work of both the medical and health humanities and the 
discourse of postpsychiatry. While Acker does not depict ‘psychosis’ in a 
traditional manner, as may be seen in novels which explore more 
clinically recognisable psychosis such as Janet Frame’s Faces in the 
Water or Doris Lessing’s Briefing for a Descent into Hell, her work does 
offer insights into what psychosis might feel like, where it may emerge 
from, how it might be heard, and how we may then respond to it.582 In 
terms of pedagogical benefits to reading Acker, her work illustrates 
                                                
582 Doris Lessing, Briefing for a Descent into Hell (London: Flamingo, 1971).  
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‘psychosis’ at the levels of context, form, and content, providing a 
diverse range of opportunities for learning. In the simplest terms, my 
analysis offers three insights. Acker’s focus on gender provides a 
depiction of the way women’s experiences of gender expectation and 
oppression, the complexities of romantic relationships and the 
experiences of sex, desire and sexual trauma are related to the reasonable 
development of psychosis. Above all else, this chapter serves to 
demonstrate how we risk unreasonably pathologising women’s 
experiences, and the importance of belief and supportive responses to 
trauma, resisting the pathologisation of reactions that might serve 
survival functions (such as self harm). This chapter may further offer a 
reminder of the need to be mindful of power differentials in clinical 
relationships – as staff / patient, but also as male / female. In Chapter 3, I 
argued that Acker’s literary analogues of psychosis offer the reader with 
two options: dismissing the text as incoherent, ununderstandable and 
irreadable, or constructing meaning and coherence from incoherence. Her 
narrative fragments then offer an invitation to a clinical reader to 
consider how they form a montage from people’s stories: how they chose 
what to hear, how to formulate this, which framework to apply. They 
might offer an analogous example of what it might feel like to experience 
incoherence or confusion, chaos or destruction, fear, anxiety or alienation 
from the external real. They further may prompt the development of 
novel literary interpretative skills that can be useful in communicative 
and formulatory ways. In Chapter 4, I argued that Acker’s version of 
subjectivity and psychosis offers a vision of the pluralistic nature of 
identity, of the challenges of coherently narrating self and experiences in 
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psychosis, which may then offer a consideration of the importance of 
content over form, of experience over diagnosis. The aim of this final 
chapter is to demonstrate how the crystallising of these three elements in 
the broadest ways might inform critically minded, narratively oriented 
psychiatric practice.  
In Acker, there are few fixed referential points whereby we can 
singularly assert (as much as we ever can, or should) that a particular 
character is ‘mad’ or ‘sane’. What is emphasised instead is the content of 
the strange, unusual, unsettling, ‘sublime’ (in Woods’ terms) experience, 
rather than the colder formal clinical definition or categorisation.583 In 
this respect I argue that Acker subverts the dominant discourse on 
psychosis and provides a novel literary voice in a language that is 
challenging to cohere and understand, as ‘psychosis’ might be 
linguistically challenging to hear. It could be, then, that through reading 
Acker, our foundational assumptions about madness are challenged. 
Acker’s work appears at first glance to potentially mirror or demonstrate 
Jasper’s ununderstandability criterion of psychosis; resultantly, it impels 
the reader to use their cognitive, emotional and sense-making skills to 
read her work differently to be able comprehend her work.  
Acker does not necessarily make ‘psychosis’ in its entirety 
‘understandable’ – and in some ways this would be antithetical to my 
(and many others) assertion that ‘psychosis’ is not one single ‘thing’. 
What she does instead is to highlight the acute individuality of 
experience and expression – a uniqueness that defies biomedical 
psychiatry’s attempts to reduce individual experience to a series of tick 
                                                
583 See Woods, The Sublime Object of Psychiatry, for a discussion of the nature of the 
sublime nature of ‘schizophrenia’ in postmodern critical and cultural theory.  
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boxes and categories. She also highlights the external factors – the search 
for stable identity and the gendered factors in this and experiences of 
oppression and control – that both affect individual madness and 
contribute to the societal construction of madness. Finally, she 
demonstrates the complexity of how we construct ourselves, our 
experiences, our beliefs and our emotions through language – language 
which is far from benign or that offers uniformity of meaning and 
interpretation, language that enchains rather than empowers. Readings of 
Acker’s work therefore offer the possibility of finding coherence in 
incoherence, method and resistance in madness, calm in chaos. It is 
Acker’s complexification of, and partial resistance towards, the 
‘un/understandability’ binary that can teach us much about the challenges 
of hearing, interpreting and responding to psychosis. 
Acker’s subversion in some ways enacts violence against 
contemporary codifications of madness and sanity. In her reading of 
violences enacted by women in contemporary literature, media and 
culture, Hendin suggests:  
Communicative violence that reveals destructive egotism can 
be seen as a process of narration that operates according to a 
subjective logic of seizure, appropriation, complication, and 
the portrayal of one or more alternative truths with social as 
well as personal meaning.584  
 
Acker’s violence – the destruction of text, but also the violence 
experienced by and from her characters (to and from self and others) – 
seizes the depiction and formulation of madness from the hands of 
corporate and patriarchal systems, placing it into a more complex 
interpretation involving gender politics, comprehension of context and 
                                                
584 Hendin, p. 36.  
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self-actualisation of experience as both valid and meaningful, rather than 
potential self-oppression through compliance with a framework of 
meaninglessness or ‘ununderstandability’.  
Here, in one sense at least, her portrayal of ‘psychosis’ has a 
successful strategic aim, in my view, one that aligns with Hornstein’s 
clinical-literary aim in Agnes Jacket. Hornstein says: “What if the mad 
are trying to tell us something? What if their ‘ravings’ contain important 
information? Just because they’re difficult to decipher doesn’t mean we 
shouldn’t try to make them out”.585 The contentions in Acker’s work are 
multiple and multifaceted, with no simple reading or application. It may 
be that upending ‘madness’ from its very foundation, from the ‘healthy’ 
or ‘sick’ binary, is required for a distinctly applied reading of Acker’s 
oeuvre. 
It has been suggested, as explored in Chapter 1, that the 
enduring need for a ‘clear’ demarcation between mental illness and 
‘sanity’ is necessary to continue the profit-making aims of 
pharmaceutical companies and greed of those associated with promoting 
the need for medicating responses to experiences that may be very 
reasonable and very understandable.586 A less malignant view notes that 
an inherited Kraeplinian history predicates current formulation. As 
Bentall suggests, “where scientific materialism prevails, the need to 
distinguish between what is ‘real’ and what is ‘imaginary’ seems self-
evident, whereas, in less materialistic cultures, this distinction is less 
                                                
585 Hornstein, p xiii.  
586 This is something that James Davies in particular notes in some depth, in terms of 
the relationships between pharmaceutical industries and those charged with the (ever 
increasing) DSM creation.  
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important”.587 The echoes of postmodern cultural theory here are evident 
in terms of what ‘reality’ may be and how a more pluralistic vision of 
‘realities’ might emerge.  
Likewise, Darian Leader aims to suggest a way forwards that is 
relevant here. He is critical of the “segregative” nature of contemporary 
psychiatry, where a person is seen to have a ‘healthy’ and an ‘unhealthy’ 
element to their being and, where the task of psychiatry and psychology 
is then to “allow the healthy part to triumph”.588 He writes:  
In this segregative vision of the psyche, patients become 
faulty pieces of equipment that must be restored to their 
original functionality through external intervention, rather 
than through their own internal resources. Psychotic 
phenomena must be removed as far as possible, and the 
patient led back to a shared reality, which in practice means 
that of the therapist.589 
 
Leader’s emphasis throughout his tome is to highlight the existence of 
‘everyday’ madness which coexists quietly alongside the mundane and 
everyday – it is only when a trigger of some kind is introduced that the 
more florid and difficult to manage crisis can occur. Hence, in terms of 
how we may view madness as existing on a continuum of mental 
experience and emotion, Leader notes that there is the potential for many 
people to exist in varying states of unreality at varying times, rather than 
any certain division between ‘mad’ and ‘not mad’.590 He suggests that 
after we have reflected on and learnt from the quieter instances of 
‘paranoia’ and ‘delusion’ that people experience, an “investment in 
dialogue and a curiosity about the logic of that person’s world can open 
                                                
587 Bentall, Madness Explained, p. 356.  
588 Leader, p. 327.  
589 ibid. p. 327-328.  
590 The idea of a continuum model of mental health and illness is one that Bentall also 
promotes extensively, and persuasively too – see especially Madness Explained, though 
it is a common theme in much of his work.  
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up new therapeutic directions and offer the possibility of change”.591 In 
this way it is useful to subvert how ‘expertise’ is perceived, instead 
recognising individuals as having the expertise in their own experiences. 
This change in viewpoint can afford the potential for growth and hope in 
people who may otherwise feel (or be) consigned to a lifelong and 
deteriorating course of illness, as Kraepelin predicted some 130 years 
ago. The role of professionals here would be to support rather than to 
treat – a distinction I will return to shortly.  
Caution may be required in simply deconstructing the 
dichotomy of ‘mad v sane’ however. As Pitchford suggests, in Acker’s 
work, “merely reversing the rational / irrational binarism by rejecting 
language and logic leaves the marginalized no way to combat their 
position”.592 Pitchford refers to Acker’s works as “unreasonable”, 
arguing, “this word offers a third term, a way out of the binary opposition 
between the rational and the irrational”.593 While notions of 
‘unreasonableness’ can carry negative connotations difficulty, 
stubbornness and challenge, Pitchford argues that these same negative 
associations can be positively construed: “To be unreasonable frequently 
carries connotations of protest, of someone’s stubborn refusal to 
acknowledge the superiority of the logic of the person using the term”.594 
Thus, moving from ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ towards ‘reason’ and ‘unreason’, 
she suggests that the “unreasonable person’s position implies that 
rationality isn’t everything, that other desires or even needs must also be 
taken into account” while simultaneously differentiating between 
                                                
591 Leader, p. 330.  
592 Pitchford, p. 85.  
593 ibid. p. 103.  
594 ibid. p. 103-104.  
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unreasonable and irrational: “To be irrational […] is simply to be 
incomprehensible or hysterical, to remove oneself from contestation 
entirely”.595 Unreasonableness, in contrast, might offer tactical strategies 
of subversion and protest otherwise suppressed by inadvertently or 
deliberately re-inscribing a binary of rationality instead of ‘madness’. 
Pitchford further suggests that Acker’s work and fictions: 
[…] develop another strategy, an ‘unreasonable’ 
manipulation of textual scraps that takes the very words and 
images that have inscribed women as powerless and irrational 
beings and turns them to women’s advantage by tactically 
recombining them and pointing out their own 
contradictions”.596 
  
I would argue that it is not only women that this tactical subversion is 
available to, or effective for. For those marginalised groups – not least 
the male and female populations deemed ‘mad’ – resistance via the 
exposure of contradictions, falsehoods and myths, can be useful. Of 
course, as Pitchford suggests, this relies on the reader correctly 
interpreting such exposures – though the notion of ‘correct’ is a difficult 
one; I prefer ‘personally meaningful’ rather than ‘correct’.597 How, then, 
does this occur in texts are deemed irreadable, as Pitchford herself 
acknowledges?598 For Pitchford, “paying attention to how a text’s 
meaning is contingent on specific rhetorical contexts is the basis of 
political practice”.599 Thus, my readings of the rhetorical contexts and 
content of madness in Acker’s work may provide the basis of some forms 
of resistance to marginalisation that focuses less on the binary opposition 
and dualism between, for example, psychiatrist /patient or anti-psychiatry 
                                                
595 Pitchford, p. 104.  
596 ibid. p. 104.  
597 ibid. p. 104.  
598 ibid. p. 182.  
599 ibid. p. 183-4.  
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/ biomedical psychiatry, and more of a way forwards in the spaces 
between such contradictory positions. 
 
Health Humanities  
The health humanities offers one such liminal disciplinary space within 
which positive ways of working with people who experience challenging 
or difficult experiences can emerge without resorting to binary 
positioning. Health humanities is an emergent discipline, having been 
established in 2010.600 It represents expansion of the existent medical 
humanities discipline, which has produced significant developments in 
medicine, health and medical education, rather than an opposition; 
aiming towards inclusive clinical, research and community practices 
which broaden the scope and appeal of both health and humanities to a 
wide range of people experiencing illness and health, as well as to 
clinicians working with them. The health humanities represents the move 
towards an “inclusive and applied approach to humanities in healthcare” 
which engages with “scholars, practitioners, healthcare providers, 
patients and their carers to develop and promote the emerging discipline 
of health humanities and to harness the full measure of potential benefits 
of the arts and health humanities in the provision of healthcare”.601 The 
focus is thus on the human experience of health and health care, 
wellbeing and sickness, and how this may best be examined through the 
                                                
600 See Crawford and others, Health Humanities – see also Paul Crawford, Brian 
Brown, Victoria Tischler and Charley Baker. ‘Health Humanities: The future of 
Medical Humanities?’ Mental Health Review, 15. 3 (2010), 4-10. Further book length 
studies advancing the Medical Humanities have emerged recently – see particularly the 
comprehensive book by Victoria Bates, Alan Bleakley and Sam Goodman (eds.) 
Medicine, Health and The Arts: Approaches to Medical Humanities (Oxon: Routledge, 
2014).  
601 Crawford and others, ‘Health Humanities: The future of Medical Humanities?’, p. 8.  
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humanities; the application of creative approaches to health and 
wellbeing in healthcare which takes place outside of the medical 
encounter and theorisation; and how broadening clinical education of all 
those involved in health care provision to include the humanities may 
afford more human and humane insights into people themselves and their 
lives. 
I suggested in the Introduction to this thesis that my work is best 
situated within the health humanities, as well as intersecting with critical 
and postpsychiatric theory. Not all of the work that I have referred to and 
employed would consciously associate itself with a critical discourse on 
psychiatry, however the majority function to at least offer different ways 
of working, or to interrogate extant assumptions, practice and approaches 
to mental health. In much the same way, Acker’s work does not neatly fit 
into a particular genre category. Her works transgress boundaries of the 
fictional and the autobiographical; of imaginative textual construction 
and high philosophical reasoning; of feminist and critical-feminist 
approaches; even of what we deem to be ‘literary’ or ‘artistic’. She is 
positioned in a liminal space, between fixed referents, political alignment 
or belief systems. It is this space between that can interrogate and 
subvert, offer radically new visions of experience and emotion, and 
propose integrative ways of working with people that do not dismiss 
anyone’s expertise, instead recognising expertise as temporary, personal 
and open to challenge and new knowledge. Thus, a health humanities-
informed framework for approaching mental health via narratives can 
offer two core developments in practice and education where my 
readings of Acker may contribute: helping people to formulate and 
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narrate their own experiences in a language and way that makes sense to 
them, and innovation in health education and the continuing professional 
development of clinical and support staff. 
 
Working and Learning Narratively 
Narrative approaches to medical practice and therapeutic work are not a 
new phenomenon.602 Much work has been forthcoming in terms of how 
to promote a way of working with people that help them to develop and 
articulate their own stories of coherence and meaning from chaos, fear, 
often alienation and distress. The work of key theorists here such as Rita 
Charon, Arthur W. Frank, Arthur Kleinman, Anne Hunsaker Hawkins 
and (more recently) SuEllen Hamkins, Femi Oyebode and Liam Clarke 
have been influential in developing the clinical implications of this 
thesis.603 These theorists and clinicians focus in different ways on stories 
and narrative in medicine and health – either in exploring people’s 
narrative accounts of their own health and illness, or supporting medical 
students towards narrative approaches to care, or how readings of 
existing fictions (and autobiographies) may be of use in clinical 
theorisation, education and practice.  
                                                
602 See for example one of the first book-length studies in applied narrative medicine - 
Trisha Greenhalgh and Brian Hurwitz, eds., Narrative Based Medicine: Dialogue and 
Discourse in Clinical Practice (London: BMA Books, 1998). See also Rhiannon 
Crawford, Brian Brown and Paul Crawford, Storytelling in Therapy (Cheltenham: 
Nelson Thornes, 2004).  
603 In exploring people’s narrative accounts of their own health and illness as genres or 
bodies of work in their own rights, see Kleinman, Anne Hunsaker Hawkins, 
Reconstructing Illness: Studies in Pathography (Indiana: Perdue University Press 1993) 
and Frank. In supporting medics and medical students towards narrative approaches to 
care see Charon and also Hamkins. For readings of how existing fictions (and 
autobiographies) may be of use in clinical theorisation, education and practice see 
Oyebode, ed., and Clarke.  
See also Crawford and others, Health Humanities, Chapter 3 ‘Applied Literature’, 
where I provide more in depth visions of the core functions of narrative in health care in 
more general terms, rather than specific to Acker’s work.  
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Leader describes the subversion of the professional role from 
‘expert’ to ‘supporter of expert’ which is necessary in narrative 
approaches to mental health, though in relation to analysts rather than 
generic mental health workers (doctors, nurses, care workers, informal 
carers):  
The work of helping the psychotic subject create a history, 
through naming, dating, isolating and detailing […] is in 
some senses a secretarial duty […] A secretary, after all, 
doesn’t – or shouldn’t – intrude too much; they write things 
done; they check, confirm and ask for clarifications; they 
remind you of something when necessary, they help organise 
schedules and the difficult aspects of life; they are hopefully 
reliable; they tend to occupy the same stable space; they 
might, like the clinician, ask you to elaborate, to date, detail, 
name and isolate in order to take down their notes; they don’t 
try to impose a world view on you or tell you that you’re 
wrong; and sometimes they may do something unusual, like 
expressing an opinion forcefully. And, of course, being a 
secretary means not being a boss.604  
 
His principle is relevant for staff at all levels in mental health. One 
potential issue here lies in the people who approach psychiatry who may 
be unable at that point to formulate their own understandings of their 
experiences – people who may seek meaning and validation through the 
purported and heavily publicised solidness of a positivistic rather than 
pluralistic approach to their experiences. I argue, following Leader, that 
we need to be honest with people in admitting that we do not know what 
causes mental health challenges; that we do not know if medication will 
work (it may quieten the experience, but it may not, and can have 
extreme side effects); that we need to offer people a range of frameworks 
and support them to narrate their experiences within whichever 
epistemological and ontological understanding they choose. I firmly 
believe, further, that we need to support people to author their own 
                                                
604 Leader, p. 305.  
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stories of hope, strength and resilience, rather than pathology, sickness 
and failure.605 As Hamkins suggests: “Medicine, while sometimes 
helpful, is never the reason why someone is succeeding in pursuing their 
dreams. That success is due to the person’s intentions, values, talents, 
commitments, creativity, and tenacity – and our job as narrative 
psychiatrist is making sure that story of success is told”.606  
Core interpersonal and reactive conditions are necessary for 
ethically responsive and meaningful working with people towards 
narrating their experiences – as Bowman notes, “choosing how to write, 
to communicate and to read is integral to doing good medical ethics”.607 
These skills include, but are not limited to: believing people’s 
experiences of trauma and the way they feel this has contributed to (or 
not) their experiences in later life; promoting the fact that people are in a 
room communicating with another person as an opportunity for change; 
and privileging people’s formulation of the aetiology of their experience 
over that offered by tentative psychiatric formulations. As I noted in the 
beginning of this chapter, Acker’s narratives prompt, further: recognition 
of the importance of external context and of experiences of trauma and 
how these affect the present; consideration of how we might ‘read’ 
fragments of disordered expression to support a coherent self-story; 
which reading skills we might use for this as learned from our experience 
of reading texts like Acker’s (both in terms of the experience of reading 
and the interpretative skills needed to reconstruct the fragments). Acker’s 
works encourage us, primarily, to consider the individual, not the label. 
                                                
605 Hamkins, p. 50.  
606 ibid. p. 14.  
607 Deborah Bowman, ‘What is it to do good medical ethics? Minding the gap(s)’, 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 41 (2015), 60-63, (p. 61).  
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In much the same way as Acker’s work could be dismissed as 
fragmented, irreadable non-sense, so too do we risk dismissing people’s 
valid, real and meaningful experiences and perceptions as ‘only’ 
indicative of ‘psychosis’, rather that as part of an expression of the 
richness of subjectivity that the person has, has lost, and can be supported 
to regain.  
Any ethical and empowering approach to healthcare needs to 
place the person at the centre of their care and as the expert in their own 
needs, desires, fears and experiences. Healthcare encounters are 
inevitably bound by narrative in all but the most common or mundane 
illnesses. As Greenhalgh and Hurwitz write, “not only do we live by 
narrative, but, often with our doctors and nurses as witnesses, we fall ill, 
get better, get worse, stay the same and finally die by narrative too”.608 In 
psychiatry, in particular, the person’s own narrative should be at the core 
of the interaction. Thus, skills in narrative interpretation, close reading 
(or listening), learning to discover narrative threads through possible un-
linear narration, appreciating the importance of socio-political context 
(social determinants of health and illness), characters (family members / 
friends), time and place (personal history) and personal meaning are vital 
in informing contemporary healthcare.609  
The use of narrative in clinical education is fairly well 
established, primarily in medical education, although though many of the 
                                                
608 Trisha Greenhalgh and Brian Hurwitz, ‘Why study narrative?’ in Narrative Based 
Medicine: Dialogue and Discourse in Clinical Practice ed. by Trisha Greenhalgh and 
Brian Hurwitz, (London: BMA Books, 1998), pp. 3-16, (p. 5).  
609 See also Martyn Evans, ‘Roles for literature in medical education’, Advances in 
Psychiatric Treatment, 9 (2003), 380-386. 
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principles illuminated have inter-professional applicability.610 This 
innovation has not had a linear or easy pathway to implementation, and 
questions have been asked as to whether narrative and humanities 
approaches are truly “integrative” to curricula or merely “additive”.611 
Nonetheless, it has been suggested more recently that humanities-based 
elements to clinical education may offer a counter to what Tischler 
describes as an “erosion” in the initial “passion and enthusiasm” that 
medical students bring to their course throughout their 5 plus years of 
education.612 Nurse education has begun to receive critical attention in 
terms of what the Humanities can offer, from narrative-based elements in 
clinical pedagogy but also visual arts, music, film and so forth.613  
Arun Chopra notes that it is an individual’s decision as to 
whether the arts and humanities can offer anything meaningful and useful 
for their educational development, suggesting that the two pedagogical 
approaches best aligned with the use of literature in psychiatric education 
are experiential and constructivist. He notes that the “experiential” 
                                                
610 See for example Alan Beveridge, ‘Should psychiatrists read fiction?’, British Journal 
of Psychiatry, 182 (2003), 385-387; Evans; Greenhalgh and Hurwitz; Oyebode and 
Victoria Tischler, ed., Mental Health, Psychiatry and the Arts: A Teaching Handbook 
(Oxon: Radcliffe Publishing, 2010).  
611 See Beveridge, ‘Should psychiatrists read fiction?’ for a clear summary of the 
different concerns around the benefits and limitations of literature in medical education 
and practice; see also Alan Beveridge, ‘The benefits of reading literature’ in 
Mindreadings: Literature and Psychiatry ed by Femi Oyebode (London: RCPsych 
Publications, 2009), pp. 1-14, (p. 8-11).  
612 See Tischler, p. 1. This issue is one I have witnessed in nurse education and one 
which I try to counter through the use of music in sessions and reading suggestions 
based on enjoyment as well as education – see Paul Crawford and Charley Baker, 
‘Literature and Madness: A survey of fiction for students and professionals’, Journal of 
Medical Humanities, 30 (2009), 237-251 and Charley Baker, ‘Narrative in nurse 
education, practice and research’, Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 22. 
1 (2015), p. 1-2. See also Crawford and others, 2015, Chapter 3.  
613 See for example Clarke; Andrew McKie, and John P. Gass, ‘Understanding mental 
health through reading selected literature sources: an evaluation’, Nurse Education 
Today, 21 (2001), 201-208; Diann Slade, Iona Thomas-Connor, and Ting Man Tsao, 
‘When Nursing Meets English: Using a Pathography to Develop Nursing Student’s 
Culturally Competent Selves’, Nursing Education Perspectives, 29. 3 (2008), 151-155; 
Andrew McKie, Violet Adams, John P. Gass and Colin MacDuff, ‘Windows and 
mirrors: reflections of a module team teaching the arts in nurse education’, Nurse 
Education in Practice, 8. 3 (2008), 156-164.  
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approach “involves symbolic experience and appeals naturally to the 
learner’s imagination”, provoking an “emotional response from the 
reader as they identify with the characters’ joys, struggles and 
aspirations”.614 In contrast, “constructivism”, he writes, “fosters learning 
by encouraging the discovery of meanings through the use of personal 
viewpoints and validation of the learning experiences through 
intersubjectivity or the convergence of personal meanings”.615 The 
benefits aligned with these two views in terms of using literature are that 
unlike “with the largely cognitive-oriented traditional didactic teaching, 
experiential or constructivist based learning methods appeal to emotions 
and provoke thought”.616 Both this empathic appeal and the cognitive 
follow-through associated with reading about people’s experiences can 
perhaps then support compassionate and ethical care provision and 
delivery.  
Indeed, the use of various humanities subjects, particularly 
narratives, in clinical education has further been illuminated as one way 
of supporting future clinician’s ethical development, as Deborah 
Bowman suggests:  
It may be that whatever one believes one is teaching when 
delivering seminars, courses and lectures in ‘healthcare 
ethics’, the importance of emotion and the power of the 
narrative is greatly under-developed in, but a nonetheless 
essential aspect of, the business of moral reasoning.617  
 
                                                
614 Arun Chopra, ‘When art and medicine collide: using literature to teach psychiatry’, 
in Mental Health, Psychiatry and the Arts: A Teaching Handbook ed. by Victoria 
Tischler (Oxon: Radcliffe Publishing, 2010), pp. 51-62, (p. 53).  
615 ibid. p. 53.  
616 ibid. p. 53.  
617 Deborah Bowman, ‘The Ethicist’s Tale: Using the Humanities to Facilitate Learning 
in ethics’, in Healthcare in Approaches to Ethics in Higher Education: Teaching Ethics 
across the Curriculum ed. by Susan Illingworth (Leeds: Philosophical and Religious 
Studies Subject Centre for the Learning and Teaching Support Network (PRS-LTSN, 
2004), pp. 54-63, (p. 55) 
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She continues by suggesting that, if one of the primary outcomes of 
health education is to “produce practitioners who are reflective, 
empathetic and humane, professional, patient-centred, honourable and 
responsible” then “drawing on emotion and offering contrasting human 
perspectives on moral dilemmas in healthcare may be an essential part of 
ethics teaching and learning”.618 In this respect, Bowman suggests that 
the “innovative” approach of the Medical Humanities can:  
*Accentuate the power of the narrative in healthcare ethics 
(thereby reminding all that healthcare is a human science and 
engaging learners) 
*Offer multiple perspectives on a dilemma or problem  
*Capture the ‘silent’ or overlooked perspectives in ethics 
*Make emotion and psychological responses an explicit and 
integral part of what constitutes a practitioner’s ‘duty of 
care’.619 
 
A truly ethical response to people experiencing mental health challenges 
is one that must acknowledge the limitations and risks of medicinal and 
biomedically oriented psychiatry, instead offering individualised versions 
of both pathology and recovery, which are pluralistic in their approach. 
Narratives can support both reflective and empathetic capacity building 
in students and practitioners, which might further, then, prompt ethical 
reflection which seeks to open up rather than close down meaning, 
interpretation and experiences.  
Such an ethically-minded approach may resist the dominant 
obsession with quantifying human reactions into numerical formulas, 
ratings and results – in themselves antithetical to person-centred, 
individualised, compassionate and ethical practice, which may not neatly 
fit with a tick box culture. As Clarke asks and asserts: 
                                                
618 Bowman, ‘The Ethicist’s Tale’, p. 55.  
619 ibid. p. 55.  
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But why tell of mental distress through fiction? In an era of 
evidence-based practice, biotechnology and pharmacology, 
it’s unfashionable territory [….] literary narratives might 
augment psychological knowledge and, consistent with 
current service user involvement, validate the unorthodox 
against professional ownership of ideas, thus establishing a 
more democratic, reflective, psychiatry.620 
 
Reading literature can act as a buffer against the homogenising potential 
of a biomedically oriented pedagogic and clinical framework. This move 
alone – recognising the person not the ‘pathology’ – may further support 
genuinely ethical practice and future practice. 
Where I differ from some of the scholars who have contributed 
to the important discourse of the clinical use of narratives in Medical 
Humanities is that I do not necessarily believe that all the interpretative 
skills professionals and student professionals can take away from 
humanities-related study need to be tied to a particularly medical 
framework. Charon, for example, proposes some imaginative ways of 
working reflectively, creatively and with a great deal of empathy through 
narrative approaches such as writing a parallel chart to complement 
medical notes – but she does not focus on the harder to pin down issues 
around mental health and wellbeing unless they are related to direct 
reactions to physical disease and disorder.621 In this way, the issue of 
whether a disease is ‘real’ remains un-challenged – we can test and 
diagnose cancer, diabetes, coronary artery disease and so forth. We 
cannot do the same for mental illnesses and cannot demonstrate 
unequivocally that they come from the body / brain. 
What I propose instead, and have demonstrated in my analysis 
of the way psychosis is demonstrated and enacted in Acker’s work, is to 
                                                
620 Clarke, p. v.  
621 See Charon. See also Greenhalgh and Hurwitz, ‘Why study narrative?’. 
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celebrate plurality and plasticity of meaning, interpretation and belief 
around mental health and wellbeing. Anne Whitehead has noted the 
value of multiple meanings in literature and medicine, writing that 
instead of “subscribing to a dominant impulse towards meaning and 
control” readers can “also benefit from what the literary can reveal to us 
about what it means to live in a condition of uncertainty”.622 With 
Acker’s texts, this benefit might require a suspension of one’s own 
beliefs around the aetiology of psychopathology and an embracing of the 
tenuousness of explanatory models of mental illness, given that Acker 
does not offer a biomedically recognisable re-inscriptions of what 
psychosis ‘is’ or ‘looks like’. Hence, in this thesis, I have deliberately 
tried to avoid placing a solidly psychiatric, psychoanalytic, philosophic, 
linguistic or even literary model of reading onto Acker’s texts, but 
instead drawn from multiple disciplines when tentatively proposing my 
readings of the madness at work in Acker’s fictions. Clarke, similarly, 
writes that his aim in his analysis of various fictions focused on madness 
is to augment a: 
[…] reductionist evidence base with fiction that amplifies 
therapies which prize client’s narratives within reparative 
work […] to impart some stories of mental distress wherein 
patients are better understood from a literature that explicates 
the missing dimensions of the orthodox and the turgid.623  
 
What better format than the innovative fiction of Acker to appreciate 
individuality and uniqueness? Orthodox or turgid are words not 
commonly associated with her radical texts. 
 
                                                
622Anne Whitehead, ‘The medical humanities: a literary perspective’, in Victoria Bates, 
Alan Bleakley and Sam Goodman, eds., Medicine, Health and The Arts: Approaches to 
Medical Humanities (Oxon: Routledge, 2014) pp. 107-127, (p. 115).  
623 Clarke, p. 16.  
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Broader Understandings?  
A range of directly clinical approaches are emerging which may offer 
versions of the individual approaches to understanding and meaning 
making with ‘madness’ that I suggest a reading of Acker’s (and others) 
work can offer. Recovery, one of the dominant models throughout the 
UK and Europe over the past 10 years, has for example attempted to 
offer these ‘person centred’ approaches has made some progress towards 
supporting people to a more positive and individually defined future, 
rather than a biomedically envisioned symptom-controlled, medically 
defined one. As Leader says, though, there “is always a great danger in 
trying to ‘normalise’ a patient, and adapt them to what we take to be a 
common reality”, and in this sense, ‘Recovery’ may be aiming for 
something that is neither desired nor desirable for many.624  
One issue I take with Leader’s otherwise well thought through 
and positive text in fact is his denotation of people as ‘patients’, often by 
their diagnosis (‘schizophrenics’) – this view still relies on one which 
promotes and relies of different, on a binary of ‘them-us’, which I argue 
critically informed views on psychiatry have begun to, if not overthrow, 
at least to demonstrate as problematic and stigmatising. I am aware, as 
Leader suggests, that some people find labels useful and validating, 
anchoring them, acting as a “staple to pin things down” – however, I 
reject the homogenising way that labels are used when we turn from a 
person experiencing a particular set of symptoms that they feel indicates 
a particular illness towards something that indicates that a diverse group 
of people ‘are’ or ‘do’ something, seen in referring to ‘schizophrenics’ or 
                                                
624 Leader, p. 296.  
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‘psychotics’ for example.625 I also feel that labels have the potential to 
subsume a person as their diagnosis – rather than having or experiencing 
something, they are something. Finally, labels can, and do, carry their 
own socially constructed meanings – seen most clearly through the 
associations of ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘psychosis’ with ‘violence’ in the 
media.626 Recovery, at its philosophical core, promotes an individualised 
approach – policy and practice documents relevant to Recovery risk 
relying on the discourse of ‘Recovery from <insert diagnosis>’,which in 
itself is reliant on the same problematic binary approach to mental health.  
Positive visions of what the experience of madness can offer, 
rather than what it removes, are also available. Chadwick, for example, 
offers versions of ‘schizophrenia’ that celebrates differences in 
perspective and dialogues with the self and others.627 Similarly, 
Hornstein also brings into acute focus the understandability of people’s 
experiences, versions of their experiences that are often found without 
the support of medical professionals but instead through communities of 
support from people who understand because they have experienced 
similar. Shared understanding is often constructed through narratively 
informed dialogues, she notes:  
We all construct narratives of our lives, using what’s 
happened to us in the past to shape what follows. Experience 
is too chaotic and complicated, taking place on too many 
channels simultaneously, to be straightforwardly intelligible. 
[…] We are hugely dependent on the reactions of others to 
make sense of what is happening to us, especially if it’s 
sudden or dramatic.628  
 
                                                
625 Leader, p. 221.  
626 See, for example, Paul Hammersley and Terence McLaughlin, ‘Campaign for the 
Abolition of Schizophrenia Label’. See also Cross, Mediating Madness.  
627 See Chadwick.  
628 Hornstien, p. 97.  
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If the response of others is to tell people they are wrong, bad, damaged, 
broken, ill, and to medicate and isolate them, restrict their freedom, 
curtail their lives chemically and physically, then no wonder the 
epidemic of madness grows. Elements that make us human are 
pathologised; beliefs and experiences that may be normal responses to 
extreme or traumatic circumstances, that may be entirely understandable 
(rather than unreasonable) emotions or cognitions, that may be 
reasonable responses to an unreasonable external reality, as Acker may 
have phrased it, are deemed unreasonable or pathological. Hornstein 
more than amply demonstrates the empowering potential of fully or 
partially leaving the medical system and forging one’s own way towards 
their own understandings through community involvement and the 
validating power of story-telling and story-sharing.  
This is not to suggest that mental health professionals and 
clinicians do not have a significant role in working with people with 
mental health challenges – far from it. Leader, Hamkins and Hornstein, 
similarly, suggest that the role of professionals may be to support people 
to make sense of their experiences and to support them towards 
formulating them into something that is both meaningful but also offers 
hope for the future. Again, this requires a shift in thinking about who we 
deem to be ‘expert’, consideration of power and its foundational 
relationship with traditional and current practises where coercion and 
compliance are legally supported and enforced, and for increased 
humanistic appreciation of the person and their experiences.  
Relatedly, in terms of the role clinical staff have in supporting 
people with their experiences, the discourse of postpsychiatry offers a 
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version of approaches to mental health generally and to clinical practice 
directly which clearly align with the readings I have offered of Acker’s 
fiction. I want to return here to the framework that I elaborated in 
Chapter 1. Bracken and Thomas note that postpsychiatry is based on five 
areas.629 Firstly, the context of experiences is the starting point, rather 
than the adjunct, for understanding what has led a person to this point; 
secondly, the need for a “hermeneutic exploration” of the person’s own 
meaning, significance and values should be offered prior to seeking 
biological or causal explanations; thirdly, diagnosis is negotiated, if 
offered at all, by clinician and patient; fourthly, a consideration of 
temporality is vital; finally, postpsychiatry aims to face forwards towards 
“a time when we become more comfortable with dealing honestly with 
different viewpoints and different ways of framing our problems, more 
comfortable with ambivalence”.630 The plurality and individual focus of 
postpsychiatry, as I noted in Chapter 4, offers an evocative paradigm for 
care. My analysis of Acker’s work fits here within all of the 5 areas 
offered for transformation within this paradigm.  
Open Dialogue may offer a different clinical route forward that 
works in narrative and dialogic ways. This Finnish approach has recently 
begun to attract attention in the UK and shows some promising results, 
though as always further studies are required to declare it ‘successful’.631 
The core principles of Open Dialogue have much in common with 
Acker’s work. The aim is to work with people in their own homes in a 
                                                
629 Bracken and Thomas, Postpsychiatry, p. 133-134.  
630 ibid. p. 133-134.  
631Jaakko Seikkula, Jukka Aaltonen, Birgittu Alakare Kauko Haarakangas, Jyrki 
Keränen and Klaus Lehtinen, ‘Five-year experience of first-episode nonaffective 
psychosis in open-dialogue approach: Treatment principles, follow-up outcomes, and 
two case studies’, Psychotherapy Research, 16. 2 (2006), 214-228.  
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deeply humanistic manner, with their network surrounding them and with 
the aim of developing new narratives around the experiences they have. 
Crucially the person experiencing ‘psychosis’ remains at the centre of all 
meetings and guides the process, deconstructing notions of power in the 
process. The process draws on work from philosophers such as Bakhtin 
and Derrida, cohering around three interrelated principles: tolerance of 
uncertainty, dialogism and polyphony, starting with the 
acknowledgement that “there is no conception or truth or reality that can 
be known as separate from and outside of human expression”: 
The therapeutic ingredient comes from the effect of 
dialogism on a social network as new words and stories enter 
the common discourse. To accomplish this, the language 
practices of the treatment meeting have the double purpose of 
holding people long enough (tolerating of uncertainty) so that 
the inexpressible can be given voice (dialogism) with the 
help of others in the network (polyphony).632 
 
The process in this respect aims to create new narratives where people 
learn to consider and interpret their experiences in a way that makes 
sense to them. Those around them are encouraged to contribute to the re-
authoring of the person’s experiences and to formulation of their own 
stories – all voices are celebrated and included. The co-founders of the 
approach suggest, “this way of working has humanized and improved the 
care of young people in acute severe crises, such as psychosis”.633 Such a 
polyphonic approach has much in common with Acker’s fictions and 
with the readings I have elaborated in the preceding three chapters, 
noting the importance and challenge of social networks in sense-making 
and selfhood; the need for novel languages and formulations of 
                                                
632 Jaakko Seikkula and Mary E. Olsen, ‘The Open Dialogue Approach to Acute 
Psychosis: Its Poetics and Microplitics”, Family Process, 42. 3, (2003), 403-418, (p. 
410-411). .  
633 Seikkula and Olsen, p. 416.  
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experience; and the need to acknowledge all voices as equal, recognising 
power differentials. Such approaches may yet wrest the wellbeing of 
people from the grasp of pharmaceutical companies and provide more 
ethical, humane and supportive ways of working.634 
 
Closing Thoughts  
Literature that focuses on madness has the potential to teach readers 
about how it might feel to experience unusual perceptions or beliefs, to 
feel acutely frightened or suspicious, to hear or see unfamiliar things in 
an unfamiliar way, or to feel the crushing bleakness of depression or the 
heightened sense of doom associated with acute anxiety. Acker’s 
narratives go a step further, immersing the reader in an experience that 
might be analogous to the fragmentation and confusion commonly 
discussed by people who experience ‘psychosis’. As well as benefits for 
clinical education and practice, literature more widely may also provide a 
broader understanding in a social or public sense. There are two elements 
to this potential. Firstly, the areas I have explored above in terms of 
experiential knowing and empathetic development. Secondly, through 
highlighting the different approaches that people find helpful and that 
many people do not find biomedical understanding or treatment helpful – 
or at least without significant risk. Literature can demonstrate recovery 
                                                
634 For the most recent scandal in pharmaceutics related to mental health drug creation 
and manipulation of efficacy and safety data, see. Joanna Le Noury, John M. Nardo, 
David Healy, Jon Jureidini, Melissa Raven, Catalin Tufanaru and Elia Abi-Jaoude, 
‘Restoring Study 329: efficacy and harms of paroxetine and imipramine in treatment of 
major depression in adolescence’, British Medical Journal, 351 (2015), DOI: <http://dx. 
doi. org/10. 1136/bmj. h4320> [accessed 16th September 2015]. See also Peter Doshi’s 
accompanying editorial which clearly sets out the history and background to the case, 
demonstrating the lengths that pharmaceutical companies will go to to retain profits – 
Peter Doshi, ‘No correction, no retraction, no apology, no comment: paroxetine trial 
reanalysis raises questions about institutional responsibility’, British Medical Journal, 
351 (2015) <http://www.bmj.com/content/351/bmj.h4629> [accessed 16 September 
2015].  
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and strength, survival and resilience, buffering the effects of the common 
media discourse of madness that often focus on risk, fear and 
confinement.635 We know, as repeated studies have shown, that a 
biomedically oriented public-facing framework of mental health – ‘an 
illness like any other’ – paradoxically increases public stigma.636 What I 
have aimed to do in this thesis is not to merely offer a counter narrative 
to the dominant framework, or to read Acker through these counter-
narratives. Instead, I have illuminated through Acker’s complex textual 
constructions the nuanced complexities of madness as they are portrayed 
through one author’s texts.  
A range of literature could potentially have been used in this 
thesis, as noted in the Introduction. However, to my mind Acker’s work 
best exemplifies the experience of psychosis because of its complexity. 
Acker challenges our perceived ideas, arguing for deeper examination of 
the sociocultural context and phenomenology of psychosis, an 
examination that recognises the importance of gender and trauma, the 
boundaries and perils in the way that language may confine people to a 
particular binary, and the importance of recognising the individual 
meaning of experiences and attending to the experience’s content. In this 
way, her texts offer a different approach to those found in more popular 
fictions and autobiographies, and as such I have only briefly touched 
upon the idea of wider audiences here. 
Madness narratives have an established place in literary studies 
and in mental health. Hornstein recognises this and draws a parallel with 
                                                
635 There is not space to discuss this notion in more depth in this thesis, but see Simon 
Cross, Mediating Madness.  
636 M. C. Angermeyer, A. Holzinger, M. G. Carta, and G. Schomerus, ‘Biogenetic 
explanations and public acceptance of mental illness: systematic review of population 
studies’, British Journal of Psychiatry, 199, (2011), 367-372.  
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the now-established discourse of trauma studies in literature, cautioning 
against the homogenisation of individual’s stories through demarcating 
them as just another text to be analysed (in much the same way that 
psychiatric practice risks treating each person experiencing challenges to 
their mental health in a homogenising or disease-centric manner): 
In the new field of ‘trauma studies,’ the connections between 
writing, torture, abuse and violence are emphasised. Such 
work has certainly made trauma narrative more salient in our 
culture. But as critic Lee Edwards has argued, too close a 
focus on ‘the text’ can paradoxically make actual suffering 
seem less salient. If every account is equally analysable, then 
the testimony of the survivor has no special claim to 
authenticity. […] Madness narratives are similar: taking them 
simply as literary productions, as Evelyne Keitel, for 
example, does […] risks failing to focus on patients’ real 
experiences in the mental health system. For people whose 
descriptions of ‘reality’ have been systematically invalidated 
by their doctors, trauma isn’t just another trope to use in 
storytelling.637  
 
Madness may be the trope which I have focused on here through Acker’s 
fictions, but my suggestions for the clinical implications of such reading 
and interpretation are far from homogeneous or positivistic. Acker in this 
sense aligns more closely with the work of the critical and post 
psychiatric movements than any extant biomedical framework. My 
reading has much in common with a growing, but still not adopted, 
imperative in psychiatry more widely to acknowledge, as noted by 
Bracken and colleagues, the “mounting evidence that good practice in 
psychiatry primarily involves engagement with the non-technical 
dimensions of our work such as relationships, meanings and values”.638 
They continue: 
Psychiatry has thus far been guided by a technological 
paradigm that, although not ignoring these aspects of our 
                                                
637 Hornstein, p. 168.  
638 Bracken and others, p. 430.  
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work, has kept them as secondary concerns. The dominance 
of this paradigm can be seen in the importance we have 
attached to classification systems, causal models of 
understanding mental distress and the framing of psychiatric 
care as a series of discrete interventions that can be analysed 
and measured independent of context.639 
 
Fictions are not designed to be read as being one ‘thing’ or as holding 
one ‘meaning’ – the text is individual, pluralistic, offering flexibility of 
meaning but also education, learning, challenges to extant viewpoints 
and values, empathetic or alienating reactions towards people’s inner 
worlds or to their behaviour as described or depicted by others. Texts can 
support the approaches I have described here but cannot replace the real-
world concerns of people and their immediate circles – they are 
adjunctive. Texts could however be more centralised to both people and 
the professionals who support them, in terms of how clinical staff work 
and develop. The principles I have illuminated through my reading of 
Acker’s work certainly could and should be much more foundational in 
clinical theory and work, if we aspire to ethical and humane practices.  
Acker may have begun her literary career with a focus on 
deconstruction and destruction, but later texts such as Empire of the 
Senseless offer more reconstructive proposals. As I have argued, her 
writing can offer something reconstructive from seeming fragmentation, 
chaos, randomness, and incomprehensibility. This reconstruction could 
lie in what is taken away from her novels in terms of how to clinically 
approach psychosis. In this respect, my thesis offers an applied example 
of the boundary crossing and opportunities for engagement from a 
diverse range of health care practitioners evident within health 
humanities discourse. This is the first, to my knowledge, extended study 
                                                
639 Bracken and others, p. 430. 
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of how one author’s work can be read as offering relevant clinical 
insights. My reading of Acker could, and I hope will, offer a second 
reconstruction – one which offers a version of literary criticism which 
does not ‘symptom spot’ or interpret within the existing framing, but 
instead teases out the unknown and draws together the fragments to 
illuminate a way of working with a person towards building, rebuilding 
and maintaining the whole. 
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